Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-167
Tuesday
28 August 1990

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FBIS-SOV-90-167 *28 August 1990*

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U.S. Delegation Visits Chemical Arms Plant

LD2708211590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] And now we have a report for you from the south of Udmurtiya, from a facility which quite recently still bore the seal of strict secrecy.

[Unidentified correspondent] A group of U.S. specialists on chemical weapons has come to a military facility in Kambarka for work under the memorandum signed by the leaders of the foreign policy departments of our two countries in September 1989. [video shows helicopter landing with the members of the delegation, then an interview with P. Mikulak, head of the delegation]

A few days ago a Soviet delegation visited a similar facility for storing chemical weapons in the United States, so our arrival in Kambarka is a return visit. During this visit we would like to examine in practice what provisions are essential in an agreement on eliminating chemical weapons, and what could raise the level of trust between our two countries in this matter.

Since the beginning of the 1950's the Kambarka facility has been storing the toxic substance (Luizit), which is based on arsenic. As army specialists stated, there has not been a single serious accident at the facility over all the years of storage. In their view, the tanks made from special steel have a sufficient safety margin for another 25 years of faultless work, but in just 12 years, under the treaty signed, our two countries' quantities of toxic substances have to be reduced to a minimum. Our country began working on the development of technology for the destruction of the stocks of (Luizit) from the beginning of the 1970's.

The U.S. delegation was presented with materials on six such technological processes, and moreover, one of them provides for the utilization of the toxic substance, with the use of enriched arsenic, for the needs of the national economy. In the course of the two-day visit, the U.S. delegation was acquainted with the practical aspects of storing, monitoring, and inspecting the storage of chemcial weapons in the containers. As military chemists believe, they now have less secrets, but there is more work for the Supreme Soviet and Congress, which have to examine the question of ratifying the bilateral treaty.

Skepticism Voiced Over 'Unilateral Disarmament'

LD2708163590 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 27 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 27 TASS—Only a comprehensive ban on nuclear arms tests can stop a new round in arms race, Soviet Deputy Nuclear Power Industry Minister Professor Viktor Mikhailov told TASS.

He said he was worried about the discontinuation of nuclear tests in the Soviet Union, since the United States continues to modify its nuclear potential.

He said the United States is discussing a 20-year modernisation programme for objects connected with nuclear weapons development and production. The programme attaches great importance to underground tests.

Work to increase the precision of nuclear weapons and to develop less vulnerable weapons and ones that hit objects situated deep in earth continue, he said. It should be noted that these are first strike weapons and the NATO countries, unlike the Soviet Union, have not pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Mikhailov noted.

The existing, approximate parity between nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States is the basis of stability in the world, Mikhailov said. Our country's unilateral disarmament could lead to a U.S monopoly fraught with unpredictable consequences for the whole of the world community, he said.

The U.S. monopolised nuclear weapons between 1945-1949. Progressive people understood the tragedy of the situation and "there is no reason to conceal that some of them helped us, at the cost of their lives, in our titanic work to create the nuclear shield," he said.

Soviet nuclear test sites have been inactive for two and a half of the past five years, Mikhailov said. Demands to stop nuclear testing in the Soviet Union, voiced over television and radio, for Supreme Soviets' rostra, at various meetings and conferences are persuading the public to support unilateral steps in this direction, he said.

It seems that the ascent in the struggle for comprehensive nuclear disarmament has moved in recent years to the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament. Statements by professionals that our country cannot afford to become a hostage to other nuclear powers' political ambitions are muffled by people whose emotions overwhelm reason, Mikhailov said.

Within the framework of the sufficient defence doctrine, the Soviet Union stands for the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear tests, Mikhailov said. "We are not to blame that they still continue."

In 1985, the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium and in 1986 it put forward a programme to create a nuclear-free world by 2000. The calls were not heard in the United States, which conducted 26 underground nuclear blasts during the Soviet moratorium.

Mikhailov said he doubted that the Soviet Union would continue to keep its nuclear test sites silent. Only a comprehensive ban on nuclear arms tests can stop a new round in arms race, he said.

Baker To Attend Two-Plus-Four Talks in Moscow

LD2708224190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2209 GMT 27 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korolev]

[Text] Washington 28 Aug—In accordance with existing plans, U.S. State Secretary James Baker will visit the Soviet Union on 9-13 September of this year.

Official State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler announced Baker will take part in another meeting of foreign ministers of the two German states and the countries that were victors in World War II, according to the "two-plus-four" formula, which will take place in Moscow. This international mechanism is intended to settle the various international problems arising in connection with the unification of Germany.

Gremitskikh Denies Involvement in Iraqi Invasion

PM2408175590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "The Specter of the KGB in the Pages of U.S. Papers. From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] A scheduled briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was addressed by Yu. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, who said the following:

The U.S. newspapers THE WASHINGTON POST and THE NEW YORK TIMES have published articles accusing the Soviet Union of involvement in the preparations for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. These articles are clearly intended to cause a sensation. The "evidence" put together by the newspapers includes, for example, the claim that the "KGB has infiltrated all aspects of Iraqi government life, including the topmost levels." In short, the articles contain everything but real facts and common sense. In fact, and I want to stress this, there were no and are no Soviet military advisers in Iraq. There are only Soviet military experts—around 200 of them. It is perfectly clear that by virtue of their functions and their status they cannot participate in the building of the Iraqi Armed Forces, let alone in the planning of their combat use.

As far as we know, groups of experts from Western countries and Third World countries are continuing to work at Iraqi defense enterprises. As for our experts working on contract in Kuwait, they, like all other Soviet citizens, have been evacuated and are now at home.

As for the U.S. newspapers' claim about the KGB, I will say one thing: It is a totally groundless fabrication. In the current situation we regard the articles in THE WASHINGTON POST and THE NEW YORK TIMES as an attempt to cast aspersions on the broad international understanding and upset the consensus in the UN Security Council, particularly among its permanent members on the question of settling the Persian Gulf crisis.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman went on to touch on the problem of Afghan refugees:

When in late July the UN plan for the repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan came into force, it was supposed to have considerably increased the number of Afghans returning home. The refugees themselves enthusiastically welcomed the plan, as shown by the support rallies held in a number of camps. However, according to information from authoritative organs in Afghanistan, the opposition has taken active steps to prevent the repatriation of Afghan refugees. These measures are of an economic and ideological nature. Moreover, the opposition and Pakistani subunits have placed solid barriers in the way of returning refugees in the provinces of Konarha, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Qandahar. The Afghan "fundamentalists"—Hikmatyar, Khalis, and Sayyaf—have been particularly assiduous in this. The first of them, addressing a rally at the Khwaja-Ghar camp, said that "as long as the current regime remains in power in Afghanistan, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan will not allow the refugees to return to the country." Instructions from the opposition leaders have been issued in the camps: Make absolutely certain that people of draft age do not return home. These parties have also organized propaganda groups equipped with motor vehicles and loudspeakers. A propaganda group comprising eight religious figures, newly created by the mujahidin "government," is resorting to direct intimidation of the refugees: "Anyone who returns could be killed and this would not be considered a crime," they say.

The most effective means of preventing the repatriation of the Afghans remains the barriers set up by the "Islamic parties" and Pakistani militia on the return routes. Pakistani militia posts are demanding large sums of money from all returning families, which has in effect totally paralyzed repatriation in that sector.

China

Chinese Air Force MiG Violates Airspace

Forced Down in USSR

LD2708155990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1514 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Aug (TASS)—As IZVESTIYA reported today, on Saturday [25 August] an airplane of the PRC Air Force, having violated USSR airspace, was made to land in Primorskiy Kray.

According to the newspaper, after crossing the border, the plane flew deep into USSR territory. In the Vladivostok airport area the aircraft appeared at a low altitude and passed over the runway without responding to flight control. The violator then changed course and landed by means of his brake-parachute.

"The Chinese-manufactured 'MiG-19' flew at a height of 30 meters and was spotted the moment it crossed the border," said Colonel General Vladimir Litvinov, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Defense Troops in an interview with IZVESTIYA. "The plane was intercepted and the pilot was forced to land at a military airfield. The general added that he knew nothing about the purpose of the flight.

The newspaper's correspondent was told at the USSR KGB public relations center that the situation with the Chinese pilot is still unclear. But, it has been established that he made the flight for political reasons and he apparently intended to go to the United States.

Pilot Requests U.S. Asylum

AU2808154090 Paris AFP in English 1514 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, Aug 28 (AFP)—A Chinese Air Force pilot who landed his MiG-19 in the eastern Soviet city of Vladivostok plans to ask for asylum in the United States, Moscow Radio's news agency INTERFAX said Tuesday.

Lieutenant Van Baoyui, 28, asked the Soviet Foreign Ministry after he defected Saturday to "let him meet American officials whom he plans to ask for asylum", the news agency said.

It said the pilot had considered defecting since Chinese authorities crushed pro-democracy demonstrations in Peking last summer. He was also "dissatisfied with results of economic reform in China", INTERFAX said.

Northeast Asia

Shevardnadze Plans Visit to Asia-Pacific Region

Rogachev, Japanese Envoy Meet

PM2708172290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Conversations at USSR Foreign Ministry"]

[Text] On 24 August I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, received S. Edamura, Japanese ambassador to the USSR. They discussed questions connected with the forthcoming visit to Japan by USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze as well as a number of international problems, including the situation in the Persian Gulf.

Visit To Include PRC, Japan

LD2708153790 Moscow TASS in English 1514 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 27 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is scheduled to set off on an eight-day tour of the Asia-Pacific region at the end of this week, the IZVESTIYA newspaper's diplomatic correspondent reported today.

The trip has not yet been officially announced, but according to IZVESTIYA, its first leg will take Shevardnadze to the Chinese city of Harbin, after which the Soviet minister is expected to visit Pyongyang, although the North Korean authorities have not yet confirmed the fact.

After that Shevardnadze will travel to Vladivostok and Tokyo.

Visit Scheduled for 1-7 Sep

LD2708170390 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 27 TASS—It was formally announced here today that in accordance with agreements Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will make a working visit to China (1 September) and an official visit to Japan (5-7 September).

In addition, Shevardnadze will take part in the international conference "The Asia-Pacific Region: Dialogue, Peace, Cooperation" in Vladivostok between 4-7 September.

Military Preparations in Koreas Questioned

90UF0486A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Aug 90 p 3

[Commentary by M. Morozov: "Peace and the MiG"]

[Text] Recent news from the Korean peninsula has been promising. Nonetheless.... What is preventing the damping down of a most chronic regional center of tension?

The Korean nation, divided by a state border, has for more than four decades lived in a state of temporary truce. All this time piles of weapons have been mounting up on both sides of the 38th parallel.

The North's anxiety concerning the location on the southern side of a 43,000-strong American military corps, deployed at 130 bases and facilities and equipped with a considerable quantity of nuclear munitions, is understandable. The South Korean leadership looks warily at the North, maintaining that the numbers and equipment of the Korean People's Army are in excess of the limits necessary for defense. When the American military, in company with its South Korean colleagues, stages the annual Team Spirit maneuvers, a heightened state of combat readiness is introduced in the DPRK and the population practices operations for the contingency of war. And at the alarm signal, held once a month for training purposes, residents of Seoul take cover in bomb shelters, rehearsing a situation which could arise as a result of an invasion of the peninsula from the North.

The U.S. Administration has plans to sell South Korea 120 of the latest F-18A fighters worth a total of $3 billion. The need for the retro-armament of the South Korean Army—South Korea spends on defense annually $5 billion, incidentally—is explained in Washington and Seoul by the danger created for the South by the supplies to the DPRK of modern Soviet MiG-29 aircraft whose outstanding specifications are being advertised incessantly in aviation showrooms by Soviet pilots. It is not customary in our country to write about our MiG's and other arms sent to the DPRK. Information on this may be found in abundance in the foreign press. Leaving aside for a moment the financial aspect, one involuntarily wonders: Is the USSR not creating for itself yet another tricky political situation? On the one hand we are moving toward a normalization of relations with South Korea, while on the other giving the most modern weapons to Seoul's partners in the inter-Korean peace dialogue. And how do the supplies of MiG's in general fit in with our peace initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region and with the ideas expressed by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk?

"Korea is one," they say in the DPRK. And from the common sense viewpoint one has to agree, particularly if it is considered that in the event of a military confrontation there might be no second Korea.

All the more important is the agreement on the first meeting this September of the prime ministers of the two Korean states. Tribute should be paid to the flexibility of the leadership of the DPRK and South Korea, which have overcome many disagreements. At the same time, however, a connection between this event and the recent meeting of M.S. Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo may be discerned. Those who believed that the establishment of relations with South Korea could lend impetus to a solution of the Korean problem are, I believe, right.

And what is the reaction of American legislators to the course of Korean affairs? According to press agency reports, the U.S. Congress is insisting that "in view of the profound positive changes in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has appreciably reduced its forces in South Korea" and is not planning new large-scale arms shipments to this country. As yet, however, the Pentagon is prepared to reduce its forces in Korea by 2,000 men.

At the present time, practically all parties concerned are expressing their readiness to advance a peaceful settlement on the Korean peninsula. Under conditions where the "cold war" era has passed, an era of unification and cooperation should begin on the Korean peninsula, President Roh Tae Woo declared in his address to the nation on the 45th anniversary of the country's liberation from Japanese colonial rule. The position of the present South Korean president differs appreciably from the views of his predecessor and is becoming more flexible. "We are prepared and wish to take advantage of any opportunity to have done with the confrontation," Roh Tae Woo said in an interview.

As far as the DPRK is concerned, its good will has been expressed in numerous peace offers pertaining to a radical, 100,000-man reduction in troops on the peninsula included. It is interesting to turn to a recent article in the newspaper NODONG SINMUN, the organ of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee. In the paper's opinion "it is essential for the successful conduct of negotiations between the DPRK and South Korea to create a propitious atmosphere, not inflame tension and not push one side toward confrontation. The states concerned should be aware of their responsibility for the division of Korea and make their contribution to a solution of the Korean question."

One way or another there is just one conclusion: Fundamentally new approaches are needed. The strategic interest of the United States in a military presence in Korea is understandable. Clear also is our interest in the DPRK as an ally in the Far East. However, it is obvious also that the main strategy should be not only to ensure that the peace process in the region is not damaged but also to actively contribute to a settlement of the Korean problem by pursuit of a balanced policy here.

Soviet Newspapers Report on ROK Trade Efforts

Joint Ventures Considered

SK2508015090 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 21 Aug 90

[Unattributed talk introducing materials carried by Soviet publications on South Korea]

[Text] Quoting the (HENA) News Agency, the (?Sunday) edition of EKONOMIKA wrote: The South Korean Government has begun to work out programs for the development of economic and trade cooperation with the Soviet Union. Programs under study include expansion of mutual relations in trade matters, establishment of joint-venture enterprises, and assistance to South Korean companies participating in the development of natural resources in Soviet territories. In addition, the programs involve offering loans to the Soviet Union and concluding the agreement on investment protection and prevention of double taxation system.

The paper KHIRURGIYA reported on the exhibition of technological and mass consumer goods being held for the first time in the Soviet Far East. The paper said large South Korean companies are participating in this exhibition which is being held in Khabarovsk. On display is automated equipment for managerial organizations.

What attracted visitors' attention in particular was the South Korea-produced super computer, type-286E, which serves as a basic automated model for providing information on employment.

Present at the exhibition's opening ceremony were Chong Chu-yong, chairman of Hyundai Group; Kim Hong-chun, president of the Hong Chung Company; and Yemchenko, director of the Khabarovsk branch office of the Central Research Institute for Soviet Economy and Construction Management.

(KRASNAYA NAMYON), a paper published in Maritime Kray, reported the gist of an article from THE JAPAN TIMES under the title "What Made Us Move and What Is Making Us Move Is the Market." The article pointed out that South Korean businessmen can be seen in Budapest, Sofia, Prague, Belgrade, Moscow, and other East European capitals. They are the leaders of the forward South Korean business firms which played a prominent role in developing the South Korean economy and in expanding its trade in the past several years.

Some companies voluntarily changed their operating principles by following the examples of Toyota, Dupont, and other enterprises. A special section was organized to foster employee loyalty and to encourage workers to regard their companies as a home.

South Korean (?business circles) think that the new moral climate is necessary for enterprises to promote new strategies for products and marketing and to develop new products. Kim U-chung, president of the Daewoo company, admits that the work which lacks harmony in production relations will [word indistinct] between employees and leadership.

According to a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA report, the South Korean Government has announced the major goals of its technological development plans for the 1991-1995 period. One of these goals is to enhance South Korea's industrial competitive power in the international markets.

The paper said the South Korean Commerce and Industry Ministry will allocate more than two trillion won to realize this plan. This will raise the present ratio of 2.2 percent of South Korea's GNP used for the development of science and technology to 3.0 percent.

ROK-USSR Cooperation Detailed

LD2708141890 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 27 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Nadashkevich]

Text] Pyongyang August 27 TASS—The South Korean Ministry of commerce and industry has formed a group to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union in commerce and industry. The YONHAP News Agency reports from Seoul that the group will plan economic ties and contacts with Soviet partners.

Its initial plans are based on the first six documents dealing with commerce, protection of investments, prevention of double taxation, aviation, fisheries, science and technology. Seoul would like to sign such agreements with the Soviet Union.

The four subgroups of the bureau will plan the export of consumer goods and the construction of a trading center in Moscow. It was intended to sign a trade agreement and participate in projects for development and cooperation, for instance in such areas as the creation of high resolution TV.

The trade agreement is expected to be prepared for bilateral working talks at ministerial level to be held in September.

The South Korean Government envisages the possibility of selling 40 items to be subsequently supplied through joint ventures in the Soviet Union and will draw up a plan of participation in Soviet projects of the 21st century.

The agency notes that, on 8 September, the government will send to the Soviet Union a group of officials and businessmen to establish cooperation in the electronic industry and complex technology such as satellite communication and the production of high-resolution TV sets. A group to study the situation in the sphere of investments will be sent to the Soviet Union in September.

The government also intends to consider the construction of joint ventures to reprocess farm produce in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—vast areas inhabited by Soviet Koreans.

Chairman of Sakhalin Association Interviewed

SK2508013190 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 17 Aug 90

[Interview with Kim Mu-ung, chairman of the Koryo Association in Sakhalin, by station reporter Anatoliy Gulyayev—read by announcer]

[Text] Dear listeners: The Korean cultural associations' activities have attracted great interest of the Soviet mass media in many areas of our country.

[Gulyayev] Would you please explain what your association is and its relations with the Korean people living in other regions of our country?

[Kim] Our association is a federation-type organization. It (?represents) the social organizations of the region. It comprises the Korean cultural centers, the councils of Korean residents organized under the Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, the employees of enterprises and cooperative associations, and the Korean youth centers in Yuzhno Sakhalinsk. As for our relations with our compatriots in other regions of the country, our association is a member organization of the All-Union Koryo Association in the Soviet Union which had its inaugural rally in Moscow last May. Thus, our association is actively participating in the activities of the All-Union Association.

[Gulyayev] What is your association's task?

[Kim] We deal with Korean issues. In other words, we solve racial issues; the social positions of Koreans; and their culture, education, and daily life.

[Gulyayev] What is the difference between Korean issues from those of other races in the Soviet Union?

[Kim] I think there is no big difference. We are all citizens of the same country, and thus our problems are identical. There are many problems and we never turn away from them. One of our prime tasks is to enhance the social enthusiasm of Koreans and to lead them to the road of perestroyka. We will accomplish this task by arousing the national self-consciousness of Koreans. We think this is the best way to overcome moral decadence, low culture, and social passivity. Such phenomena, frankly speaking, are very often found in our daily life. We have lost many traditions: generosity, consideration for the weak and helpless, and love for one's own history. We have also lost our own culture, language, and art. Culture, language, and art dignify and enrich people. So the main purpose of our task is to recover these things.

[Gulyayev] What are the accomplishments of your association?

[Kim] Many schools in Sakhalinskaya Oblast have opened Korean language classes. The central library has opened an interpreter training course and about 120 people are presently studying there. We also help Korean song and dance troupes. Korean children choirs and dancing teams have been organized in Yuzhno Sakhalinsk. We have also contributed to founding tae kwon do and karate schools. The schools will place emphasis not only on physical discipline but also on philosophical studies. Philosophical knowledge is a must for those who are experts in oriental martial arts. We have many able instructors. However, they will further cultivate their skills in North and South Korea and also in Japan in the future. With regard to this, negotiations are currently under way. We are also developing traditional medicine. We have accepted the DPRK offer to send six doctors to us to serve in Sakhalin.

[Gulyayev] What is the status of the work of the Separated Families' Association?

[Kim] The work is being carried out mainly by the Separated Families' Association which has been organized according to the decision of the Oblast Soviet Executive Committee last year, and we help this association. Today the visits to the country of their ancestors by Koreans in Sakhalin have now become commonplace. South Korea's chartered Boeing plane flies to Yuzhno Sakhalinsk to bring back a group of Koreans and to take the next group. About 1,000 people have been to South Korea to this date. Most of them were elderly first-generation Koreans. Recently we have received a letter from the South Korean Red Cross telling us that those of the immigrants' second generation as well can visit the country of their ancestors. With regard to this, paper work is currently under way.

[Gulyayev] What you are talking about is something about visits. Has anyone gone to South Korea from Sakhalin for permanent residence?

[Kim] Several people have done that over the past year. They were lonely old folks who have found the whereabouts of their relatives in South Korea. Most of the Koreans living in Sakhalin have not expressed their desire to go to South Korea for permanent residence. They think Sakhalin is their home. However, almost all of them desire to visit the country of their ancestors at least once. I believe that their desire would be fulfilled in the near future.

DPRK Navy Ships End Visit to Vladivostok

LD2808092390 Moscow TASS in English 0835 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Vladivostok, Soviet Far East, August 28 TASS—A North Korean naval flotilla, led by Vice-Admiral Kwon Sang-ho, commander of the North Korean Eastern Fleet, has completed an official visit to Valdivostok. The flotilla left Golden RN [as received] Bay for home today.

The send-off ceremony was attended by Admiral Gennadiy Khvatov, commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet; chairman of the regional council Aleksay Volyntsev; and North Korea's military attache to the Soviet Union Major-General Kim Song-Chan.

Mongolian Council of Ministers Adopts Decisions

LD2608165590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0945 GMT 26 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Dugar Sanzhiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar 26 August (TASS)—Taking into account the forthcoming transition of the national economy to market relations, the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Council of Ministers has decided to set up an extensive network of banks.

The expansion of the banking system has been provoked by the need for financing the separate branches of the economy. The new banks will specialize in issuing credits and conducting settlements, and in offering services both to departments, enterprises, and agricultural formations as well as to individual citizens. They are also called upon to activate the foreign economic activities of the country's national economy.

For the uninterrupted provision of motorized machinery with fuel during the laying in of fodder, and during the harvesting of grain and vegetable crops, the MPR Council of Ministers made a decision limiting the issue of A-76 brand gasoline for all motor vehicles apart from ambulance service vehicles and those of other emergency services by 50 percent. This decision will be valid until the import of gasoline of the above brand is resumed.

From now on, the size of the payment for surplus buildings occupied by various departments both in the center and in the localities is being increased ten-fold in Mongolia. The decision was made by the government of the MPR with the aim of regulating the use of official buildings occupied by all sorts of offices. A harsh norm has been established for them now—six square meters for one official. This limit does not apply to departmental sports and sanitary centers, libraries, trading halls, buildings for public catering and consumer service enterprises, clubs, and other cultural establishments.

Near East & South Asia

Egyptian Deputy Premier's Visit Focuses on Gulf

Sees Shevardnadze, Gorbachev

LD2708183390 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 27 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Majid, who arrived in Moscow for consultations concerning the Gulf crisis.

During the conversation, held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, the ministers exchanged views, assessments and information about the situation in the region and the Middle East as a whole.

The views expressed by the ministers were similar in many respects. The ministers favoured a persistent search for political ways to defuse the situation. They stressed the need to prevent a further escalation of tension in the Gulf region.

Shevardnadze briefed 'Abd-al-Majid on recent contacts with representatives of Arab and Western states and the Iraqi leadership relating to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis and to the release of foreign citizens held in Iraq and Kuwait in particular.

The Egyptian minister told his Soviet counterpart about efforts made by Egypt and the Arab countries to solve the crisis and about President Hosni Mubarak's initiative.

The sides were unanimous in their belief that the crisis should be settled by political means in keeping with the U.N. Security Council's resolutions. Military confrontation may bring about dangerous, unpredictable consequences not only for the Middle East region, the ministers stressed.

They confirmed their readiness to closely cooperate in order to reach a peaceful settlement.

The ministers spoke in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 665 on measures to ensure strict observance of sanctions imposed in connection with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Shevardnadze stressed that before approving this decision, the Soviet leadership used all available opportunities to convince Iraq of the need to obey the will of the international community, expressed in the earlier adopted resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

The two ministers expressed satisfaction with the exchange of views and stressed the importance of their agreement to continue the dialogue concerning the entire range of problems connected with the Gulf situation.

Gorbachev Notes Peace Prospects

NC2708190090 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1835 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, 27 Aug (MENA)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has expressed his strong conviction that peace prospects concerning the Gulf crisis have not yet been ruled out. He said Iraq should obey international laws and comply with the will of the international community.

President Gorbachev received Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, at the Kremlin this afternoon. The two sides discussed the extremely complicated situation in the Gulf region. They also discussed Egyptian-Soviet relations.

'Abd-al-Majid Ends Visit

LD2808075290 Moscow TASS in English 0712 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 28 TASS—Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid left Moscow today upon completion of his working visit.

During his stay here, 'Abd-al-Majid met President Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. They discussed the Persian Guilf crisis and the situation in the Middle East.

The talks also focused on the fate of foreigners in Iraq. The sides stressed the need to prevent any unlawful actions towards them.

The sides expressed their "complete satisfaction" with the talks.

'Greater Dynamism' Needed

LD2808132590 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] The Egyptian foreign minister, Mr. 'Abd-al-Majid, is said to have ended a brief visit to Moscow on Monday [27 Aug] after discussing the Gulf crisis with President Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Commentary by Yuriy Solton:

The sides had largely similar views on ways of defusing the crisis, stressing the need for political methods and for avoiding a military confrontation which would have most dire implications far beyond the Middle East. Although the Soviet Union threw its weight behind the Security Council's resolution, which allows for minimum force to be used for enforcing the United Nations trade embargo on Iraq, that in itself should not be taken that the nations building up their military presence in the Gulf have a free hand for direct military action against Iraq. Nor should passions be allowed to prevail over sensible policies under the current volatile situation there.

One may well share the indignation the British prime minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, expressed in a recent speech blaming the Iraqi president for aggression, brigandage, and violence. But, her categoric pronouncement that London would have no talks with Baghdad until Iraq withdraws from Kuwait to redress the injustice done seems to be overemotional.

More importantly, any chance must be used to resolve the crisis peacefully. To this end, Moscow is engaged in active dialogue with all countries which are involved in the conflict directly or indirectly. Contacts are also sustained with Baghdad in an effort to try to persuade the Iraqi leaders not to aggravate the situation but draw relevant conclusions from the world community's solidarity laid down in Security Council resolutions.

The Soviet Union believes the Arab factor must be given a greater role to play in defusing the tension in the Gulf, which would largely define whether or not attempts at preventing an armed conflict would be successful. Unfortunately, the Arab world is divided, but the worries of those Arab leaders who do not question the West's desire to safeguard international law but doubt the unselfishness of plans for continued American presence in the region are well understood.

For his part, President Mubarak of Egypt is right, saying the indecision by the Arab world could lead to a military disaster because it could be taken by the West as an excuse for independent action excluding Arab opinion.

As the countdown quickens its pace, greater dynamism is needed for utilizing all sensible channels to bring about a peaceful solution to the Gulf conflict.

Bush Not Hopeful of Diplomatic Solution in Gulf

LD2808084790 Moscow TASS in English 0749 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Washington August 28 TASS—President George Bush said on Monday that he had no particular hope for a diplomatic settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis.

Yet he wished U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar success in his efforts to achieve such a settlement.

Iraqi President Saddam Husayn "has been so resistant to complying with international law that I don't yet see fruitful negotiations," Bush said during a joint news conference with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

The news conference was held after their talks in the president's vacation home in Kennebunkport, Maine.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the talks focused on the situation in the Gulf.

U.S. Restricts Iraqi Envoys' Movements

LD2708204390 Moscow TASS in English 1739 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Washington August 27 TASS—The U.S. State Department today introduced restrictions on the movements of Iraqi diplomats in the country, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told the Iraqi ambassador to the United States today.

According to the ASSOCIATED PRESS, the action is in retaliation for the Iraqi blockade of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. In spite of Iraqi demands that the U.S. close the embassy, U.S. diplomats remain in the building, to stress U.S. opposition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the new Kuwaiti puppet government.

Iraq Orders Ships 'Not To Provoke' U.S. Navy

LD2808113290 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Malyarov]

[Text] Cairo August 28 TASS—Iraq has ordered the captains of its merchant ships "not to provoke" U.S. warships and to let the U.S. Navy check their cargoes, reports reaching here say.

Earlier, Iraq ordered its merchant fleet to ignore all U.S. warnings and not to stop, even if the U.S. threatened to use force.

The Cairo-based MENA news agency quoted U.S. military sources as saying that, if reports on the new Iraqi order were confirmed, the risk of an armed conflict in the Persian Gulf would be reduced by 50 percent.

The Iraqi authorities continue their war against foreign embassies in Kuwait that refuse to close down despite Iraq's order. According to reports from Kuwait, water and electricity supplies to the U.S. and French embassies have been cut off.

MENA said Iraqi troops broke the wall surrounding the French embassy and destroyed the embassy's own water supply system.

The Egyptian gazette said the Iraqi authorities expelled Lebanon's ambassador, a consular and eight members of the non-diplomatic staff from Kuwait. The ten had earlier been reported to be arrested. The newspaper said the Lebanese were now on their way to Beirut.

Newspapers report that 25 French nationals, arrested several days ago in Kuwait, are still being kept in a Baghdad hotel, despite protests from the French foreign ministry.

Iraqi authorities allowed India to begin to evacuate its citizens from Kuwait by road via Iraq and Iran.

According to reports from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia's capital, French combat helicopters from the Clemenceau aircraft carrier will be deployed in areas bordering on Kuwait and Iraq for combat patrolling.

President Husni Mubarak of Egypt said the use of force against Iraq was possible and that the only way for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to avoid this was to withdraw all troops from Kuwait.

Mubarak said a withdrawal would be a very difficult step for Saddam, as he could "lose face" even among his Arab allies. The Iraqi leader has cornered himself, he added.

Mubarak urged Saddam to show realism and withdraw troops from Kuwait.

Arab leaders are making desperate efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the Gulf crisis. They held intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations throughout Monday and Monday night, contacting one another by telephone and exchanging messages.

King Husayn of Jordan held talks with Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Palestine Liberation Leader 'Arafat met Saddam Husayn.

Jordanian foreign minister Marwan al-Qasim was received by Oman's Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id and president of the United Arab Emirates Shaykh Zayid Bin-Sultan al Nuhayyan. Al-Qasim handed them messages from the Jordanian king.

Mubarak talked on the telephone with al-Qadhdhafi and U.S. President George Bush.

Yemen's President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih spoke by telephone with Sudanese leader 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Basir, who had visited Baghdad on Sunday.

UN Secretary General To Hold Talks With Saddam

PM2708185690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 4

[News Roundup by Yu. Gatselyuk under the rubric: "Persian Gulf": "No War, But No Peace Either"]

[Excerpts] In connection with the Persian Gulf crisis, as the last roundup of events noted, world fears that military conflict is about to break out in the region had increased somewhat by Monday, according to our REUTER colleagues. However, there was an increased awareness that the forces confronting each other in the crisis are not expecting a speedy solution to their mutual grievances.

As you know, hot on the heels of Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, who, after his meeting with the Iraqi leader, called on Western countries to enter into talks with him, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar also announced his intention to meet with Saddam Husayn. And Perez de Cuellar stated that in his opinion, in the event that this initiative fails, war in the Persian Gulf seems to him to be inevitable. The date of the meeting is now known in principle. The UN secretary general is to have talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz 30 August. Obviously a rendezvous with Saddam Husayn in Baghdad will follow this.

The world's reaction to the announcement of the initiative proposed by Perez de Cuellar was mixed.

Washington's reaction, for instance, was rather cool. The U.S. President's national security adviser, Scowcroft, told an ABC television correspondent that he still sees the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the crisis. But in his opinion this will depend on Saddam Husayn's readiness to meet the demands of the world community for the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait. Britain expressed its position more clearly. Margaret Thatcher said that in her view the resolution of the crisis by peaceful means is unlikely. She said in a BBC interview: "There can be no talks with a man who has occupied

another country by force unless he fully withdraws his troops. This man is a despot and a tyrant; he must be stopped." [passage omitted]

Three European countries—Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden—sent a joint message to the Iraqi Government 26 August containing an appeal for the release of all Baghdad's foreign hostages who are currently on Iraqi and Kuwaiti territory. In this connection it is apposite to recall the U.S. position, which was expressed in a statement by presidential national security adviser Scowcroft, who stressed that however much the fate of the American citizens held by Saddam Husayn may worry the U.S. Administration, the U.S. concern will not make it abandon the strategy formulated by President Bush.

Iraq, naturally, cannot totally ignore the ever increasing indignation of the world public about its policy on the foreign hostages. From time to time it releases small groups of foreigners, allowing them to leave Kuwait and Iraq. For instance, according to the latest reports, 55 American citizens—members of diplomats' families—were allowed to go to Turkey via Baghdad. [passage omitted]

Diplomatic activity in connection with the quest for a way out of the "Persian impasse" continues unabated. According to REUTER, Sudanese leader 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir has set off from Jordan for Baghdad for talks on the Gulf crisis. The Syrian and Egyptian leaders had their latest meeting on Sunday. King Husayn of Jordan is continuing his tour of a number of North African countries, and also intends to visit the FRG and Britain. On Monday a meeting is to take place between George Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas has just been to Moscow, and a visit here by Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid has begun. The same question is the focal point for all these visits and meetings—how to resolve as quickly and effectively as possible the crisis that broke out three weeks ago, how to avoid a military denouement. It is reported from Cairo that 10 countries have already confirmed their readiness to respond to Egypt's initiative on holding an emergency meeting of the Arab League on this question 30 August.

Will Baghdad realize that it must respond to [poyti navstrechu] the demands of the international community; will it agree to fulfill them?

For the time being, because of its actions, the region does not have the peace it needs.

UN Envoy Recommends Force Only as 'Last Resort'

LD2508123890 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 25 Aug 90

[Text] New York August 25 TASS—The U.N. Security Council resolution permitting use of force to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq is "historic," U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Pickering said. He called for an early political solution to the Gulf crisis on the basis of previous Security Council resolutions.

However, a political settlement is impossible without the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, he said.

Yemen and Cuba said the resolution does not clearly specify the role of the Security Council in monitoring compliance with the resolution. In addition, the decision was taken too hastily and the U.N. secretary-general has not yet prepared a report on the implementation of the Security Council resolution imposing sanctions against Iraq, they said.

A Colombian representative, although supporting the resolution, pointed to some drawbacks in the text. The Security Council has in fact ordered the imposition of a naval blockade of Iraq, he said.

The resolution does not give carte blanc for uncontrollable use of force, the French ambassador said. Minimum force can only be used as a measure of last resort to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq, he stressed.

The Soviet Union continues urging the Iraqi leadership to radically change its policy, acting Soviet Ambassador Valentin Lozinsky said.

"Unfortunately our hopes have not been justified. Iraq has failed to withdraw its troops from Kuwait and continues to take steps that can only be characterised as illegal and provocative," he said.

"We urge Iraq to study carefully the mood in the world following its actions and not to attempt anything that can be regarded as a challenge to the international community and the Security Council decisions," he said.

"This approach alone will help prevent an escalation of the crisis and make it possible to seek a settlement. We emphasise the need to continue the dialogue and the search for a political settlement within the framework of the United Nations, on a regional and bilateral basis," he said.

Today's resolution aims to expand control over compliance with the sanctions. However, measures taken to enforce it should depend on concrete circumstances. Full use should be made of political and diplomatic methods. It is also important that the Security Council should continue considering this burning issue permanently, Lozinsky said.

The speed of developments show how important it is to show prudence and reserve in such circumstances and not to rely on force and actions that can only cause a conflagration, he said.

The crisis requires all those involved in the stand-off to respect the will of the international community and demonstrate concern for the future of the world, the Soviet ambassador said.

Representatives of Britain, Canada, Ethiopia, Zaire, Romania and other countries denounced Iraq for openly disregarding previous Security Council resolutions.

The Chinese ambassador stressed that his country in principle opposes the participation of superpowers in military actions to settle the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and use of force.

This prompted China to suggest removing words "on minimum use of force" from the previous draft. Emphasis should be put on a political settlement, he said.

The Kuwaiti representative thanked members of the Security Council for their efforts to make Iraq stop the aggression.

"We tried to seek an Arab solution to the conflict, but the Iraqi president rejected all proposals for a settlement," the Kuwaiti representative said, hoping that the new resolution will have a sobering effect on Baghdad.

The Iraqi representative took the floor to criticise the resolution and U.S. actions in the region. He said the resolution was "illegal," "hasty" and "invalid." The document does not give the right to use force, he said. The resolution is very dangerous because it failed to provide the Security Council with real power to control states that have deployed naval forces in the Gulf, he said.

However, he did not mention whether Iraq intended to comply with previous Security Council decisions.

Commentary Says Arab Extremists Hurt by Saddam

TA2708192390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] Israel is not under any circumstances interested in being dragged into the Persian Gulf crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir announced. From his remarks it seems that Israel's strategic interest is to reach a political settlement with the Arab states, and that the main obstacle to that is in the extremist position of several Arab regimes, first and foremost that of Iraq. This is what our commentator Dmitriy Prokofyev has to say on this:

I do not have anything in principle against the Israeli prime minister's remarks. I welcome the first part of his remarks and I agree with the second half. Still, I believe that Mr. Shamir concluded his remarks too early. What do I mean? His position, as he expressed it, leads to pessimistic conclusions. Even if Israel manages not to be dragged into the Persian Gulf crisis—although the Saddam Husayn regime will, of course, try to convert his conflict with the international community into part of the Israeli-Arab crisis—we can assume that there is a chance for a dialogue between Israel and Syria, between Israel and Libya, and even between Israel and Iran. At the present stage, nobody can, of course, give assurances about that. Moreover, as long as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait continues there is no chance that any progress toward a settlement between Israel and the Arabs is possible, even with the countries which unequivocally sided with the opposition to the Iraqi aggression, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Arab world does not want to give Saddam Husayn presents since, for instance, if Syria begins negotiations with Israel, it will immediately be accused by Saddam of deserting Arab interests and of complicity with the Zionist enemy.

But let us proceed. What is interesting is what will happen after the center of tension in the Persian Gulf is removed. Preparations should already be made for the new situation, because if Saddam retreats or is removed it is already clear that the international community will in one way or the other, with or without violence, end the occupation of Kuwait. It will be a heavy blow to Arab extremism, not only to the extremist Iraqi regime, but to the forces which supported it, first and foremost the PLO. It is doubtful that the retreat of the extremists will permit the moderate Arab regimes to enter direct negotiations with Israel. The main obstacles are internal Arab disputes. Egypt could overcome these disputes, or more precisely disregard them, but Egypt is the leading country in the Arab world. I do not think that Syria would be able to disregard the Arab element, and this is even more true of Jordan. There is, however, a growing chance for solving problems within international frameworks. What the Arab regimes would not dare to do on their own initiative and without international backing they can do under U.S.-USSR auspices. We hope that they will learn the lesson of Iraq, which is that extremism and attempts to solve problems through military means do not pay. It is well known that there were deep fears in Jerusalem over an international framework for a settlement, but I believe that the coordinated positions of the United States and the USSR on Iraq should, to a certain extent, dispel these concerns, because in the final analysis all the Israeli reservations were over a unilateral Soviet position which encouraged the Arabs to take a hardline position. This might have been true in the past, but the situation has now changed. The Soviet Middle East policy has changed values; it has become more moderate. It is reasonable to assume that after removing the Iraqi danger the question of renewing full diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel will also appear on the agenda. When that happens, Jerusalem will not have an excuse to oppose an international settlement of the Middle East conflict and preparations could start to convene an international forum.

First Group of Evacuees Arrives From Iraq

LD2808075890 Moscow TASS in English 0722 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow August 28 TASS—The first group of Soviet evacuees arrived in Moscow on an Aeroflot

charter flight from Baghdad this morning. The 240 evacuees are mostly women and children.

A second group of Soviet citizens is expected to return home from Iraq on Wednesday [29 Aug] morning, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official told TASS.

Reports Continue on 20 Aug Hijacking to Karachi

Pakistan Investigates

LD2608093890 Moscow TASS in English 0933 GMT 26 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladislav Legantsov]

[Text] Islamabad August 26 TASS—The Pakistani authorities are investigating the hijacking of a Soviet Tupolev-154 airliner from Tashkent to Karachi on August 20, a Foreign Ministry official told the ASSOCIATED PRESS of Pakistan.

He said a final decision on the hijackers' fate would be taken after the investigation was over.

The official said it had not been decided yet whether the hijackers would face trial in Pakistan or would be extradited to the Soviet Union.

Hijacking carries a death penalty or life imprisonment in Pakistan. The hijackers' property may also be confiscated.

Undecided on Deportation

LD2708082190 Moscow TASS in English 0815 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] London August 27 TASS—Pakistan is still undecided whether to try or deport 11 Soviet convicts who hijacked an Aeroflot Tupelov-154 airliner to Karachi, the REUTER news agency said, quoting Pakistani officials.

"It has as yet not been decided whether the hijackers will be tried here as per specific rules or handed over to the Soviet authorities," a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman said, as quoted by REUTER.

The news agency said Pakistani intelligence detectives had joined police in interrogating the hijackers.

If tried in Pakistan, the hijackers, who surrendered at Karachi airport last Monday, can be punished with death or 25 years in jail.

Foreign Ministry Comments

LD2708064890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0640 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Aleksandrov]

[Text] Moscow 27 Aug (TASS)—"The appeal by the Soviet Union to the Pakistani Government on the extradition of the criminals who hijacked an Aeroflot Tu-154 aeroplane to Karachi on 20 August has been received amicably in Islamabad. The Pakistani Government harbors no doubt that the act of air piracy was carried out by criminals and that they must bear the deserved punishment," a representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated to a TASS correspondent on the telephone today. It is expected that this matter will be resolved at government level in accordance with the procedure existing in Pakistan. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative expressed the hope that Islamabad's response will be favorable for the Soviet side.

Najibullah News Conference on Afghan Situation

PM2708190490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by V. Shurygin: "We Have the Initiative. Afghan President Najibullah's News Conference"]

[Text] When will the war in Afghanistan end? What is your view of the crisis in the Persian Gulf? What do you think about the idea of simultaneously halting U.S. and Soviet military deliveries to the warring Afghan sides?—these were just some of the questions the Afghan president answered.

In a brief statement he reported on the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, and other Soviet leaders, stressing that the talks with them had been characterized by mutual understanding on all the questions under discussion.

The Afghan Government, the president went on to say, is well aware of the grief and pain of Soviet fathers and mothers whose sons and daughters were killed, maimed, or taken prisoner while Soviet troops were in Afghanistan. While expressing my deepest sympathy, I promise that we are making every effort to bring about the release of Soviet servicemen in the opposition's hands.

How can a path to peace be found in Afghanistan? Answering this question, the president noted that a solution can only be found via a political settlement that could involve a number of stages. We agree, he said, that there should be a transitional period, which would begin with an intra-Afghan dialogue and would continue until a new government is formed. As a result of negotiations a joint commission would be created, comprising representatives of all the political forces advocating a peace settlement. Its task would be to provide conditions for the holding of elections and also to adopt measures contributing to this—distributing aid through UN channels, assisting the return of refugees, and so on. Armed detachments of the Afghan Army and opposition could be transferred to it to safeguard security. All the commission's decisions must be adoopted unanimously. The commission will work on the preparation of a new law on elections and the new text of the constitution which the Loya Jirga (National Assembly) will be convened to approve. The old state structures in Afghanistan will remain until a new government, elected by parliament, is formed.

Describing the situation in the country, the Afghan president noted that this year the political and military initiative is with the government.

Asked about simultaneously halting Soviet and U.S. military supplies to the opposing sides, Najibullah replied that the matter would have to be resolved on a comprehensive basis, bearing in mind that these countries are not the sole suppliers of weapons.

There have been some changes in Western countries' positions on the Afghan question, the president said in reply to a correspondent's question; in particular, France and Italy have reopened their embassies in Kabul and the U.S. press has changed its tone, with articles saying that the military way of solving the Afghan problem will not lead to success. We hope that realism will prevail in the United States.

The Persian Gulf crisis is causing the government and people of Afghanistan great concern, Najibullah said. It could lead to a split in the Arab world, which certain forces would exploit for selfish interests. I believe that all crises in the world must be tackled by political means, by means of dialogue, rather than by military means. Therefore, we are against any buildup of a military presence in the region by any side.

Gorbachev Sends Message to Greek Cypriot Leader

NC2308211290 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 20 Aug 90 p 3

[Text] Lefkosa [Nicosia], (A.A.)—USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev is reported to have sent a message to Yeoryios Vasiliou, leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, a short while ago. His message reportedly said: "It is necessary not to lose control over chauvinism."

Gorbachev's message is as follows:

"Disputes between national communities can be resolved through patient dialogue. Mutual confidence-inspiring measures should be taken between the two communities in Cyprus with a view to creating conditions which will contribute toward settling the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, an effort should be made to achieve a settlement that will be acceptable to those concerned and which will safeguard the interests of both sides with understanding and in a balanced way."

Meanwhile, Yuriy Fokin, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs European Department, has said that the Soviet Union supports the UN secretary general's initiatives on Cyprus and the effort he is making toward achieving a lasting solution to the island's problem.

Israeli Goodwill Mission Visits Belorussian City

LD2708185390 Moscow TASS in English 1815 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Minsk August 27 TASS—A representative health service delegation of the Israeli National Labour Federation has visited the Belorussian city of Gomel.

The delegation, including specialists in radiation medicine, familiarised themselves with Soviet methods of treatment of Chernobyl victims. They visited a children's hospital, a tuberculosis health center and the clinic of the radiation medicine institute in Minsk.

Physicians of the two countries have elaborated a long-term cooperation agreement, which was signed during the visit.

They are planning to exchange information, specialists and scientific developments. They have also discussed setting up joint laboratories, holding seminars and training personnel.

New Soviet Ambassador to Yemen Appointed

LD2808091290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0625 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Excerpts] Moscow Aug 28 (TASS)—Veniamin Popov has been appointed USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Yemen. Albert Rachkov has been released from his duties as USSR ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (as South Yemen was officially called before unification with North Yemen and the formation of the Republic of Yemen) in connection with his transfer to other works. Veniamin Popov is a Russian, born in 1942. [passage omitted] Between 1987-1990 he was USSR ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Soviet-American Cooperation in Africa Viewed

MB2408143090 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 22 Aug 90

[Commentary in series: "Answers from a Radio Moscow Obsever" by (Ivan Lenov) of USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Africa Studies]

[Text] Many of our listeners are interested in whether the improvement in the relations between the USSR and the United States will be of any benefit to Africa. The following is what Ivan Lenov of the Academy of Sciences, Institute of African Studies, writes about us. The material is translated by June Goss.

It is well known the United States and the USSR were long-time rivals, including in African countries, and were trying to attract them into one or the other global stream. It is difficult to be 100 percent positive, but no doubt, the scale of many of the African regional conflicts, and crises, would have been far less if there had not been

the interference on the part of the super-power nations, and the massive supply of arms to the conflicting sides.

At last the Soviet Union and the United States are beginning the careful search for the way to interact, and resolve, one of the key problems facing the world, the African crisis. The project, Soviet-American Cooperation for Africa, is devoted to this end. It was worked out jointly by specialists from the Soviet Institute of African Studies, the California University's African Research Center, and the Center of International and Strategic Research of that university, and the University of Southern California's School of International Relations.

The dialogue between Soviet and American experts on Africa began a few years ago, and brought about publication of the book, A PROGRAM OF ACTION, AFRO-SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION. Not long ago, it was released in Washington. More than 40 leading specialists on Africa from the Soviet Union and the United States wrote chapters for the book. African experts also took part in that research. For example, Mr. Adebayo Adedeji, secretary of the United Nations Economic Commision for Africa, Professor (Abolobo) of (Obafela University) in Nigeria, Professor (Oya Ogimbaleja) from the Cambridge International Research Center, and the former Nigerian foreign minister, Mr. (Bolaje Akinam) (name and title as received), and others.

The authors of the project have outlined a number of programs in the economic sphere for the development of African agriculture, and communications. They are examining the possibility of interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States in preventing conflicts and critical situations, and in strengthening efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Africa. They also proposed measures to be taken in the field of health care, in the first place to help in the struggle to reduce the child mortality rate. Every minute 30 children die from hunger, or disease in Africa. One interesting idea is the setting up of a group of Soviet and American volunteers to work together in Africa as part of the American Peace Corps.

By the way, experience in working together was tried out at the time of the disastrous earthquake in Soviet Armenia. Here the volunteers from both countries took part in the reconstruction of damaged buildings. They could work together in the same way in Africa during natural disasters. I firmly believe the project will be mutually beneficial to all the participants, especially for the people of Africa.

In the near future a Soviet-American group will be leaving to go to work together in Ethiopia. At the same time, a team of Soviet and American experts is working on a new book. It is to be published in Russian and English, and the title is: THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR IN THE SHADE OF BAOBAB TREES— SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION FOR AFRICA. Positive steps for this cooperation will be outlined in the book.

So, the evil empire, and the savage teeth of imperialism are becoming a thing of the past. I feel that all mankind will benefit from the ideological conversion, and this of course includes Africa.

Mozambique's New Draft Constitution Examined

MB2608131090 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 25 Aug 90

[Yelena Olgina commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Discussion around the draft constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique is being wound up. The constitution is due to be passed at the coming session of the National Assembly. Yelena Olgina has this comment, which was translated by June Goss:

[Olgina] Up to now, the Basic Law the republic adopted in 1977 is still active. The law strengthened the leading role of Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] in the life of the country, the government's ownership of the means of production, and the collective use of land under a socialist perspective. Actually, the socialist orientation proclaimed at that time proposed new economic, and political ties.

After five centuries of Mozambique being linked with West Europe and South Africa, it was proposed to break these contacts and join the market of the socialist countries. The social and economic structure left over from colonialism was dismantled very quickly, but to build socialism in its place was an empty undertaking. It did not bring the expected results, and there was a reorientation toward the socialist countries.

Practical military aid from the socialist countries helped to use the military means as a way of settling the conflict with Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. The Mozambican leadership worked out measures for overcoming the economic crisis, beginning with the search for ways on making contact with the representatives of Renamo. But for all that, it seems that this was not within the framework of the political system strengthened by the 1977 Constitution. Naturally, the question hangs about changing it.

The draft was discussed nationally, and it was surprisingly active, especially taking into account the military situation in the country. Of course, the Mozambique leadership was reproached, criticized, and demands were made to remove from the ranks of the Frelimo Party all those members who had compromised themselves.

What will the principles of the new Mozambican constitution be? In the first place, equality for all the various sectors of the economy, land to be given to the Mozambican farmers, equal rights to the various political organizations. In this way the political conditions will be created for those economic reforms so far unsuccessful in the republic. Of course, even with the adoption of the constitution, all the difficulties will not be immediately overcome. But the Mozambican people will know the

guarantees have been established for the widening of business initiatives, and various political trains of thought will become the norm of Mozambique's political life. Not to copy others, but to take its own path—this is the prospect which will be strengthened by the Mozambique new constitution.

Kenyan Minister's Resignation Explained

EA2208110090 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 21 Aug 90

[Text] Kenya's Minister for Labor Peter Okondo has resigned. It is believed that his resignation was prompted by the death of Bishop Alexander Muge. The bishop had said that the minister had threatened him with death. Six days following the threat, the bishop died in a road accident. Bishop Muge was a known critic of the present government, which he accused of corruption. Government opponents have also recalled the death last February of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko, whose murderers have not yet been found. Robert Ouko had also called for an inquiry into corruption in the government.

East Europe

Warsaw Invasion of CSFR Recalled on Anniversary

Yelena Bonner Comments

LD2608050990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0118 GMT 26 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Shamshin]

[Text] Prague, 26 Aug (TASS)—"The most interesting thing for me was the attitude of Czechs toward the past, toward 1968. Despite very sad memories about those 20 years I never felt aggressiveness in anyone; not only when I was meeting high level people, but with normal, ordinary people. I think this is the most important thing," Yelena Bonner told a TASS correspondent on the final day of a six-day visit to Czechoslovakia.

At the invitation of Aleksandr Dubcek, chairman of the CSFR Federal Assembly, Yelena Bonner visited Czechoslovakia 19-25 August. She was taking part in events marking the 22d anniversary of the introduction of Warsaw Treaty troops into this country.

Among a group of Soviet human rights campaigners who on 25 August 1968 protested in Moscow's Red Square against intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country, Yelena Bonner met the Czechoslovak President V. Havel. She was made an honorary citizen of Prague.

Responding to a question regarding the intensifying separatist trends in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the widow of Academician Sakharov commented that "this is a stage that really must be gone through by all peoples." She stressed the primary importance of observing the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of every people in a multi-national state. "Economic interdependence exists and will exist. It determines political relations, but until peoples are given to understand that they themselves choose their destiny there will be a war: a war of nerves, a political war, and what we already have, a war of bloodshed."

Speaking of the prospects for Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, Yelena Bonner particularly singled out the idea that the Soviet Union must build economic relations with Czechoslovakia on the same principles as before. "The trading standoff that is now emerging with Czechoslovakia is impermissible. We have to continue to actively assist the East European countries. We will not enter a 'common European home' separately from these states."

At the end of the conversation, Yelena Bonner announced: "I am now working on the sociopolitical and literary heritage of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. I regard this as my main task. Much travel is involved in preparing the international Sakharov memorial congress, which will be held next year in Moscow. Sponsors are neded, specific organizational matters must be resolved. The congress opens in May on the 70th birthday of Academician Sakharov. This will be an informal event. We would like the congress to produce various recommendations both for the public and the leaders of countries whose problems we will be considering. An agenda has already been elaborated and two expert groups on two topics of the congress have been set up.

'Prague Spring' Leader Reflects

90UF0490A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Oldrih Cernik, a leader of the "Prague Spring" and former prime minister of Czechoslovakia, by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kornilov in Prague; date not given: "Boomerang of the 'Prague Spring'"]

[Text] [Kornilov] What, briefly, is your assessment of the suppression of the "Prague Spring" as a result of the allied forces' invasion of 21 August 1968?

[Cernik] In my article in IZVESTIYA last year (No. 340, 1989—L.K.) I dwelt in detail on this, on the utter illegality and amorality of the invasion. I would now like to stress the following. The role of this shocking aggression will continue to be evaluated by historians. The possibility of embarkation on a new democratic path of the development of socialism was catastrophically let slip—in Czechoslovakia, in other countries, in the Soviet Union itself. The processes of the restructuring and renewal of the system were postponed for many years and are to a large extent tragically late. If today so-called "real socialism" is suffering defeat, the roots of this lie in August 1968. There also to a certain extent lie both the reasons for the disintegration of the communist movement internationally and the disbelief in our fathers' former ideals. We are continuing to perceive all these results today also. And, you know, many of today's

difficulties in your country are also an echo, a real and cruel boomerang of the suppression of the "Prague Spring." I wonder whether IZVESTIYA's readers would agree with this assessment?

[Kornilov] Millions of participants in the "gentle revolution" on the streets of Czechoslovak cities and villages demonstrated last November not only a desire for change but also an unwillingness to tie their future to a totalitarian system, to the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. At the time of the "Prague Spring," on the other hand, the people's masses supported the CPCZ. How do you assess these two facts?

[Cernik] The "Prague Spring" was a very broad movement of the people's masses against the Stalinist and, subsequently, neo-Stalinist understanding of power in the so-called countries of people's democracy of East Europe. The reformist wing of the CPCZ headed this historic movement. The people and the party were in this case truly united. It was for this reason that the CPCZ enjoyed practically universal support. This was an entirely unique historic moment in the past four decades. The history of the CPCZ had not known support of such a scale either up to that time or, even less, in subsequent years. The intervention by the five Warsaw Pact countries by military means liquidated the attempts of the Czechs and Slovaks to reform socialism. You are well-acquainted with this expression: "Socialism with a human face." It was greatly disliked by Brezhnev. In a corridor of the Kremlin he was continually trying to find out from Alexander Dubcek: "What kind of human face is this? What kind, in your opinion, do we have?" In order not to irritate him, Dubcek told him that it was merely a name and that the people liked it.

But whereas at the time of the "Prague Spring" the CPCZ called on the people for support and evoked their enthusiasm, subsequently, in the process of "normalization," it accused this people of counterrevolution. Clearly, not only the authority of the CPCZ but also simply trust in it were forfeited. And now this will be the position for a long time to come. It is expected of this party now that it not only in words but also in practice part completely with its past, up to and including, it seems to me, a change of name. Only by having convinced the citizens in practice of its sincerity and honest intention of working in the interests of all may the Czech and Slovak Communist Party restore the population's trust and begin to play a worthy part within the framework of the Czechoslovak left wing, the "left," which, I believe, will necessarily emerge.

But how was the "leading role" of the CPCZ understood and implemented in reality? A constructive opposition in a socialist society, if it wishes to progress, is essential. Any movement is born of contradictions, and a political party should take advantage of this craving ensuing from contradictory interests and foster the opposition. If this was done by kings even, why should communists not do the same? The CPCZ, however, saw the opposition as a mortal danger and for this reason suppressed and persecuted it, pretending that it did not exist on any pronounced scale. This party was absolutely unable to listen to others and learn. Like the communist movement in the world generally, it became stuck in lifeless dogmatic ideas and thereby predetermined its fate.

[Kornilov] What do you think, could the "Prague Spring" ultimately have led the country toward true socialism, could it have culminated in total success and served as a political and social model of this system?

[Cernik] Undoubtedly. I am convinced of this even today. And the decisive guarantee of success was, as I have said, the real unity of the people, the party, and the state.

[Kornilov] But does it not seem to you that you are considering only Czechoslovakia's internal development? Different sentiments reigned in the leadership of the Soviet Union, and the imperial-administrative system could hardly have left democratic development in Czechoslovakia untouched....

[Cernik] That is, without tanks, without intervention? Alas, this is the bitter truth. Yes, Czechoslovakia itself could have successfully accomplished the reforms of the "Prague Spring." But the entire Brezhnev-Stalinist system rose up in arms against this. And this also was a historical normality, most likely.

[Kornilov] What do you personally remember about the conduct of the Soviet leaders when they tried to "persuade" the Czechoslovak leaders in 1968?

[Cernik] Here is an example, seemingly, of a personal attribute. Twice Brezhnev himself all but intervened in my fate. The first time he threatened: "Watch out, if you behave like this, you will be gone as premier!" On the other occasion, on the contrary, he promised to do me a favor: "Listen, would you not care to be first secretary of the Central Committee?" It is astounding that both threats and kindness were in him mixed in a single dough: He never even doubted that it was his "paternal" right to remove foreign premiers, appoint leaders of foreign parties....

[Kornilov] You participated in the realization of many economic reforms, being leader of the local council, chairman of the State Planning Committee, head of the government.... What can you say about the present reform in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, what awaits it?

[Cernik] The previous reforms could not have been a success, they were hampered by the political system, which had a particularly distorted understanding of the party's "leading role" in society. The Czechoslovak economy was an integral part of CEMA, where market relations did not operate virtually. Now the situation is entirely different. A pluralist political system is coming into being in our country. No one party here can any longer entangle the development of the economy in the

tentacles of its programs, program guidelines, and directives. CEMA is in fact disintegrating. And all its members are in one way or another endeavoring to switch to the market. At the present time the conditions are conducive to economic reforms. And for this reason I have faith in their success. The biggest danger is that people could lose their desire to support the government in its difficult efforts. But no one from overseas, even if he has the fattest wallet, will implement reforms in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for us.

[Kornilov] Your attitude toward the market?

[Cernik] The market economy is not the ideal thing, perhaps, but no one has yet come up with anything better.

[Kornilov] Your attitude toward privatization?

[Cernik] It is essential, otherwise the reform will remain on paper only.

[Kornilov] You are a friend of Dubcek. When our second "illegal" meeting was held last July at Professor Miroslav Dubcek's apartment in Prague, you came together with the former first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee. Do you meet now, since the "gentle revolution?"

[Cernik] Of course.

[Kornilov] Often?

[Cernik] Yes. Incidentally, the "disgraced" Mirek Dubcek, our well-known financial expert and graduate student of your professor, A. Birman, is now, as you know, general director of the Investment Bank. And what about the fifth participant in our meeting at that time, Josef Kuderik, your classmate at Moscow University?

[Kornilov] He also is "Mr. Director" and heads the Prague "Lifty" Enterprise, the same which he joined as an ordinary electrician after he had been expelled from the party in 1969 and deprived of his lecturer's post at the higher educational institution. But asking the questions is, for all that, more the journalist's job. And this is the next one: What were you, a former prime minister, doing all these long 20 years of the Husak-Jakes regime? Were you in some way associated with Charter 77?

[Cernik] I was expelled from the party by decision of the then CPCZ Central Committee Presidium in 1970. And from that time until 30 March 1989 I worked in a design organization in Prague and was responsible there for a sector of the economy. I myself did not sign the Charter, but I shared its program and was in contact with certain members of the government of the times of the "Prague Spring" who were in at the birth of Charter 77.

[Kornilov] And now you are chairman of the Union of Cities and Communities, a public organization of which there is no counterpart in our country. A few words about it, please.

[Cernik] Our union was founded on 16 January of this year. Its aims and tasks are the self-government of people according to their place of residence, protection of the interests of the "localities" against the superior encroachments of the central state authorities, and, consequently, struggle for a change in the constitution, for the rights of the cities and communities, and for the recognition and establishment of municipal ownership. The union's motto is "A Free City—Basis of a Free State." After all, the self-government of a locality means in practice the level of democracy in the country.

[Kornilov] How do you and the union you head view the municipal elections scheduled for November?

[Cernik] These elections will be held under conditions entirely different from before. The national committees, which have hitherto functioned as local organs of state power and administration, will cease to exist. The Union of Cities and Communities is not a political organization and is not for this reason presenting its own list of candidates for the elections. But we will struggle to ensure that the new organs of self-government in the cities and other localities be in the hands of the best, most capable, and honest people.

[Kornilov] With whom or with what do you link your political hopes?

[Cernik] I myself am not a member of any party. But my affections are with the modern democratic socialist "left," the forces of the left are today, after all, operating successfully in the majority of developed West European countries. I am convinced that the "left" will in the future occupy a firm place in our country. And the parties of the left will play a particularly significant part in the coming united Europe, in this common home of ours.

I cast my vote at the last parliamentary elections for the candidates in whom I have faith, who stood firm at a difficult period in our history, and who serve as surety that we will not again depart from the democratic path. I will do the same at the upcoming municipal elections.

[Kornilov] What, in your view, might serve as a guarantee that the "August 1968 syndrome" (I refer not only to tanks but also the vestiges in people's consciousness and amorality in policy) will never be repeated?

[Cernik] Sovereignty is not a phrase. For this reason Gorbachev's tremendous contribution is that he has not only proclaimed but is also implementing a policy of equal respect for peoples both great and small. States' absolute equality and observance of it in practice in all things, up to and including trifling matters—this is what leads to peoples' normal relations and true friendship. For a superpower to recognize this is not that easy. But the Soviet Union is doing so. It is ultimately thus that the magnanimity of a great people should be manifested also.

Soviets Seek Break With Past

90UF0488A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Yegor Yakovlev, chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and USSR people's deputy, by Dr. Jiri Sekera, chief editor of HOSPODARSKE NOVINY; place and date not given: "August '68"—first two paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] Dr. Jiri Sekera, chief editor of the newspaper HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, which is popular in Czechoslovakia, asked the commentator Yegor Yakovlev questions in connection with the anniversary of the tragic events of August 1968. Inasmuch as both the questions and answers are of interest to a Soviet audience, we publish them with the consent of the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY editorial office.

Our regular readers will obviously recall that at the start of the 1980's Yegor Yakovlev was IZVESTIYA's correspondent in Prague. Today he is chief editor of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and a people's deputy of the USSR.

[Sekera] August—an important month not only for Czechoslovakia but for the Soviet Union also. August 1968 was a continuation of the Soviet foreign policy which had begun with the occupation of the Baltic and continued with the Hungarian events and then, after August 1968, with Afghanistan. Do you agree with this viewpoint? Do you share the views of the economist Viktor Sheynis, which he shared last year in IZVESTIYA, that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the commitment of troops to Czechoslovakia, and "internationalist assistance" to Afghanistan were links of the same chain?

[Yakovlev] I would not confine myself to this month or the other, August included. No less important for me, for example, is the spring: Stalin died in March, the 20th CPSU Congress was held on the threshold of spring and, finally, so was the CPSU Central Committee April 1985 Plenum. And for Czechoslovakia also, as you know, spring is more important than other times of the year. That the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which consecrated the occupation of the Baltic, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the blood in Afghanistan are links of a single chain is another matter. But even these are only links of the chain which has been thrown around the neck of the peasant of my country since the end of the 1920's, and it was this which hammered the best part of society in the times of the Stalin terror. Both the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union of past times were links of a single chain.

[Sekera] How do you explain the fact that, aside from the seven persons who ventured into Red Square, no one in the Soviet Union publicly protested the violence against a fraternal country bound to the USSR by long-standing friendly traditions? It is known that there were in the party organizations, however, individuals who opposed this step, as there were people also among the Soviet intelligentsia who voiced their disagreement with the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

[Yakovlev] You are surprised that there were only seven who openly assailed the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I, however, am still preoccupied with the question as to why there was no public protest not only in connection with the tragedy of a country which is very close, dear to us, it may be said, but also in connection with the fact that daily, from decade to decade, near ones and dear ones were wiped out and that many people went to bed with the threat of the night being interrupted by an intrusion of security officers and of the morning being greeted in a prison torture chamber. People did not go out, they did not protest! Primarily because appearing in Red Square with a protest in connection with the domestic or foreign policy of the country's rulers meant nothing other than putting one's neck beneath the ax at the place of execution, which towers up in the same Red Square. The instinct of self-preservation is alive in everyone. There may be heroes in a society, but there is no society made up of heroes.

Even more important is the factor of trust, more precisely, the factor of trust betrayed. Until recent years, until the onset of the times of glasnost, which opened the eyes of millions of people, there lived in the majority of us, although gradually dying, faith that the Soviet Government was always right and that those who spoke to the contrary unfailingly had ulterior motives.

I recall how in the morning I met my neighbor—a bus driver—in the stairwell of my home. Spluttering with joy, he spoke about our forces' invasion of Czechoslovakia. He uttered a set of propaganda cliches, as young boys repeat the words of playground abuse: We liberated Czechoslovakia, we fed it, now they'll know what it is to spit on us.

I recall how during the day of 21 August on his way to the airfield Karl Nepomnyashchiy dropped in on IZVESTIYA. Together with other journalists he was flying to already occupied Prague. He was cheerful, forthright, and unshakably convinced of the significance of his impending mission. He asked that there be no cuts in his reports which he would be sending from Czechoslovakia, as had most likely been the request of our military correspondents dispatched to the front in the Patriotic War.... And his death was inexpressibly tragic: He was burned up in the aircraft on a pile of leaflets intended for the population of the captured country.

The psychosis of mass trust untied the hands of the executioners, who carried out punitive measures within the country and perpetrated acts of gangsterism outside.

Finally, a third aspect, which applies to a large extent to the intelligentsia, its artistic part particularly. There is always the illusory hope that in abiding by the conditions of the forced game you will more quickly obtain an opportunity to do some good—influence something, mitigate and improve something or other—rather than

by quitting this game. Such a syndrome is typical not only of the Soviet intelligentsia. It is also, as I believe, inherent in a particular part of the intelligentsia of your country, which split after August 1968. Some, breaking free of earth's gravity, went beyond the framework of legal struggle. Others, I know many of them and am not about to throw stones at them, believed that since the occupation had been accomplished, it was necessary to try to mitigate what had happened. You will find such judgments in preceding periods of your history also.

[Sekera] What, in your opinion, was taken as the basis by the Soviet leadership, which up to the fall of 1989—to the start of our revolution—believed that a reevaluation of the events of 1968 was an internal matter for the Czechoslovak leadership, that is the Husak-Jakes group? Although this group had come to power as a result of August 1968, it was clear that it had no desire to make, nor could it, an objective evaluation of these events.

[Yakovlev] I would like to remind you first of all that the Soviet leadership today and that of the spring of 1985 are, it may be said, different people. I refer not to a change in persons—the first person has remained the same—but all of us, Mikhail Gorbachev included, have in this five-year period traveled a road of tremendous development. At the start of it that same Gorbachev, I believe, was not at that time ready for the fundamental revision of both the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union which has now been accomplished. In 1985 he, and not only he at that time, obviously, to some extent shared the position formulated in Khrushchev's times: One communist party not only does not interfere in the affairs of another but also refrains from evaluating its actions. I did not work long on the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, but was a witness to the bitter arguments which would erupt in the journal's editorial council when one party permitted itself to express critical remarks about another. The following rule, an immoral compact, in my view, worked faultlessly: Do not touch me, and I will leave you alone. This compact was practiced also at the level of official policy of the so-called socialist countries. To what this led was shown by last year's events in East and Central Europe. Recalling now how several years ago A. Gromyko presented on behalf of the Soviet leadership the Order of Lenin to Ceausescu, one can only throw up one's hands in bewilderment.

And the final point. As the editor of a political weekly, I naturally could not nor did I wish to pass by Jakes' policy in silence. I was impeded here to the utmost, by people from the first circle of our political leadership included, despite the so widely heralded glasnost. And this was the case right up to the start of the "gentle revolution." One of the arguments went: "Since the start of perestroyka we have been advising the Czechoslovak leadership to reconsider the events of 1968. It has not done so and has itself thus decided its own fate. There is now nothing we can do to help it." At the same time, however, on visits to the Soviet Union Jakes would intone: If you initiate a reconsideration of the events of 1968 today, tomorrow I will be gone.

There were in all this both distressing and comical aspects. On the eve of the decisive events in Czechoslovakia (we did not know that this was the eve, of course) MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published a letter from Daniil Granin to his Czechoslovak friends. He also did not know that this was the eve and for this reason preferred not to give the names of those he was addressing. The letter spoke about the fact that the year of 1968 required our repentance—the blame for it was giving Soviet people no rest. The weekly came out on the Wednesday. On the Thursday at a meeting of the leaders of central newspapers in the CPSU Central Committee Vladimir Svetozarov, a senior official of this organization (he continues to prosper under this roof today also), fulminated against MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI and the esteemed writer, accusing us of an unforgivable political mistake. And what was to happen in Czechoslovakia happened the next day. Granin's letter to Prague was translated into Czech, printed and distributed—the sole confirmation at that time that Soviet people were with you. Something similar to what happened concerning a Romanian diplomatic representative in Moscow. In the morning he called on the editorial office of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI to lodge an official protest in connection with our criticism of Ceausescu. In the evening Ceausescu was gone....

When charges against our leadership (the generals are particularly zealous) that as a result of the policy of perestroyka East Europe has been let slip from the Soviet Union are heard today, I, of course, think about something else. If the Soviet leadership is to be reproached, it is from directly opposite standpoints: In supporting until recently the leaders of unpopular regimes it shares responsibility to this extent or the other for the fact that liberation from them dragged on for so long and in Romania came about via a bloody horror.

[Sekera] How do you assess Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia in 1987, bearing in mind the subsequent development of events? From the Czechoslovak public's viewpoint he was at that time supporting our corrupt party and state leadership.

[Yakovlev] We should not really judge what is past through today's eyes. I was in Prague at the time of Gorbachev's visit. I recall the home-made slogans: "Give us Misha, if only for a month." And viewing this visit merely through the prism of support for the corrupt leadership is, it the would seem to me, unfair. This visit had big repercussions and moved Czechoslovak society forward in its aspiration to make a break with the past. It was at the time of this visit that undoubted shifts in the evaluations of 1968 occurred, even if not very big—seen, once again, through today's eyes.

[Sekera] What, in your view, is the difference in the attitude toward Czechoslovakia of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and the Soviet Army leadership?

[Yakovlev] I do not perceive differences in attitudes toward Czechoslovakia between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. True, I have not spoken with Boris Nikolayevich on this subject. I believe that the position of both of them is determined by common sense.

As far as the Soviet Army leadership is concerned: I do not know Yazov's viewpoint. As far as the feelings of the most manly generals, who, suffering from imperial nostalgia, are reiterating that we gave up East Europe without a fight, are concerned, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has, like other Soviet newspapers also, repeatedly spoken out very abruptly in this connection. In addition, I am sure that the Army is not generals, and a general, not the Army.

[Sekera] The Soviet leadership has acknowledged that the commitment of forces to Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a flagrant violation of international law and allied treaties. But, as far as we know, considerable numbers of the Soviet public still believe that the Soviet Army was at that time acting as our savior in the face of the danger of civil war and the aggression of American and West German armed forces. Our press recently described how in the latter half of 1968 trains carrying the coffins of young soldiers "who had died in Czechoslovakia in the struggle against the counterrevolution" were returning to the USSR and that many mothers are still weeping for their sons who "died in Czechoslovakia in 1968." When, in your view, will the Soviet public at large learn about what really happened in Czechoslovakia and realize that the Soviet press reports on the death of your soldiers at the hands of counterrevolutionaries were a lie of party and military propaganda?

[Yakovlev] A mother will always weep for the death of her son, whatever his mission. German mothers also had a right to tears when their sons, killing in Russia and Czechoslovakia, themselves met their end there. Politics and a mother's grief should not be confused.

As far as the truth about August 1968 is concerned, there has of late been much honest writing about this in the Soviet press. There has also been the documentary film, which has earned recognition, on the participation of Mazurov, special representative of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, in the events of 1968. It repeats shots, but in a directly opposite context, from the lying film which was put together in the Soviet Union shortly after the August events and on which a state prize was bestowed even. Of course, the truth is not yet exhausted. But those who wished to hear it have heard it. Some time ago MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI arranged a public showing of the well-known film "Confession" with Yves Montand in the leading role. I introduced this showing, attended it, and together with the whole audience once again experienced a sense of guilt over Czechoslovakia—not only for 1968 but also for the preceding tragic decades.

[Sekera] Even following the fall of the totalitarian regime in Czechoslovakia, trends toward mass anti-Sovietism were not observed. We wonder about the Soviet leadership's next steps. What will be done to ensure that anti-Sovietism not only not give a reminder of its presence but that the opposite occur: the credit of trust on the part of our people toward the USSR increase?

[Yakovlev] I do not, I confess, greatly believe that the events which occurred and which are occurring in Czechoslovakia are devoid of a negative attitude toward the Soviet Union. This would be unnatural. My Czech and Slovak friends cannot, of course, in a single hour forget the Soviet Union's criminal actions in respect of their country. What is understood by anti-Sovietism today is another matter. Yes, wittingly or unwittingly, in the minds of many people the very notion "Soviet" is connected with that inhuman system—with its tanks, missiles, and aggressiveness—which was for so long dominant in my country. But I also, in turn, have a right to call it anti-Soviet and urge a break with it in every possible way because we cannot go on living this way. In this sense I am an anti-Soviet, of which hawks of our domestic model do not tire of reminding me.

But to speak about the future, it affords grounds for hope, although wounds are not healed in a day. But they must heal because the present policy of the Soviet leadership is aimed at the maximum recognition of the rights of Czechoslovakia in absolutely all things (abstracting ourselves, it is true, from the final convulsions of Soviet bureaucrats still impeding the development of our normal relations and from the nasty articles, composed according to the former prescriptions, in some of our newspapers).

The recent replacement of the USSR's diplomatic representatives in Czechoslovakia says a great deal. Even at the difficult times Boris Pankin, as editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, managed to remain himself—courageous and honest. In any event, the appearance in Prague of such a USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary will ensure reliable information from Czechoslovakia. If we return to the information or, more precisely, disinformation which reached Moscow from Prague in an avalanche in 1968, we understand that our leadership was not only the subject which made the decision to commit the troops but also the object of premeditated disinformation. This latter does not excuse it, however: Authorities always receive the information to which they are predisposed.

[Sekera] Last year MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI carried your interview with Zdenek Horeny, then chief editor of RUDE PRAVO. To your question of whether it was not time to view the events of 1968 from the standpoint of broader relations and answer for oneself where the constructive trends of the "Prague Spring" ended and

where antisocialist trends began, Mr. Horeny said that he did not see the need for a return to an evaluation of those events, for the present generation, in any event. You let Horeny's response pass without comment. How did you perceive this answer at that time, what were your feelings, what is your attitude toward him today?

[Yakovlev] I would like to say first of all that I have known Zdenek Horeny for many years and am attached to him even today. There is a personal aspect to this: In 1968, when I had been expelled as chief editor of the journal ZHURNALIST, for having published the Press Act, which was born of the "Prague Spring," included, Horeny showed me care and attention. He helped me out in many respects later also, when I went to Prague as IZVESTIYA correspondent.

Now about my interview with Goreny. What feelings did I have? Both then and now a feeling of awkwardness inasmuch as he had in some sense been "set up." I believe that Horeny realized this also. However, we have to give him his due, he agreed to answer my questions. Why? I can only assume that my questions were for Horeny gentler than his answers. The point being that in addressing him I was endeavoring to reflect the positive changes in the evaluations of 1968 which had occurred by that time in the commonsensical part of the Soviet political leadership. The essence of the questions spoke for itself. And Horeny answered them in the way that they could have been answered in that situation by a person occupying the positions which he had occupied—he was not only editor of RUDE PRAVO but also a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee Secretariat. The difference between what I asked and what I heard in reply testified for the thinking reader to the incompatibility of the views of a Soviet journalist and the unrealistically dense recalcitrance of the Czechoslovak leadership. There was no need for me to comment on Horeny's answers (the person conducting an interview should not do so): The semantic gap in our dialogue was perfectly eloquent.

Reportage on Troop Pullout From GDR Continues

Completion Expected 1992

LD2708211690 Hamburg DPA in German 2041 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The Soviet Union is planning to pull out its entire force of around 380,000 men from the area of the present-day GDR by as early as the end of 1992. This was stated by GDR Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann at a news conference in Bonn this evening, according to the private television company RTL Plus. Originally a period ranging up to the end of 1994 had been agreed for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Eppelmann cited the increasing gap between the Soviet soldiers and GDR citizens in the economic and social sphere as the reason for the early withdrawal. This could lead to considerable tensions.

Called 'Historic Mission'

PM2808100790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] [video shows trucks being loaded onto rail transporters] As has already been reported, the Soviet troop withdrawal from the town of Neuruppin, 60 km from Berlin, started yesterday. Here is what GDR deputy premier and Minister of Internal Affairs Diestel stated in an interview: "The Western Group of Soviet Forces on GDR territory has carried out a historic mission, which is naturally different in the current situation. This mission should not be called into question any longer. We must not allow there to be any hatred of Soviet soldiers among the population," the minister emphasized.

Last Train of Southern Troops Leaves Hungary

LD2708202990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1925 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Today the last trainload of Soviet soldiers of the southern group of troops left one of the main provinces of Hungary.

Tension 'Gradually Subsiding' in Bulgaria

LD2708142690 Moscow TASS in English 1413 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Sofia August 27 TASS—The tension is gradually subsiding in Sofia after the headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party were set alight. The central square is still cordoned off by police, however. The red star can still be seen above the party headquarters despite Vice-President Atanas Semerjiev's promise to have it removed.

Crowds behind police lines continue trading insults and remarks. some of the people, who openly sympathized with the opposition and its former leader earlier, are critical of the presidential order to clean the square of hooligans. Other blame the police for remaining idle for several hours, letting militants run wild inside the building and do considerable damage.

According to the chief investigation department, a preliminary investigation has begun into the fire. Offenders are charged with using force against the authorities, flagrantly violating public order, committing arson and destroying and damaging property on a large scale—all actions described as crimes in the country's criminal code.

Investigators have begun questioning witnesses and examining the premises where the crime was committed. Thirty-nine people have been detained.

Head of the Sofia police force Khristo Velichkov said in a radio interview that the circumstances made him suspect that the action had been pre-planned. All district police forces have been placed on red alert and instructed to use force if peaceful means fail.

The coordinating committee of the Union of Democratic Forces appealed to all true democrats who cherish the ideals to freedom to resist acts of provocation, help maintain public order and pacify impatient people. "During these dramatic hours, it is necessary to show that we are wise and civilised people in control of the situation."

The opposition leadership has described the fire as an act of provocation aimed at disrupting the peaceful transition to democracy. The Union of Democratic Forces has denounced violence and insisted on an objective criminal investigation, including by a specially created parliamentary commission.

The Bulgarian Democratic Youth leadership has released a declaration saying that the night flames in the sky above Sofia consumed the foundations of civil peace and order.

The organisation has called for people to resist provocateurs and abstain from playing a part in street clashes. The organisation has called on other youth organisations of the country to form patrols to help law enforcement forces protect the peace.

Comparison of Memo to Poland on War Memorials

PM2708173290

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 August 1990 in its Morning Edition on page 4 carries a report incorporating the text of a Soviet memorandum to the Polish charge d'affaires. The IZVESTIYA item, entitled "Memorandum Presented," has been compared with the translation of the Moscow TASS International version published in the 24 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 29, under the headline "Destruction of War Memorials in Poland Protested." The IZVESTIYA item, sans quotation marks, has been found to be identical to the TASS version aside from the following variations:

Page 29, column one, paragraph five, only sentence in IZVESTIYA reads: [Text] On 24 August, Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, handed to E. Lukosz,.... (deleting dateline, rewording)

Paragraph six, sentence one, in IZVESTIYA reads: ...with deep concern and bitterness the reports coming.... (adding "and bitterness")

Column two, paragraph one, last sentence in IZVESTIYA reads: ...Labor, and the USSR Armed Forces.

At the same.... (adding "USSR," omitting opening quotation marks)

Same column, third complete paragraph, sentence two in IZVESTIYA reads: ...of demolishing the "Gratitude" monument and the transfer of the remains of Soviet servicemen from the central part of Krakow to the municipal cemetery.

The nature.... (rewording)

Last paragraph, last sentence in IZVESTIYA reads: ...of both sides.

24 August 1990 (Adding date, omitting closing quotemarks)

West Europe

Dumas-Shevardnadze Talks Focus on Gulf

Termed 'Productive'

PM2708154890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin: "Results of Roland Dumas' Visit to Moscow"]

[Text] French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas flew from Moscow on Sunday afternoon after lengthy and, as he acknowledged, productive talks with Soviet leaders.

The French journalists who accompanied their minister to the Soviet capital said that President Mitterrand attached very great significance to this trip and it was he who insisted that Dumas meet with M.S. Gorbachev. In principle, working visits by foreign ministers do not include talks with a head of state. But on this occasion, in connection with the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the situation was extraordinary. That was why the two rounds of talks between Dumas and Shevardnadze were preceded by a 90-minute conversation between the French minister and the USSR president.

The dominant theme was of course the situation in the Persian Gulf. "We conducted a joint analysis of the situation. And we established that our countries' positions are very close," Dumas stated at a joint news conference with Shevardnadze on 26 August a few hours before the French delegation's departure. The Soviet-French communique, the full text of which is published on page 4 of today's IZVESTIYA, demonstrates that the approach of Paris and Moscow remains firms and uncompromising: The sides have again demanded that the Iraqi authorities unconditionally withdraw their troops from Kuwait and release the foreign hostages. The USSR and France confirmed their readiness to observe the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on Iraq. The Soviet foreign minister noted that in the opinion of Moscow and Paris it has become necessary to convene an international conference on the Near East.

Among the other questions touched on by the ministers during the two-day consultations, they both highlighted the preparations for the all-European summit, due to be

held in Paris in November. In Dumas' words, "certain procedural differences" came up initially when discussing this question. (He did not explain what precisely they were). However, in the course of the talks they were successfully resolved. Shevardnadze noted that during the exchange of opinions on the forthcoming all-European conference "there was a high degree of mutual understanding and proximity of the principled approaches" of the USSR and France.

Attention was also paid to the "German question," a traditional one in recent months. The ministers expressed the wish that the meeting to be held in Moscow 12 September within the "two-plus-four" framework succeed in eliminating all the differences of opinion and adopt the necessary documents. As Dumas stressed, time is pressing and the experts from the states involved (including the USSR and France) will have to work strenuously if they are to keep to the rigid schedule and prepare the draft agreements which are due to be signed 12 September.

Dumas and Shevardnadze discussed problems of the Asia and Pacific region, first and foremost the situation in Cambodia. The heightened attention to these questions was due to the fact that at the end of the week the Soviet minister is setting off on a visit to countries in the region. This visit has not been officially announced yet. The first stage of the tour will be the Chinese city of Harbin after which (it is almost certain, even though the DPRK authorities have still not confirmed it). Shevardnadze will visit Pyongyang and then Vladivostok and will finish his eight-day tour in the Japanese capital. During the upcoming meetings with the leaders of China and Japan the discussion is sure to center on the problem of the Cambodian settlement. In this connection it was important for the Soviet minister to ascertain France's position.

In the sphere of bilateral relations the most important result of the Moscow talks was the accord on President Gorbachev's visit to France. Although the official communique mentioned this visit in very vague terms merely as a "planned meeting between the USSR and French presidents," the ministers spoke more definitely at the news conference. Gorbachev will visit Paris in October (independently of his trip in November to take part in the CSCE conference). The precise date will be agreed upon "in due course" in the light of the Soviet president's calendar.

A new aspect of Soviet-French relations is Moscow's proposal on starting preparations for a state treaty on accord and cooperation which would cover all aspects of bilateral ties. Thus, France is the second country, after Germany, with which the USSR intends to sign such a document.

The foreign ministers reached an understanding on the creation of special groups which will work on a draft agreement. Roland Dumas expressed the hope that the two countries' experts will manage to prepare a document before the start of the October meeting between Mitterrand and Gorbachev. Perhaps the treaty will be signed at the actual meeting.

Representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry announced that the Soviet working group will be headed by Deputy Minister Kvitsinskiy. It will include USSR Ambassador in Paris Dubinin. It is assumed that at some point before the next meeting between Roland Dumas and E.A. Shevardnadze, which will be in Moscow within the framework of the "two-plus-four" talks, the Soviet and French working groups' paths will cross and the first consultations will be held on the question of the future treaty, with preliminary drafts being submitted for each other's perusal.

In conclusion, a few words about the Soviet and French foreign ministers' joint news conference. As one might have expected, nearly all the journalists' questions were about the Persian Gulf crisis. Foreign colleagues wanted to know above all how the USSR would behave in relation to Iraq following the UN Security Council's adoption of the resolution authorizing the use of minimal force.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union has no plans to use force and will not participate in operations to blockade the Iraqi coast. At the same time, the minister let it be known that if the Security Council adopted a decision on the formation of a multinational force which would be sent to the Persian Gulf, the USSR is prepared to "fulfill its obligations."

Asked whether Moscow would object if the Americans were to use force against Iraq, the Soviet minister replied: "In our opinion, the United States and other states whose armed forces are in the region can operate within the framework of Security Council Resolution 665." Shevardnadze also said that if need be, the Soviet Union will be prepared to give the UN Security Council Military Staff Committee information about armaments it has sold to the Iraqi regime in the past. Once again he denied claims in the foreign press that Soviet military advisers were involved in the preparations for the Iraqi Army's attack on Kuwait.

Asked when the USSR plans to start withdrawing its advisers from Iraq, the minister said that the main task at the moment is to evacuate the women and children who are in the country. We will remove the other citizens, including military experts, from Iraq at a later stage—"as it becomes necessary."

The Soviet foreign minister pins great hopes on UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's upcoming visit to Baghdad. "He has a unique chance to contribute to a political resolution of the crisis in the region," Shevardnadze said. The French minister was more restrained in his attitude toward the UN secretary general's trip.

Gorbachev Supports Embargo

AU2508140590 Paris AFP in English 1335 GMT 25 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow, Aug 25 (AFP)—The Soviet Union will do "everything necessary" to ensure the embargo against Iraq is complied with, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said here Saturday.

Speaking to journalists at the Kremlin just before a meeting with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, Mr. Gorbachev said his country had adopted "a very clear position" by voting at the United Nations Security Council in favour of a resolution on possible use of force to ensure compliance with the embargo against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait.

Mr. Dumas arrived in Moscow Saturday afternoon for a day and a half of talks, notably on the Gulf crisis.

Addressing Mr. Gorbachev, the French foreign minister expressed the hope to soon see him in France.

"I hope so, and I believe the time is approaching," said Mr. Gorbachev who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and special adviser Anatoly Chernyayev.

Mr. Dumas carried a message for Mr. Gorbachev from French President Francois Mitterrand, informed sources said. The Soviet president informed his French counterpart on Thursday of Moscow's intention to harden its stand in the Gulf crisis, sources added.

On Friday, Mr. Gorbachev issued a strong warning to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, calling on him to withdraw his troops from Kuwait and release foreign nationals.

Mr. Dumas, who was due to have formal talks with his Soviet counterpart Sunday morning, was also to discuss disarmament problems and German reunification with Mr. Gorbachev.

The next, and probably final meeting of the "two-plus-four" conference, involving the four World War II allied powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain—along with the two Germanies, is to take place in Moscow on September 12.

MM. Gorbachev and Dumas were also to discuss the November summit in Paris of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which Mr. Gorbachev may attend.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Speaks at Meeting on Land Legislation

LD2408180890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "On Problems of Land Relations"]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Aug (TASS)—A conversation took place on 24 August between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and scholars, lawyers, economists, representatives of the USSR Peasants' Union, and leaders of farms and of the agro-industrial complexes of a number of oblasts, republics, and of the country. During the conversation problems of implementing land legislation were discussed.

Taking part in the exchange of opinions were: Stroyev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Nikonov, president of the VASKhNiL [Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin]; Kulik, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers; Petashvili, first secretary of Adigenskiy Raykom of the Georgian Communist Party; Aniskin, leader of the collective farm imeni Gorkiy of Klinskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast; Shuplyakov, head of the legal department of the Union Council of Collective Farms; Ikonitskaya, sector head of the State and Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Krylatykh, VASKhNil acting academician secretary; Shmelev, head of a department at the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Starodubtsev, chairman of the USSR Peasant's Union.

Support was expressed at the meeting for the work that is being done in the localities on improving land relations, and the need to accelerate the adoption of land codes in the republics was noted. All of this should become a component part of the measures connected with the transition to market relations in the agrarian sphere.

Special attention was paid to the social development of the countryside and the intensification of the concern of all society about its scientific, technical, and resource provisions. Those gathered spoke about the impermissibility of an artificial restraint on the processes for the development of a mixed economy in agriculture.

Mikhail Gorbachev concluded the discussion.

Ignatenko Made Gorbachev's Assistant Press Chief

LD2808121190 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] Moscow August 28 TASS—NEW TIMES magazine Editor-in-Chief Vitaliy Ignatenko was appointed assistant to the USSR president and head of the president's press service, TASS has learned from authoritative sources.

Ignatenko is expected to conduct his first briefing on Wednesday.

KGB Reveals 'Particularly Dangerous' CIA Agents

LD2708152990 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 26 Aug 90

[Text] The USSR State Security Committee, the KGB, says that it has disclosed more than 30 particularly dangerous agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and other foreign secret services over the past five years. The KGB's vice chairman, Viktor Grushko, has also announced in an interview that the KGB has prevented more than 120 attempts at passing secret information to Western secret services. Among the disclosed agents, Grushko mentioned former General Polyakov of the chief intelligence department of the Soviet Army's General Staff, who worked for the United States. The KGB official pointed out that his agency has stepped up operations against smuggling and organized crime.

Moscow TV Profiles KGB's Antiterrorism Section

LD2708183290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1430 GMT on 27 August carries a 35-minute "television sketch" entitled "The Professionals," on the KGB's antiterrorism department including interviews with and comments by members of that department. The report opens with video showing street scenes and views of Dzerzhinskiy's statue on the square where KGB headquarters is situated, followed by views of long corridors with closed doors. The narrator says that for years no one talked about the KGB, but today the topic is just that. KGB officials, speaking with their backs to the camera, are interviewed on the Sukhumi Prison hostages incident and what their task was in the KGB action on 15 August to end the crisis. Over photographs of everyday violence, the hungry and deprived, correspondent Boris Smirnov says that today we have become hardened to violence in everyday life. The video shows combat training exercises, men dressed in camouflage engaged in hand-to-hand combat, target practice, and training with weapons and dogs. In a conversation with Colonel Karpukhin, Hero of the Soviet Union, Smirnov asks about the qualities needed for work in the KGB, considering that violence and hijacking are on the increase nationwide, and international measures are needed to fight hijacking and international terrorism. Video shows hijackers being arrested on an aircraft, followed by film of an armed robbery in an apartment.

A.V. Yurin is asked how his family reacts to his work; he earns 400 rubles a month, with extra for assignments. Senior Lieutenant Prokofyev speaks about his physical condition; he gets no extra food rations except on assignment. His last operation was in the Sukhumi hostage crisis. Major Ye.V. Raskhodchikov says he has a two-room apartment, earns 450 rubles a month for his family, and his parents have a household garden plot.

Asked his view of having to undertake dangerous operations without any substantial recompense, he says it is not the custom to talk about such things, nor about the risks themselves. He adds that his wife is very supportive.

Over video of struggling men being arrested in the subway, and combat training, Smirnov enumerates some of the dangers, and then Karpukhin describes the action to release the Sukhumi hostages. A surgeon reports on the wound received by one of the KGB men involved in the action. Captain E.V. Orekhov, shown in a still picture, recounts his feelings about the Sukhumi operation and about the wound he received. It was his birthday, perhaps that was why he was lucky. Lieutenant Prokofyev talks about his feelings toward the criminals. Smirnov summarizes the 11 Aug events in Sukhumi, when prisoners seized wardens and other prisoners as hostages. He says that a precise plan was worked out by the staff of the KGB antiterrorist squad. Masked KGB men are shown donning bulletproof vests and helmets, followed by a video of the attack on the bus carrying the ringleaders, and of the KGB seizure of the prison isolation block, wounded prisoners, and confiscated weapons. Prokofyev recalls his sense of pleasure at successfully completing the operation. Video shows KGB officers returning to an airport and being greeted with flowers. KGB Chairman Kryuchkov is shown reading out a statement. He says:

"We had never before come up agaisnt a situation with 74 criminals and a total of five hostages, where it was necessary to storm a four-story solitary confinement unit and isolation block and where it was necessary to carry out an operation with an unprecedented risk to life. For almost five days and nights the criminals terrorized the town. Public opinion, and the people of the town—and not only the town, but of the republic and our country, because it was reported in the press—were naturally worried and frightened. And there seemed to be only one way out of the situation: to satisfy the impudent demands of the criminals in order to somehow put an end to the affair by arranging a deal.

"And then the State Security Committee decided to intervene in this situation and render assistance in localizing and disarming this criminal gang. As always, the task was given to the most courageous, I would say, bold and self-sacrificing State Security Committee employees in our assault group. We were all very worried and concerned for our comrades' lives, because the situation was such that our comrades were going to their death in the full sense of the word. Everyone was ready, no one faltered, for that is the nature of our work. Such an attitude toward duty, and results such as these will serve to enhance the State Security Committee and its staff at the center and in the localities, and will demonstrate to the Soviet people—and not only the Soviet people—our capabilities, our readiness, and our high degree of professionalism."

Colonel Karpukhin, shown in a still picture, says harsh measures must be taken against harsh and violent people. Smirnov ends the report with video shots of the eyes of some of the KGB men, and of them donning combat gear.

KGB Captain Refutes Kalugin's Allegations

90UF0474A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 18 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by USSR KGB Captain A. Zakharov: "Former Colleagues Ask..."]

[Text] ...There is an amazingly interesting period in the activity of the CIA. For approximately a decade—starting in the middle of the 1960's—not only Langley, but also the CIA field stations were almost paralyzed. They were literally bogged down in the muddy waters of spy-mania. They were searching for "Russian agents." This hysteria was transferred from the United States to England where MI5 became involved in the same thing, hunting for those in the ranks of the intelligence service who were working for the "Russians." Even then when Angleton, the head of counterintelligence, and his zealous assistants were invited out of the CIA, they continued to talk repeatedly about "Russian" penetration.

Others also use this today to frighten, long after Angleton's death.

It is not difficult to imagine what a windfall for such circles the campaign against the KGB that former Chekist O. Kalugin undertook in the mass media has become. In addition to many other things, he declared: "During the time of my work as the chief of foreign counterintelligence (1973-1980), Soviet intelligence did not have even one agent among CIA employees." O. Kalugin made this admission after the article in PRAVDA which indicated in particular that at the end of the 1970's "a very valuable source working in the Central Intelligence Agency was lost as a result of his incompetent and presumptuous actions." THE WASHINGTON TIMES (2/7/1990), quoting a representative of the George Bush administration, stated then and there that what was written in PRAVDA looked like part of a KGB campaign to discredit its former official. Where did the "Bush administration" obtain such information about the most delicate questions which, moreover, coincide with O. Kalugin's point of view? It is hardly likely, of course, that we will be able to talk to the White House on this subject. But Kalugin, nonetheless, should explain himself in this regard.

It would be good to clarify a lot of other things. For example, why did it dawn upon CIA Director W. Colby that Angleton's diligence in looking for "Russian agents" undermined the effectiveness of the department specifically in 1974—that is, at a time when Kalugin headed the directorate of foreign counterintelligence? Consequently, his own debut in this post awaits explanation. As for the epilogue to the work of O. Kalugin in this capacity, it is

only after the general's departure from the directorate of foreign counterintelligence that it began to work as it should have been working.

The changes, in the opinion of specialists, were striking. In a short period, dozens of agents of intelligence services of foreign states who were Soviet citizens were exposed and brought to trial. Western special services immediately felt these Soviet counterintelligence blows. But it is a fact that Kalugin did not have any connection with the exposure of betrayal.

It is apparently also necessary to give an explanation with respect to some "dis" (disinformation) which was planted "from abroad" and which plunged us into wasteful and fruitless work to create over-the-horizon radar.

Protecting his protege—a certain American "scientist 'K'"—O. Kalugin asserts that "fearing persecution, he departed for the USSR in 1964 and gave a lot of help to Soviet specialists in the creation of modern types of missile fuel. But after encountering disgraceful goings-on in our country, he began to express dissident attitudes."

In O. Kalugin's opinion, the USSR—a pioneer in space exploration—needed "modern types of missile fuel" and therefore awaited information on this score from the United States. It is strange that it is not the other way around. But this is not the only point. The main thing is that our "bureaucratic amateurs," as they were called in one article by G.V. Kisunko, a general designer of the first Soviet ABM system, began to conduct experimental research work on 'K' material supplied by Kalugin. Three years passed, and about 100 million rubles were spent. The results equalled zero. Independent expert analysis showed that it could not have been any other way: "Dead-end" information was planted through 'K'. It is time for Kalugin to explain why he trusted 'K' so much. It is a pity that trusting Kalugin, we were late with this analysis.

One senses that O.Kalugin is trying in every way to acquire the currently fashionable reputation of a "lover of truth." At stake are purely official questions and idle conjectures, and even blackmail.

At a meeting in the Zelenogradsk Palace of Culture on 12 July 1990, in the presence of 1,300 people, Kalugin declared: "Agents of KGB organs penetrate the entire Soviet society, beginning with the Presidential Council and the Holy Synod and ending with those assembled in this auditorium. I know a number of agents from among the leaders of certain radical and democratic organizations. I will give their names only if certain circumstances force me to do this."

Indeed, in the end circumstances, as a matter of fact, make it necessary to tell the truth.

FROM THE EDITOR.

In publishing this material, which was given to us by the USSR KGB, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA expresses the hope that Comrade O. Kalugin will also speak out in this newspaper on the questions that have been broached.

CPSU's Falin Views Party's Role in Society

90UF0481A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Aug 90 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Interview with V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by V. Ovchinnikov; place and date not specified: "Looking at the World Without Prejudice"]

[Text] [Ovchinnikov] Valentin Mikhaylovich! How do you conceive of the CPSU's international activity following the 28th congress? How are the forms of its leadership changing? What will the structure and functions of the Central Committee International Department be under the new conditions?

[Falin] In my view, there is no component of the party, of the Central Committee included, that is not in need of fundamental renewal. We have to critically rethink all that has been done in the past—not necessarily for the sake of rejection but primarily from the viewpoint of the needs of the immediate and distant future.

If the party's task is to be not the manager of the country's affairs but the political leader of society, we need first and foremost to learn clearly and precisely how to recognize development trends. Also we must not simply be a generator of ideas but also be able also to work out methods of the preemption and removal of negative phenomena, which are always present in life, and methods of consolidation of all that is positive and the conversion of possibilities into reality. I believe that politics today means not so much the art of the possible, as the art of the conversion of prerequisites into visible results.

If we view the Central Committee International Department from this angle, the primary task, together with the continuation of relations with kindred and many other political parties, movements, and groups, which themselves display an interest in interacting with us, will be comprehension of all that is happening overseas in the political, economic, and military spheres and also in the spheres of ideology, culture, and social mentality. In order that by relying on international experience the party may respond adequately to the challenges of the times and approach our domestic affairs in more qualified manner, with regard for this experience. There is no point in reinventing the wheel every time if the concerns causing a headache have been optimally resolved by some neighbor or other.

[Ovchinnikov] Will the International Department be involving itself in the elaboration of the CPSU's foreign policy strategy and how, in this case, will it "share roles" with the Presidential Council and Foreign Ministry?

[Falin] Permit me first to make it clear that pluralism does not merely mean the existence of different parties

and currents. True, mature pluralism is when there is a struggle of opinions in the parties themselves, and when, in the course of the arguments, people of like mind seek the best possible versions.

The existence of various centers where information is collated and analyzed will afford an opportunity for the same facts to be illuminated from different angles. And in this case dissimilar evaluations and proposals are sometimes engendered. There will be no duplication, as before. After all, things had become grotesque—virtually every verbal note was approved by the Politburo. It was hard to understand where the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry actually started and where it ended. This was always unnecessary. Except for crisis situations. Today, however, such a thing is unthinkable, particularly given the present volume and tempo of our international relations.

Operational matters have firmly become and will remain the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry. Problems of a broad state level are within the competence of the Presidential Council. But how many subjects there are protruding beyond the framework of interstate relations in which the mood of the public expressed directly or by way of party structures comes to the fore!

A principal and permanent contribution of the October Revolution is the fact that it made world politics the property of the masses. The peoples know about it today immeasurably more than ever before. They are not only the objects but also the creators of policy and simultaneously the supervisory authority, as it were, in international affairs. Implementing foreign policy would soon be simply impossible without the peoples, aside from them, and, even more, against them.

[Ovchinnikov] My foreign colleagues sometimes interpret personnel moves as a shift of priorities. They are drawing far-reaching conclusions, for example, from the fact that the American specialist Dobrynin has been replaced as secretary of the CPSU Central Committee by the Germany specialist Falin. What can you say in this connection?

[Falin] I personally see the appointment of my predecessor to this position somewhat differently. It is not a question of the "America specialist" Dobrynin and not a question of the professional specifics of his successor. A specialist who had attended the stern school of interstate work was represented by A.F. Dobrynin; chosen for the first time, perhaps. This was a very appreciable addition to the practice of interparty relations. And he was chosen at a moment when the CPSU's international activity was being put strictly to the test under the sign of the new political thinking. That was the ultimate essence of the reform: looking at the world and ourselves in this world without ideological blinders, which were reducing the very wide spectrum of world processes to constricted orthodox patterns distorting much of what needed to be seen by normal human vision.

International politics, however, is not a path for the elect. It means primarily work that requires considerable knowledge, does not brook frivolity, and presupposes an ability to see not only one's own but also others' interests. I have in my life seen many party officials who have given the very best account of themselves in the diplomatic field after they have spent sufficient time and effort assimilating the new work, which does not tolerate dilettantism.

[Ovchinnikov] What impact could the impetuous process of Germany's unification and the movement of the German problem to the center of world politics have on the CPSU's international activity, in your view.

[Falin] We are not yet fully aware, I believe, of the scale of what is being accomplished before our eyes. Germany is returning to world politics at a qualitatively new level. If it all happens as the Germans assure us it will— the entire potential of a powerful state is addressed to people's benefit and if only peace and never war emanates from German soil—Europe will, on the basis of the solution of the German question, be entering into the most constructive era of its existence. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, what is happening testifies primarily to our readiness to believe in the choice being made by Germans, as a nation, in favor of peace. This is an investment of trust in a common peaceful future.

Europe has finished fighting. The last war in Europe has already occurred. It was called the "cold" war, but it was essentially World War III. More material and spiritual resources were spent on it than on any other war in history. A line is now being drawn before our eyes beneath both the second and this third world war.

[Ovchinnikov] Against the background of an end to the "cold war" there arises the following question: How are the recent changes in East Europe influencing the nature of the CPSU's international relations? How, in your view, should we be constructing relations between parties that have ceased to be the ruling parties there and, on the other hand, what should be our attitude toward those that have come to power?

[Falin] This is a difficult question. There is no simple answer. And oversimplification is harmful. Let us leaf together through pages of the memory: Yugoslavia, 1948; the GDR, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Albania, 1961; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, 1980; in Asia, the rupture with China in the 1960's.

It can be seen from the list of dates how many times the veche [village meeting in ancient Russia] bell was rung and how much evidence there was that there was much that was not right in our state and party policy with respect to a whole group of countries, long before perestroyka. But the conclusions drawn from the warnings were, as a rule, the opposite of those that should have been drawn. The main thing was that we failed to ask ourselves whether it was appropriate to go by our own regulations in another's monastery.

Perestroyka, which introduced new principles in relations between the authorities and the people in our home and which, if it has not accomplished, has prepared the soil for the accomplishment of the task of a combination of morals and policy—this perestroyka could not have failed to have contributed to the true sentiments surfacing. We recognized our own people's right to decide how to live henceforward. How could this primordial right have been denied others?

[Ovchinnikov] But the processes of renewal and democratization in East Europe are, after all, having negative side effects also. A manifest surge of anticommunism, for example.

[Falin] This is another aspect, alarming and dangerous even. Bernard Shaw called anticommunism the greatest stupidity of the 20th century. The basis of it is group and individual egotism and attempts to perpetuate social injustices of past eras.

Anticommunism, as it is now manifesting itself in a number of East European countries, is an unworthy phenomenon if only because responsibility for the crimes and mistakes of a small group of leading functionaries who have failed to pass the tests of life and time cannot be transferred to honest people who sincerely believe in the socialist idea and also to members of their families. This is the same as holding the American people responsible for the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

[Ovchinnikov] Many of our readers are interested in the CPSU-perestroyka-Third World topic. What is your attitude toward the claims that in de-ideologizing its foreign policy, the USSR is turning its back on the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

[Falin] Such opinions are incorrect. The Soviet Union is not turning its back on anyone. It is turning toward everyone.

As far, however, as the de-ideologization of foreign policy is concerned, Lenin even called for this. The confusion of party and state interests, which was practiced for decades, by all the great powers, incidentally, was of considerable harm and quite little benefit. It was ideologization taken to absurd lengths; to psychological warfare, which rejected everything that emanated from a potential enemy, regardless of the content of the initiatives. He would never propose anything to his own detriment, it was alleged. Instead of politics, the result was a zero-sum game: All that is bad for the opponent should be good for me.

Now about the developing states, where three-fourths of mankind lives. The majority of them are our partners and good friends. Therefore our endeavor to put relations with them on a more substantial and stable basis is natural. And this is possible only provided that one party does not become a giver, and the other a taker. A balance of interests and mutual benefit are needed.

Direct aid is appropriate and justified when it is necessary to save people from starvation, disease, or the consequences of natural disasters. The Soviet Union itself gratefully received such assistance when the blows of the elements destroyed one-third of Armenia. It came from the developing countries also.

And one further point. Our cooperation with the developing countries has ceased to be a closed topic and the subject of classified decisions. This issue is now in the field of vision of our parliament. The amount of aid is determined by the Supreme Soviet.

[Ovchinnikov] I would like to ask in conclusion: To what extent was your present position predetermined or prepared by your career?

[Falin] In the rush of business I suddenly discovered that I am the most elderly person in the present party leadership. Next year I will have been working for 50 years. I began work at the age of 15. I qualified as tool-maker lathe operator at "Krasnyy Proletariy."

Knowledge of life in the entire variegation of its tints, which were particularly contrasting in the difficult times of war, undoubtedly shaped my character. One further circumstance played its part also. Many people close to me perished in the war. Too many by human standards, perhaps, and a question which has remained with me was evidently logical: How did the German people, who had made a tremendous contribution to the development of world civilization, descend to the lowest levels of barbarity in the Nazi campaign for world domination? So chance fate made me a German specialist.

After the institute, I engaged in research and, subsequently, diplomatic work. I was reputed among my superiors to be a willful and very awkward employee. In the mid-1970's, following several unproductive discussions with A.A. Gromyko, I decided to quit politics, the more so in that an opportunity for involving myself in more emotional work had arisen, seemingly.

[Ovchinnikov] It is said that you are not only a specialist on the German problem but also a connoisseur of West European art and that you would even be summoned to make expert museum appraisals?

[Falin] Yes, that is why I had the idea of transferring to the Hermitage to B.B. Piotrovskiy. But my request was turned down, which can only be regretted. Somewhat later, true, there was a "short circuit" on account of a denunciation to Yu.V. Andropov regarding my "unauthorized investigation" of the Katyn tragedy. In short, in 1983 I received an award—the position of political commentator of IZVESTIYA. I state this without irony and recall with satisfaction my work on the newspaper, which gave me an opportunity to complete my candidate's and write my doctoral thesis begun 25 years previously.

There is hardly any time left now for art and science. I manage infrequently to tear myself away for the theater or a concert. And too rarely, to see close friends: musicians, artists, and writers.

IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS Outlined

PM2808109590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report on new issue of IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS: "Published"]

[Text] Issue number eight of the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS has been published and is being sent to subscribers. It provides detailed information on the Central Committee and Central Control Commission elected by the 28th party congress and on the new leading party organs' first steps. There are brief biographies and portraits of Politburo members, Central Committee secretaries, members of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and members of the CPSU Central Control Commission Presidium, and also brief interviews with Central Committee Politburo members.

The journal has begun publishing the documents and materials presented to 28th party congress delegates including those on: the budget and CPSU property; Politburo members' and candidate members' and party Central Committee secretaries' answers to 28th CPSU Congress delegates' questions; information on the party personnel elected by 28th congress delegates; "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" documents; and "Congress" sociological service express information. There are excerpts from working people's telegrams and letters to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Detailed information on new social and political organizations, parties, and movements is published in the issue and the latest cadre changes are announced. At the request of readers, information is provided on the state foreign trade monopoly, on the armed nationalist underground in Estonia in the forties and fifties, and on membership dues in the French, British, and U.S. Communist Parties.

The issue's archive section contains the record of party Central Committee activities in January 1920, the first two parts of the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" ("Ryutin group") platform, as well as documents from the history of the Great Patriotic War (July 1941).

Meeting of City Soviets Improves Coordination

LD2708212890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1502 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Donetsk, Southeast Ukraine, 27 August (TASS)—Anatoliy Gordeyev and Vladimir Yurkevich, UKRINFORM-TASS correspondents, report:

The interregional conference of chairmen of city soviets of more than 30 cities with populations of over 1 million in the Ukraine, Russia, and Belorrussia, which has ended here, eliminated the lack of coordination among the leaders of the soviets of major industrial centers. They discussed questions of the interaction of city soviets with other levels of soviets and the coordination of their efforts in the conditions of the transition to the market economy.

"We are not only convinced that we have common misfortunes and tasks," said Aleksandr Makhmudov, chairman of the Donetsk City Soviet, when summing up the results, "but we also have found common points for applying forces. My colleagues decided to impart to the interregional conference a permanently operational status. Cooperation will now be carried out at the level of leaders of soviets, of permanent deputy's comissions, and deputy's and working groups according to directions and interests."

The conference in Donetsk discussed the previously common strategy of actions of the city soviets. The elaboration of tactics is next in line. The next interregional conference, which will take place in October in Volgograd, will be devoted to its immediate questions.

Deputies To Investigate 'Tobacco Crisis'

LD2708191690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] At the initiative of the Human Rights Committee and the Commission for Social Policy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a special group of deputies has been set up to study the causes of an acute tobacco crisis in the republic and to give help to the government in solving the problem. Mostovoy, member of the Human Rights Committee, told an INTERFAX correspondent that the group had gone to various Russian enterprises to analyze the situation locally. Comrade Mostovoy stressed that he is personally convinced that the crisis in tobacco sales came about not by itself but is a well-thought-out action by anti-perestroyka forces.

Economic

Premier Ryzhkov Views Soviet Economic Transition

AU2708150790 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 22 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[Report by Vladimir Mitarev on interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, "supplied through NOVOSTI specially for OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK"; place and date not given: "We Support a Uniform Free Market"]

[Text] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 10 September, Premier Ryzhkov will present the government program for the transition of the Soviet economy to market-based relations. How will this program differ from the previous one which was proposed last May?

According to Ryzhkov, the reports appearing in the press concerning a second, third, and recently also a fourth

program, drafted jointly with the president's working group, do not accurately reflect the actual situation.

"I believe that there has always only been one program," commented Ryzhkov in a conversation with a NOVOSTI correspondent. "Of course certain specific points in the program have been reviewed, but its basis remains the same, and we regard the present work as a final drafting of the program submitted to the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR."

What we are talking about is the "Abalkin program" which provides quite a long period for the transformations (1990-1993) and envisages a smooth transition to the market economy, accompanied by the development of its key structures in banking, supplies, and legislation. It provides for the preparation of numerous draft laws to establish the equality before the law of all forms of ownership, the independence of the producers, and the open nature of the economy as regards cooperation with foreign business. If we go back a little into the past, we will clearly see the consistency of the government's policy in implementing this program. Laws have already been adopted on ownership, the land, cooperatives, taxation of citizens' incomes and the profits of enterprises, as well as a number of government and presidential decrees on securities and joint stock companies, small enterprises, and so on. These are quite convincing fragments of the general picture of the economic reform.

Of course, continued Nikolay Ryzhkov, the changes in the political life of society to some extent induced the government to speed up its actions connected with the transition to market relations. However, if we take a more careful look we will see that the accelerated program which was the subject of discussion in February this year merely brought forward the deadlines for restructuring from 1993 to 1991. The government's conception remained unchanged on this occasion as well.

The premier considers that his speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session was a failure and incorrect from the tactical viewpoint since it failed to take account of the psychology of the people who primarily see the government program as a plan to increase prices, and several-fold at that. Nonetheless, the report which Ryzhkov will present to the deputies on 10 September basically contains the same ideas. The premier emphasized that the changes being introduced are not a whim on the part of Ryzhkov, Abalkin, and Gorbachev, but the result of the changes in society and in the political climate which is now much different from what it was last May. The striving of the republics (both the federated and autonomous ones) toward independence poses in a new way the issues of the distribution of power and responsibility for the decisions made. In the economic field, this primarily affects the distribution of incomes and the amounts withheld from taxes and foreign trade. The preparations for the transition to a market economy coincide with the preparation of the Union treaty, the economic basis of which is the distribution of economic power. Insofar as the limits of this power are determined by the republics themselves, the part of the government program on the transition to the market economy which concerns the interrelations between the republics and the center cannot be formulated without a mandate from the republics, and all the other sections of the program must take this fact into consideration.

However, it is not only the "primacy of the republics" which makes the prepared report different from the previous one. The program also sheds much more light on the problem of social protection which has provoked such a sharp reaction among the people. Moreover, the government has not limited itself merely to the issue of protecting the incomes of the poorly paid against inflation or the employment problem, but has also taken the population's savings under its wing and guaranteed that it will refrain from a monetary reform and a freeze on deposits.

Adjustments have also been made to the procedure for implementing the reforms in price fixing which has provoked the most discussion in society. It is often said that it is impossible to avoid increasing prices, although the state has agreed to leave the prices of the main kinds of food, communal services, and alcoholic drinks at their present levels. As for the rest, the premier proposes that they should be discussed by the republics, leaving them to decide whether to free prices or to try to maintain them at their previous levels.

"We see a market without any restrictions, with a uniform and healthy monetary system moving toward a convertible currency and with a central bank," stated the head of the Soviet Government in conclusion.

Agricultural

Soviet Grain Import Policy Examined

90UF0476A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by economist D. Bulatov under the rubric "The Agro-industrial Complex and the Foreign Market": "The Import of Goods: Reality and Myths"]

[Text] Long-term grain agreements (DZS's) have become an integral element of our practice of importing food goods, however much this has been denied by the MVES [USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations]. True, after August and December 1986 when such agreements went into effect with Canada and Argentina, no more DZS's were concluded. The reason is simple—there was practically no one to conclude them with.

Such agreements exist with all the main suppliers of grain: with the United States, Canada, and Argentina. Apart from that, we buy grain on a long-term basis within the framework of general trade agreements from France, the People's Republic of China, and Hungary.

Up until this year only distant Australia remained "untapped," but an agreement was recently concluded with it as well.

At the present time the USSR's purchases, solely in accordance with its DZS obligations, are about 20 million tons of grain which comprises one-tenth of all world imports. It is clear that such a volume of purchases cannot help but influence market conditions. However the leaders of the MVES deny this, stating that DZS's "naturally" reflect the interests of both parties "just like every bilateral document." Is this the case?

A little background. In 1975 the Ford administration, having obtained the USSR's assent to conclude the first long-term grain agreement, made the decision to forbid short-term sales of grain crops to us. That prohibition functioned for three months and was reversed only after the conclusion of an agreement—that is to say an embargo on the delivery of grain to the Soviet Union virtually existed during that period.

The transition of a portion of our grain trade over to a long-term, "planned" basis was accompanied by an increase in the strategic dependence of the Soviet Union on grain imports—their share in the country's grain consumption at the end of the seventies increased 15 percent. In the process, our dependence on the United States was fairly substantial—during the period 1975-1979 that country contributed about eight percent of the grain products consumed in the USSR. The U.S. share of grain imports after the conclusion of the DZS never dipped lower than 50 percent, and during some periods it approached 90 percent.

Such a level of dependence has given certain political circles in the United States a basis to view these deliveries as a potential lever for applying pressure to the USSR. Such views have been expressed quite openly at congressional hearings and in the press. Nonetheless, nothing has been done by our foreign trade department to diversify or disperse purchases among the countries as much as possible.

The assertions that the DZS's permit us to receive preferential prices, thanks to which we have already succeeded in supposedly saving hundreds of millions of rubles in freely convertible currency, do not hold up to criticism either. In fact, from May 1986 to May 1989 the United States delivered 17.1 million tons of wheat to the USSR under preferential conditions. The total sum of subsidies for that period was $541.3 million. However, they were granted to our country by the United States and European countries for quite different reasons, ones that are not connected with the DZS. There is a struggle between the United States and the EEC for the food goods market. As a result, both of them make use of subsidies which are granted not only to the Soviet Union but also to other importing countries.

The current U.S.-Soviet DZS runs out at the end of this year. As a result, a new agreement has already been signed. The minimum volume of our obligatory annual purchases of grain in the United States has been newly increased to 10 million tons. That means that we are forced to spend no less than $7 billion for this goal without taking price increases into account.

What influence will this agreement—the largest in the history of international grain trade—have on market conditions? How will it influence the freedom of action of our foreign trade organizations? Will we be able to allot the necessary amount of hard currency to fulfill our obligations? After all, a shortage of hard currency is already leading to delays in payments for the grain of U.S. suppliers today. And finally, has it occurred to anyone to consider what kind of increase our own agriculture could produce if the same sum were to go for purchases of the equipment, machinery, and technology necessary for its accelerated development?

As C. Yeutter, U.S. secretary of agriculture, reported a few days ago in THE WASHINGTON POST, the Soviet Union requested that the U.S. Administration grant credit guarantees worth approximately $2 million to finance purchases of U.S. grain this year. Yeutter warned that the granting of credit is tied to the adoption by the USSR of a law stipulating a more liberal emigration policy.... Is there any need for commentary...? It happens that, as previously, we are giving preference to foreign producers, hoping that "help will come from abroad." I would hope that in the future the conclusion of similar agreements will be preceded by a detailed discussion of them in the country's highest legislative organ. A long-term agreement with Canada runs out next year. Will we extend it?

Last year when the harvest ripened in the fields, equipment and transportation stood idle because of a lack of fuel. But we have continued to export our energy resources because we need hard currency in order to buy grain to replace what we lose. The throttle of foreign trade operations is set for "full speed ahead." And each year at the height of the harvest campaign, the ships that have delivered imported grain stand idle in the receiving ports. Fines are paid in hard currency for each day of idle time. One cannot think of a clumsier situation.

The absurdity of the situation shows that the whole system of foreign trade in this sector must be fundamentally restructured. The main objective is to make foreign economic relations accord with the existing needs of the economy.

The import system would undergo significant changes if the organizations, as customers, were allowed to decide whether to buy their grain from our own suppliers at domestic prices or from foreign suppliers at higher world prices. The monopoly of a single foreign trade association over the establishment of contacts with foreign suppliers of grain should also be broken. These ties could be maintained at far greater effectiveness by multi-product brokerage firms free of departmental control that compete with one another for our consumer and

have their own hard-currency resources—and an appropriately broad freedom of action—but do not import goods using centralized funds.

Such firms really could make active use of exchanges, not only purchasing grain there during periods of reduced prices but selling it during periods of high prices as well, and not necessarily directly or in their own name. Under such a system of grain imports we would succeed in avoiding the disarray that our purchases create. It would be a real use of an exchange mechanism as opposed to our current timid attempts to purchase grain on the exchange.

As domestic demand is satisfied, such firms could "introduce" our producers of wheat, rye, oats, sunflowers, flax, and other goods to the foreign market. As opposed to the oil and gas markets, a number of types of agricultural products are currently showing a long-term tendency toward increased prices on world markets. As a result, in the future our exports of so-called "temperate zone products" could more than pay for the import of other food and food-producing goods—tea, coffee, cocoa, spices, and other tropical produce—and become a serious source of hard-currency receipts.

Of course, no one intends to hold individual leaders of the MVES exclusively responsible for all the impasses and defects in our foreign economic policy. However, not to notice their role in its development and implementation would be to distort the picture of the problem as a whole. After all, even though the USSR's dependence on grain imports may be explained as a consequence of the low production of grain in our agriculture, the orientation for the most part on one country within the framework of an already severe dependence on imports is nonetheless exclusively the "achievement" of those persons who are responsible for implementation of grain purchases. A number of countries stipulate the maximum allowable dependence on deliveries of basic agricultural goods from abroad; the development in this country of a similar concept of food security would in practice mean limiting the powers of the MVES to choose trade partners where, of course, it is not an interested party.

Our difficulty, still unresolved to this day, is that the solution of foreign trade problems is not connected with the solution of internal problems. And although Minister K. Katushev also speaks in the press about the "Food Program, proclaimed by the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum," so far the MVES has not made the necessary contribution to its resolution. And incidentally, for the information of K. Katushev and those who prepared his speech on this issue, not a single one of the aforementioned forums—never mind all three—proclaimed the Food Program which was approved back at the May 1982 plenum. And despite its indeterminate nature, the Food Program nonetheless envisions resolution of the country's food problem on the basis of the development of the country's agro-industrial complex and not at all through growth in imports of agricultural products.

Goskomstat Reports on Harvest Progress, Problems

904B0283A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 24 Aug 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by N. Osychkin under the rubric "Commentary on a Report of the USSR Goskomstat": "Time Is Pressing"]

[Text] According to data from the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], 45.9 million hectares of grain and legume crops, excluding corn, had been threshed on kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] by 20 August—46 percent of the area under crops. Rainy weather slowed the harvest in many places. During the last week, 7.8 million hectares of grain were harvested which is 2.2 million hectares less than for the preceding week. During this period the farms of Lipetsk Oblast and Khabarovsk Kray threshed 26 percent of the area under grain production, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] 22 percent, Amur Oblast 21 percent, the Lithuanian SSR and Tambov Oblast 20 percent, the Belorussian SSR and Ryzan Oblast 19 percent, and Perm Oblast 18 percent. Meanwhile the harvest is going at a slower pace in Chelyabinsk and Orenburg Oblast and in Altay Kray, where only four to six percent of the crops were threshed during the week.

In all, 132.5 million tons of grain have been threshed around the country, including 17.5 million tons of grain for the week. Some 40.1 million tons of grain have been delivered to the state reserves; this is 47 percent of the state order and less than was delivered by this date last year. The farms of the Georgian SSR; the Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; Stavropol and Khabarovsk Krays; and Rostov, Orel, Bryansk, Donetsk, and Volyn Oblasts have fulfilled the state order. However the pace of grain purchases remains low. Only 5.3 million tons were purchased over the past week—1.1 million tons less than for the preceding week.

The overload of grain on a number of southern elevators is slowing down purchases. This is caused by a shortage of wagons. Shipments of grain out from enterprises in Nikolayev, Poltava, Kharkov, Rostov, Volgograd, and Saratov Oblasts as well as Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays have decreased.

As before, the kolkhozes and the sovkhozes are not being properly supplied with fuel and lubricants and the schedules of their deliveries are not being kept. During only 12 days of August, agricultural consumers were shorted 101,000 tons of gasoline. The fuel delivery situation is especially troublesome in the Ukraine; Kazakhstan; in Rostov, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kaluga, Kursk, and Smolensk Oblasts; and in Krasnoyarsk, Altay, and Maritime Krays.

The sowing of winter grain crops is under way. There have been 2.8 million hectares sown. Some 6.6 million hectares have been plowed for winter fallow. Preparations are proceeding twice as slow as last year's.

Soon it will be fall. Each day exists for both this year's and next year's harvests!

Peasant Family Given Land 'In Perpetuity'

PM2808094990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 23 Aug 90

[Report by A. Mochalov and Ye. Konstantinov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The recent development of new forms of ownership in agriculture is helping to strengthen farms in Kirov Oblast. A report from our correspondent.

[Reporter] A vacant plot in the village of Pyanovskiy [as heard] on the Iskra Sovkhoz [state farm], Sunskiy Rayon. It would still have been vacant had not three peasants arrived—the Zhelonkins, a father and his two sons. Zhelonkin senior is a machine operator, his son Gennadiy is an agronomist, and his younger son Sergey is a mechanical engineer. They all came from Kazakhstan, not only because they're not natives of that area. They also upped stakes because they found living at the beck and call of various bureaucrats intolerable. The idea of becoming their own boss was a real attraction. The sovkhoz people understood the peasants. Of course they sized them up first, then allocated them animals, equipment, and land as well as concluded a long-term lease agreement. The farmers are doing well, weight gains are good, plenty of feed has been laid in, and papers have been sent to the rayon applying for the land to be completely transferred for use in perpetuity by the family. They will be farmers.

So do peasants need land or not?

[Zhelonkin] I think they do. But it must be land they can feel they own, that is, land where they can work freely.

[Reporter] We're used to landowners being harassed and beset by difficulties. Here the picture is different. And the solution to the complex problem of ownership turns out to be unexpectedly simple when the main requirement exists: willingness and goodwill on the part of both interested parties, the former users and the new landowners.

Military

Yakovlev Discusses Defense Industry 'Conversion'

AU2708141990 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25-26 Aug 90 p 5

[NOVOSTI interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "We Are Not Ready"]

[Text] A UN conference entitled "Conversion: Changes in the Economic Field in an Age of Arms Reduction" was held in Moscow from 13 through 17 August. The conference was attended by businessmen and scholars from 40 countries. Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council, was among them. A NOVOSTI correspondent put the following questions to him:

[NOVOSTI] Many people, including those who delivered papers at the conference, believe that the conversion process as such should begin with a change in people's attitudes and in the principles that governments and parties base their actions on. In your opinion, what will be more difficult to overcome: people's mistrust or the conservatism of politicians?

[Yakovlev] I think that we should begin by saying that, apart from attitudes and principles, people as well as governments and parties have ordinary human and political interests.... They have various interests of this kind. For example, two years ago I visited a certain strategic military base. A whole town had grown up there. So what will really happen once it is closed down? Where will the hundreds of children who need schools and kindergartens go? Where will their parents work? It is already the case that many of the 500,000 officers and warrant officers who have been discharged from the Army as part of the reductions have no homes. This was something that was overlooked by the state and the military authorities who knew about the changes that were coming but failed to proceed fast enough with the construction of housing for the troops who were about to be demobilized.

It has to be acknowledged that when one talks about conversion, those who are directly affected very often consider it to be an assault on the well-being that they earned themselves through their work. Thus, the first thing that has to be done is to do everything possible to ensure that a person has the same material and intellectual circumstances as before.

For example, there is a tank factory that has never produced anything but tanks. What will happen to it under the conversion process? What should one do with the work force? Perhaps I could flippantly say that nothing should be done. Perhaps wages could continue to be paid until the factory completely goes over to civilian production or until people find suitable work. It will, nevertheless, be advantageous for the state which will be able to conserve important resources in this way and will allocate them for civilian purposes. Of course, both sides will have to agree on a time limit for finding new solutions and steps would have to be taken to prevent possible abuse. That aside, I think that there are branches of the national economy that are capable of "swallowing up" the military industrial complex—for example, to engage in production that would meet ecological needs. I know that there is a great international project in the USSR that is estimated to be worth tens of

billions of rubles. Why should we not divert defense industry capacity to work on the project?

In addition there are highly skilled workers, engineers, and scientists working in the military-industrial complex, people who possess an enormous fund of skills and knowledge, and I doubt very much whether they will be faced with the danger of unemployment under market conditions even if they change the nature of their work.

As far as politicians are concerned, there is resistance of a different kind. If you, during the course of your life, had become accustomed to thinking in terms of one set of categories; if the idea of pacifism combined with a "hostile environment" was simply encoded in your genes, you would find it difficult to change. That is why overcoming conservatism on the part of politicians—and not as much "pure" politicians as those connected with defense and the defense industry—will be much more difficult. It is because they represent different interests. However, today's philosophy brings these two political wings closer together insofar as there is an awareness of the fact that there is no alternative to disarmament and conversion. What is more, in the Soviet Union disarmament is a condition for restructuring. Quite simply, we have to "hit the bull's eye."

[NOVOSTI] Are conversion issues being examined by the Presidential Council?

[Yakovlev] It is on the agenda, and a preliminary plan which was prepared by the Commission for Promoting Conversion, headed by Academician B. Avadujevskiy, has already been discussed. However, we are waiting for similar proposals from the USSR Council of Ministers. A council of experts that would work out a single national plan might be set up. I think that it would include outstanding Soviet scientists and managers.

[NOVOSTI] In your opinion, how quickly can society be made interested in this problem?

[Yakovlev] I think that there has to be complete openness in discussing every subject and everything that can be said should be said.

[NOVOSTI] What effect may the crisis in the Persian Gulf have on the conversion process which is still in its early stages? Will it not dampen the enthusiasm of the advocates of conversion?

[Yakovlev] The military conflict in the Middle East is undoubtedly a tragic and disturbing fact. It reminds us that peace can be easily disrupted. However, I think that conversion—understood as arms reductions and therefore a new stage in mutual relations between peoples and governments—will not be negatively affected by it.

Airborne Commander Views Gorbachev Visit, Iraq

OW2808082690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2130 GMT 25 Aug 90

[Video report by journalist D. Kurilenko from the "Serving the Fatherland" program]

[Text] Military exercises were underway in the Odessa Military District on 17 August. Troops from Guards Airborne units demonstrated their combat skills to Soviet President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Many things were demonstrated, including drops of military equipment from a height not exceeding three meters, the parachuting of troops in their combat vehicles, unarmed combat, and all the other skills that make the winged infantrymen famous.

Unfortunately, the state security services apparently consider that the Law on the Press does not extend to them, and therefore our film crew was not given an opportunity to interview the president. Instead, our questions were answered by Colonel General Vladislav Alekseyevich Achalov, commander of Soviet Airborne Troops.

[Begin recording] [Kurilenko] Why did Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev interrupt his vacation to attend the military exercise in the Odessa Military District?

[Achalov] Well, he did not interrupt his leave; he is still on vacation. The defense minister simply informed him that exercises were being held in the Odessa Military District under the command of the commander in chief, and Mikhail Sergeyevich apparently has wanted to meet with the military for some time now and thus expressed his desire to attend the exercises. These were planned exercises without the excessive bustle that we witnessed previously when we anticipated the attendance of important guests. And so he attended these exercises.

[Kurilenko] Did he like what he saw?

[Achalov] Well, when he met with the officers and commanders, he assessed the actions of both the sailors and paratroopers very highly. Our men exerted great efforts and achieved good results.

[Kurilenko] Vostrotin, division commander and Hero of the Soviet Union, told the president that he would make him an honorary soldier in his division. How do you assess this?

[Achalov] Well, he did not say that. He told him that the personnel would like the president... They had asked the division commander.... [Achalov changes thought] After the assault exercise, Valeriy Aleksandrovich told the president of his decision and then expressed this request. Mikhail Sergeyevich received it with satisfaction. I believe that this will be a great stimulus for our soldiers, not only for the soldiers of this regiment but for all

airborne troops. So, by an order of the division commander, Mikhail Sergeyevich will be included as an honorary soldier in the First Parachute Assault Company.

[Kurilenko] Will he have to jump?

[Achalov] Well, I think we have the men to jump, so let Mikhail Sergeyevich engage in state affairs. But I believe that this will be a great stimulus for the soldiers and airborne troops in the performance of their duties.

[Kurilenko] Vladislav Aleksandrovich, you are the commander of airborne troops. How do you assess everything that is presently happening in Kuwait, something the whole world is talking about? Did you talk to the president about this after the exercises, after he saw what you were capable of doing?

[Achalov] Our press has made an objective assessment of these events. In his speech to the officers Mikhail Sergeyevich also made an assessment. We did not talk about this during our meeting, during his visit to these exercises. But as far as what is happening there is concerned, this is of course another new and very serious hotbed of tensions which can lead to much bloodshed.

[Kurilenko] What did the president have to say about the development of airborne troops?

[Achalov] Mikhail Sergeyevich assessed very highly the paratroopers' activities, as I have already said. He pointed out that we still need these troops at present and that they demand and need further improvement. [end recording]

Land on Sakhalin Returned to Civilian Use

PM2808095790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 23 Aug 90

[Report by V. Feoktistov and V. Shinkarev from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The inhabitants of Sakhalin have obtained 50,000 hectares of new agricultural land at one stroke of the USSR defense minister's pen.

[Reporter] Here are some figures for comparison purposes. There are 44,000 hectares of cultivated land on Sakhalin—that is, just five-hundredths of a hectare per resident. The rest of the land is made up of mountains, swamps, and peat bogs. Yet at the same time, many thousands of hectares of land suitable for agricultural use have not been used at all for years. They are cordoned off by these long concrete fences and indicated by boundary marks and cuttings. This is Defense Ministry land. Most of it, I repeat, has not been used for years. The new Sakhalin Oblast Soviet, having set its sights on the socioeconomic renewal of the island and its transformation into a free enterprise zone and a prosperous area, started campaigning as soon as it took office for this land to be returned to peasants. And now the long-awaited document, on a standard form and with the signature of USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, has arrived. The question of transferring 50,000 hectares of Defense Ministry land to the Sakhalin Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] has been resolved positively. [passage omitted]

Baltic Republics

Russian-Speaking Estonian Deputies Issue Appeal

LD2808082890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0710 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Tallinn, 28 Aug (TASS)—An appeal to build together a common home, the name of which is Estonia, has been issued to the population of this Baltic republic by a number of Russian-speaking parliamentary deputies. Their appeal has been published here today.

The document categorically rejects the attempts being made in the republic to portray Russian-speaking deputies as "the bearers of imperial policy and neo-Stalinists."

"The Supreme Soviet of Estonia has adopted quite a lot of declarations and resolutions on independence, on the break with the Union, on restoring the Estonian Republic," the appeal goes on to say. "These are quite important documents in political terms, but do they have validity and relevance if they are not supported and guaranteed by economic independence?

"And this is the truth, because each one of us is being convinced every day when we see the unchecked growth in prices, the ever-growing list of shortages, speculation—on a state level as well—and life becoming more expensive...."

The deputies note that their attempts to discuss these questions at Supreme Soviet sessions are met by concerted and categorical opposition from the ruling majority. Not one of their proposals on including economic questions on the agenda has received support.

The appeal expresses indignation that none of the proposed Russian-speaking delegates was included in the commission empowered to conduct negotiations with the USSR and the RSFSR. "We are firmly convinced that this should not be; that Estonians are not hostile to either the Russian people or any others," the appeal says.

Moscow, Estonia Talks Begin in Kremlin

PM2808102390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS "Official" report: "Talks Begin"]

[Text] Talks on relations between the USSR and Estonia began in the Kremlin on 23 August between official representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and a delegation from the Estonian Republic, authorized by the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

At the first meeting the delegations set out the sides' initial positions concerning the subject of the talks. The sides agreed that in the course of the talks a wide range of issues will be touched on, relating to historical and legal aspects of relations between the Soviet Union and Estonia and also relating to the present and future of state, economic, and humanitarian links between them. There was a discussion of the organizational plan and schedule for subsequent talks, which will last until the end of October 1990.

The meeting between the delegations took place in a frank and constructive atmosphere and was geared to the quest for solutions that meet both sides' interests.

Savissar Addresses Price Stabilization Meeting

LD2808114590 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] A conference chaired by Estonian government chairman Edgar Savissar on 26 August addressed price stabilization (?issues).

It was noted that in preparing for economic reform, the price liberalization package has overtaken other economic regulators.

Thus, it was decided that resolutions adopted by the republic of Estonia's government and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers pertaining to independent setting of regular prices for periodicals should be suspended until relations between enterprises and the state are put in order; new taxes are levied; and several social programs are implemented, including adjusting incomes according to the cost of living index.

The government chairman also cancelled the Tallinn city government resolution on the temporary use of commercial prices for retail gasoline sales and ordered the Estonian Fuel Production Association to stop selling gasoline at commercial prices.

Recognition of Lithuanian Independence Pushed

LD2808093690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas said that Lithuania's contacts with the West, impressive as they may be, do not change anything because the West has firmly granted to the East the right to be first in recognizing the status of independent Lithuania.

Speaking on Lithuanian Television yesterday afternoon [27 August], Romualdas Ozolas pointed out that international recognition of independence is becoming the top priority. This is not because of the possibility of receiving international credits but because, as he put it, "moral degradation could begin" in Lithuania. The deputy prime minister stressed that according to him the most significant point is that during the last couple of weeks the center of Lithuanian foreign policy has been shifted to the East.

However, Romuladas Ozolas said that the political advantage gained from the Russian Federation by Lithuania would be rather insignificant.

Lithuanian Official Discusses Republic Investment

LD2708125190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Statements by Egidijus Bickauskas, Lithuanian republic envoy to Moscow; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bickauskas] I have never visited Yakutiya but hear it is a very rich area; a rich yet very poor republic. It is rich in its mining resources, of which only diamonds and gold are currently being exploited; nothing else is left since everything goes [word indistinct]. Moreover, since discussion is currently focusing on a transfer to market relations, they are somewhat alarmed and are looking for such contacts, with Lithuania also, to establish joint firms and joint enterprises. I think the Lithuanian government should certainly note this since a great future is really in store for this republic. The Japanese, the Czechs, the Austrians, and many other firms are looking in its direction.

If we we were not so poor, it would really behoove us to invest as much capital as possible in those areas.

[Correspondent] This amounted to a so-called scouting expedition?

[Bickauskas] Let us refer to it as, yes a scouting expedition. I hope, we will soon be able to sign some.

I will provide the government with some information [word indistinct] about my excursion. I think some interested individuals will come forward who will direct their attention to this republic, especially since it plans to announce its declaration of sovereignty at the beginning of September.

Although this declaration is, as you know, more symbolic, let us refer to it as such, especially since Yakutiya itself has not progressed that far democratization wise.

Ozolas Says Lithuania Should Shift Focus to East

LD2808052990 Moscow TASS in English 0516 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius August 27 TASS—"Contacts with the West, no matter how impressive, accomplish nothing for Lithuania," said Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas.

This is why he believes that the republic's foreign policy should shift its focus to the East. "Lithuania is not a state for Western countries," he said. "The West has firmly ceded to the East the right to be the first to recognise the status of our state."

"The international recognition of independent Lithuania is a high priority need not only because it will enable us to receive credits to patch up the biggest economic holes, but also because it will prevent the beginning of our spiritual degradation," he said.

Ozolas noted that the republican economy, especially trade, is very weak and profiteering has reached an unprecedented scale.

Misiukonis 'Ambiguous' on Kaunus Death

LD2308151390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 22 Aug 90

[Text] [Words indistinct] in political life in Lithuania is rather undecided, and the act of independence proclaimed by the Lithuanian parliament on 11 March opened a new era in this country. However, there are still lots of Soviet relics in everyday life; no doubt a transitional period is necessary and even unavoidable.

But, has this transitional period started already in all the spheres of our lives?

The Lithuanian people could hear today the parliamentary debate broadcast by the local radio. One of the issues discussed was the situation in the Lithuanian interior ministry and the militia force. Marijonas Misiukonis, the interior minister, had to explain the reasons for the negligent reaction of the militia to the death of a young Lithuanian in the streets of Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city.

The young man did not want to continue his service in the Soviet Army and, of course, fled from the military unit. The Soviet soldiers pursued him and shot him dead in broad daylight. According to one member of the Lithuanian parliament, the militia has to sound all the bells at once. Regretably, it did not do so.

It was not easy for the Lithuanian interior minister to give a clear-cut answer to this question. According to the laws that are still valid, the crimes committed by the soldiers are investigated by the Soviet military procurators' office, which in its turn does not recognize the independence of Lithuania and ignores its governmental officials.

The Lithuanian militia itself is in a very ambiguous situation. The greater part of its expenditure is still financed by Moscow. The Lithuanian government plans to fully finance it only with the beginning of the next year. From then on, the Lithuanian militia is going to be called the police.

The finanical dependence of the Lithuanian militia on Moscow is not the only obstacle in the way of creating an independent police force here in Lithuania. Part of the present militia staff is not loyal to the government of the Lithuanian republic. This was pointed out by (?Zigmas Vaisvila), chairman of the parliamentary commission on the defense and interior affairs, at today's sitting of the parliament. (?Zigmas Vaisvila) cited several documents

in Lithuanian and Russian revealing the ambiguous standpoint of high militia officials on the hunt down of the Lithuanian evaders of the Soviet Army whose persecution is organized in an especially cruel way. The contents of these documents, compiled by the Lithuanian interior minister himself, is opposed to the official policies of the Lithuanilan militia, namely the policy complying with the legislation of the Republic of Lithuania exclusively.

Marijonas Misiukonis is [words indistinct] and a lawyer by profession, had worked for 22 years in the Lithuanian branch of the KGB system. He was appointed to the post of the interior minister last year by the former Lithuanian parliament. The present parliament reappointed him as minister of interior, (?the first) of independent Lithuania.

Observers think that Marijonas Misiukonis was thought to be able to consolidate the Lithuanian militia force in the face of the danger of its breaking into two opposite sides. It seems that Mr. Misiukonis succeeded in this. However, (?the reports) were released about the noble deeds of the present militia for the sake of Lithuania.

Officers in Lithuanian uniform started to appear on the streets of the Lithuanian cities. Marijonas Misiukonis himself has publicly confirmed his loyalty to the new legislation of Lithuania. It seems however, that the interior minister has (?given up strengthening) his position today. The reverse might be more probable. The crime is skyrocketing in Lithuania and young men are unwilling to join the militia force because of the low wages.

The present ambiguous situation of the interior minister is tearing him apart. The ministry itself is still dependent on Moscow, and the minister should be more resolute in making the final decision. (?Zigmas Vaisvila), chairman of the parliamentary commission on defense and interior affairs, who made the most serious accusation today, told Radio Vilnius that the present militia force of Lithuania is full of high-ranking officials who are not loyal to the Lithuanian government. There are strings attached that lead to the minister himself.

And here we should add that the Lithuanian militia is the only force in Lithuania capable of ensuring order today. Lithuania (?still has) no army of its own, and most probably some time will pass until it is going to have some military units. The Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania is opposed to a freely-elected parliament; therefore, scandals of all kinds in the Lithuanian militia force are absolutely detrimental to the independence of Lithuania.

Procuracy Issues Directive on 'Kidnappings'

LD2508063190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 24 Aug 90

[Text] Increased frequency of incidents involving the kidnapping of Lithuanian young men has given rise to serious anxiety among the Lithuanian people. The criminal acts are perpetrated by Soviet Army soldiers, aided by military commissariat workers and collaborators.

These are barbaric crimes that are atypical of civilized states, points out the Lithuanian Republic General Procuracy Statement. The procurator general of the Lithuanian Republic and the minister of internal affairs have ordered the security organs leadership to initiate criminal proceedings, as soon as posible, in all cases concerning Lithuanian youths' kidnappings, woundings or killings, in Lithuania by military personnel.

The Lithuanian Republic's law protection organs will carry out (?an investigation) of such cases, while completed criminal cases will be examined by courts of the Lithuanian Republic, solely, notes the declaration.

Writer Sees Aim To 'Exploit' Pact Anniversary

PM2808092790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Aug 90 Second Edition pp 1, 6

[Article by correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "Anger Is No Argument"]

[Text] Vilnius, 23 Aug—It was on 23 August that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed, 51 years ago. A whole series of public events—debates, conferences, demonstrations—is being staged in Lithuania by "Sajudis" to coincide with this date.

Unfortunately the first of these events, which took place today, already indicates that people are still being overemotional and that some people are openly trying to exploit this date, which is a time of sorrow not just for Lithuania, to exacerbate confrontation and tension.

It was as though at a word of command actions began in the republic's cities aimed at defiling or dismantling monuments to V.I. Lenin and other prominent political figures and Soviet military heroes. In spite of feeble protests from the government and exhortations from the republic's Ministry of Culture, assaults on monuments have continued.

Yesterday, at midday, I arrived at the monument to General I.D. Chernyakhovskiy in downtown Vilnius, where numerous groups had gathered. No, there was no debate; instead, we heard vulgar abuse.

Nearby, across the road, is the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Institute of Sociopolitical Research. The former Party History Institute. I spoke briefly to its director, K. Surblis, who had just been literally pulled from the hands of an irate crowd. What happened?

The institute had accumulated a large archive over the course of decades. The quarrel about to whom it belonged—the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party or the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU)—spilled over onto the pages of the newspapers. And the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to cut the Gordian knot with one stroke by resolving, on the very

eve of 23 August, to transfer it to the State Archives. At the same time a rumor began circulating that the Communists were planning to carry off the documents in the night. An agitated crowd assembled at the doors of the institute at dawn on 23 August. K. Surblis came out to talk to the people and explain the situation. However, many of the assembled crowd found his words not to their liking. They pushed and jostled the elderly man, grabbed him by the hair, and tore his clothes.

"The decision of the parliamentary presidium is unlawful," K. Surblis said to me, "but we had no intention of removing the archive. This is a provocation."

Emotions, fury... Even as it is, you meet them at every step these days. Why then inflame passions more and more? Is it really the right time, on the eve of Vilnius' talks with Moscow, when all questions can be settled by political means, to compare our border with the Berlin Wall? One of the "Sajudis" events is the organization of a camp site and a demonstration near the Polish-Soviet border in Lazdijai. A mass crossing of the border was planned. I telephoned Lithuanian Internal Affairs Minister M. Misjukonis.

"The situation in Lazdijai is calm," he said. "The border guards let 500 people through to the Polish side on Soviet passports. Having met the Polish organizers of the action there, they all quickly returned."

Attacks on Monuments Investigated in Vilnius

LD2808095890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced that the attacks in Vilnius last week on Bolshevik monuments are under investigation. These attacks coincided with the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact last Thursday when a crude attack on Lenin's monument in the city center was committed that afternoon by a group of citizens who took part in a rally organized by the Lithuanian League of Liberty.

After a scuffle with a group of so-called Soviet citizens, a bottle filled with a flammable liquid was thrown at the Lenin monument. Since World War II, the West has labeled such devices Molotov cocktails.

Some time later, in another part of the city center, a memorial plaque to Justas Paleckis, first chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, was ripped off and smashed.

Domininkas-Vytautas Sustautas, who is suspected to have committed the offense, has been detained by the militia. He is from Kaunas.

Last month, after similar attacks on Bolshevik monuments were carried out in Kaunas, these monuments were demolished under a decision of the city's local government. The authorities in Siauliai did the same.

Rubiks Interviewed on Latvian Parties' Status

90UN2616A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 12 Aug 90 p 1

[Interview with A.P. Rubiks, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, conducted by V. Zaytsev for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA; place and date not given: "Being a Communist in Latvia"]

[Text] Riga—[Zaytsev] Alfreds Petrovich, your assessment of the 28th CPSU Congress? To what extent were your hopes justified?

[Rubiks] I am one of those Communists who believe that the congress accomplished its mission. I shall attempt to explain why. First, we avoided a split, the congress prevented such. Second, the congress succeeded, in my view, in bringing closer on a number of issues the viewpoints of the different platforms, which prior to the congress were defending their own positions. And, third, the congress has armed the Communists with an action program for the immediate future. I include here the work connected with the preparation of a new party program. Therefore when I hear arguments to the effect that the congress failed to justify hopes and live up to expectations, I always ask: What expectations? And people frequently find it difficult to answer precisely. I, however, believe that the congress undoubtedly justified the hopes.

[Zaytsev] You have been elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. What, in your view, should the new principle of the formation of this collective directive organ of the party do?

[Rubiks] To be honest, this turnabout in my fate—election as member of the Politburo—was for me and my Union republic Communist Party first secretary colleagues a surprise. Although, thinking about what the nature of the Politburo should be and recognizing that we are moving toward a union of sovereign states, I fully understand that both the party and the structure of its directive authorities must be modified accordingly. We did not, therefore, rule out such a version of the formation of the Politburo in principle.

This will do a good deal in terms of the fact that the opinions of the Communists will not now be submitted to the Politburo by region, and in its new composition, not only by "permanent" CPSU Central Committee secretaries but also representatives from the localities. This will afford an opportunity for tightening the connection between the viewpoint of the "masses" and the primary party organizations and the problems which should be dealt with by the Politburo as a whole. I am convinced that this was a principal shortcoming of its former composition—the link with the Communists locally was lost, and purely theoretically abstract conclusions, at times insufficiently substantiated on the basis of

specific material from the localities, engendered a certain discrepancy between how the center felt and understood this task and problem or the other and how it was perceived in the masses.... I believe that, given the new way of forming the Politburo, this problem will be solved.

[Zaytsev] The Latvian Communist Party is now operating under multiparty conditions, as an opposition party, essentially. What can be said about the particular features of the Communists' work in this situation?

[Rubiks] Yes, it is now the second year that the Latvian Communist Party has operated under opposition conditions. We lacked and still lack sufficient experience on how to operate under such conditions. We would like to occupy a position of constructive opposition and we aspire to this. We came to the conclusion that we needed to form a parliamentary faction—"Equality." This is not a faction of the Latvian Communist Party, its composition is somewhat broader. We have already drawn up an alternative version of the bill "Social and Political Organizations and Parties" and, by way of legislative initiative, a draft referendum law. We are now working on a bill on protection of the rights of needy families under the conditions of a market economy.

One further question is the participation in government bodies. Unfortunately, the government and leadership of the parliamentary committees were formed on a mononational basis, and since the majority of our faction is composed of people of non-Latvian nationality, they have been excluded. There is a similar situation when it comes to organizing groups for negotiations. This is unjust and undemocratic, if only because our faction constitutes almost one-third of the Supreme Soviet.

I would note that the final version of the CPSU Rules formulates the tasks and propositions which could help the Communists work, say, in the soviets while members of the opposition.

[Zaytsev] The development of the social and political life of the republic is being influenced by the problem of interethnic relations.

[Rubiks] At the basis of all our friction between parties and social currents and, to a certain extent, of the split in public opinion are, as distinct from other republics, not questions of interethnic relations but political issues.

How should Latvia develop: become a sovereign republic within the USSR or separate from it? On which path to proceed: socialist or nonsocialist? Use is being made of interethnic relationships also in order to impart to this a more emotional coloration. Following the formation of the government on a mononational basis and after great attention—frequently deserved, but sometimes exaggerated also—has been paid in various bills to all that is purely Latvian, the non-Latvian population is beginning to feel uncomfortable. I, as people's deputy of the USSR and the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], conduct meetings with the electorate, and more than half of those who apply to see me ask: "What should we do? Should we leave Latvia or not? Where can we go?" I believe that this is an indication that the use of interethnic relations to achieve political ends has had an effect. Those who are advocating Latvia's separation from the Soviet Union see as a necessary condition the fact that three-fourths of the republic's population should be of Latvian nationality. These as yet constitute 52 percent. It cannot be ruled out that their plans include the creation of such an uncomfortable atmosphere as to ensure that some of the non-Latvian population leave the republic. Our party, of course, is opposed to this.

[Zaytsev] There are now in Latvia two Communist Parties—that which you head and the independent party. Is dialogue or compromise possible, and if so, on what issues?

[Rubiks] Yes, at the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress some delegates announced their withdrawal not only from the congress' hall of sessions but also from the Latvian Communist Party as a component of the CPSU. This step struck a certain blow at the Latvian Communist Party for, following the first session of the congress, the same processes occurred locally in the primary party organizations. Some Communists have quit the party and, it is true, the majority of them has not gone to the "independent" Latvian Communist Party but has considered itself disillusioned with political life....

In the time that has elapsed since the first session of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress we have drawn up a program of action under these conditions, when Communists find themselves under constant moral pressure and being a member of the Latvian Communist Party currently is not easy. It may be hinted to you: "Leave the Communist Party, and you will have a position, stay, and we will find someone else to take your place." One needs really to be a Communist to stand one's ground and struggle for the ideas inscribed on our party's banner.

We have been able since the split to fully restore the structure of the rayon and city party committees—there are now as many of them as there were prior to the congress—although the splitters were hoping that they could eliminate not only the primaries but also the rayon party committees—with their eyes on the rural rayons. But this has not happened, and we believe that we have achieved the first serious victory en route to the restoration of the unity of the Latvian Communist Party. Account also has to be taken of the instances of depoliticization of the state authorities. Some ministers of the republic are in a great hurry to put into effect the ideas contained in the draft law "Social and Political Organizations and Parties," the ideas being put forward by the leaders of the Latvian People's Front and the national independence movement. But they amount to an outlawing of our party.

As of the present approximately 16,000 persons have clearly formalized their withdrawal from the Latvian Communist Party (it had 177,000 members as of the start of the year). There are in the rayon and city party committees approximately 22,000 party cards and applications. This process has now come to a halt. There are most likely people who were waiting not only for the 28th CPSU Congress but also those who will wait for the concluding session of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress. And will then finally determine their position. Such people may, it is true, only nominally be called Communists.

As far, however, as the "independent" Communists are concerned, I believe that dialogue with them is possible, compromise, hardly.... This is why. The Latvian Communist Party advocates development of the republic's sovereignty within the Soviet Union, and we support the socialist choice. The "independent" Latvian Communist Party has directly opposite goals—it advocates secession from the USSR and a complete severance of ties to the CPSU as a single organization and is contemplating a change of name (there is talk in the discussions about a variety of socialist party). And they see the path of development and state arrangement as being not socialist but based on the constitution of bourgeois Latvia of 1922.

So there can be no compromise because they will renounce neither of their goals. In any event, the Latvian Communist Party has advocated and continues to advocate the socialist choice—the future belongs to it.

Latvian Communist Sees Need for 'Integral'

904A0558C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 8 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by V. Afendik, secretary of the party committee of the "Alfa" production association and member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, under the rubric "The Experience of Our Neighbors": "Prices Rise and the Enterprises Unite..."]

[Text] **The interbranch territorial association "Integral" has been created in Estonia. Having found out that the factory imeni Kh. Pegelman had also joined the association, the related "Alfa" enterprise decided to explain locally what has caused the creation of the association and what kind of advantages there are for enterprises who join it.**

Tallinn.... The last time I was here was several months ago. The streets of the old city are just as full of tourists, and the "informals" are leading the same heated discussions near Old Toomas. But there is also a new feature in the atmosphere of city life—anxiety. Anxiety about the future, about rising prices for products, and about a life that is growing more expensive every day. People speak about it in the food stores, on the city transportation, and at the newspaper stands. This same theme is discussed by people of different nationalities, who are expressing dissatisfaction with the actions of the government.

The new government of Estonia needs funds to implement its programs. Now it has "found" the simplest and quickest route for getting them—raising prices for state trade and increasing taxes.

Several months ago it was decided to raise prices on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. Then vegetables and fruits at state prices disappeared from the shelves of the stores. They were replaced by those at "contract" prices, which are actually market prices. The newspapers became more expensive—now the minimum price for a press publication is 10 kopeks. Since July, prices for fish and for fish products have doubled on the average.

But apparently the funds which have been earned are not enough. There are attempts to compensate for gaps in the local budget by making only irregular payments to the Union budget. The reaction of the Union Government is to reduce state subsidies for lower retail prices on a number of food products, which in turn results in a new round of price increases: A doubling of the price for city transportation has been announced for 1 August, and meat and milk products will become more expensive in October. A significant increase in the price of apartments and public utilities is expected.

Nor do the kilometers-long lines at the filling stations promote confidence in the future. But at present the government is not concluding profitable agreements on direct deliveries of fuel from the oil-producing republics, although proposals do exist.

Like mushrooms after a summer shower, hard-currency stores are popping up in Tallinn. And it is possible to reconcile oneself to the abundance of tobacco, perfume, and alcohol products available for dollars, but the inaccessibility of outer clothing and children's goods evokes contrary sentiments from the city's residents.

It would be naive to suppose that the stores, where only dollars, marks, and pounds are in circulation, are only for the numerous tourists. One may already notice around them growing packs of young people with a business-like and predatory gleam in their eyes. And in the evening many cabdrivers will not agree to drive you for our own rubles, demanding instead green paper with a picture of Washington or some other convertible currency.

Hard-currency stores may be a step toward a market, but they are also a step away from the interests of the workers. In the general understanding, the market is an opportunity for a conscientious worker to buy all the necessary goods for honestly earned money. If the government were to pay out a portion of wages in hard currency, there would be no controversy. But at present the population cannot earn dollars by honest means. And no one cares how those who are spending hard currency in the appropriate stores have obtained it.

True, I must mention that over recent months the government has taken a number of steps directed at

supporting the standard of living of some categories of the population. The wages for workers in public health, cultural institutions, and local industry have increased significantly. But in the first place, this is only a portion of the republic's population. Those who work in enterprises under Union jurisdiction have found themselves in a disadvantageous position inasmuch as their wages are not regulated by the local power. In the second place, if we are to compare the increase in prices to the increase in wages, it turns out that the higher cost of living more than "eats up" the extra money in the family budget. And we are not talking about just any system of social compensation. The recently published draft law on taxation of Republic of Estonia citizens, which stipulates a substantial increase in the percent of wages that is to be handed over to the state treasury, has provoked an outcry of opposition.

Only by taking these instances from the life of the Republic of Estonia into account may one correctly evaluate the move of 12 of the largest Tallinn enterprises in creating the association "Integral." The association is not advancing any political demands. Its chief goal is to defend the economic and social interests of the workers and officials of state enterprises under Union jurisdiction. By combining finances and exchanging materials and equipment, they open up the opportunity for more rational management. They have plans for the creation of their own construction organization which will undertake the construction of housing and cultural facilities.

The USSR Government has commissioned the appropriate Union ministries to supply the members of the association with the full volume of limited resources and raw materials that have been allotted. An agreement has been reached on changing the percentage of deductions from the profits, which will permit implementation of a significant increase in wages.

It seems that the government of any country would be interested in the efficient operation of the enterprises located on its territory and an improvement in the welfare of its workers. But the government of the Republic of Estonia has responded with a declaration stating its dissatisfaction with the creation of the association. It contains a reference to the USSR Law on the Economic Independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Council of Baltic States also opposes the association.

One cannot help but notice the contradictions in the assertions of the government and of the press, which expresses the interests of the National Front of Estonia. Previously the thinking was that the enterprises under Union jurisdiction in Estonia are not necessary because the majority of production is exported outside the republic. Now they have suddenly recalled that more than 30 percent of the Estonian budget is formed from deductions from Union enterprises.

It is believed that there is something else at the basis of the statements of the government and the Council of Baltic States and of the Declaration on the Essence of State Associations of the "Integral" type, which was signed by representatives of the governments and soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Moscow, and Leningrad (it is published today on page 3). The creation of the association is a step toward the freedom of enterprises from both departmental and local dictate. But the local powers will not agree to lose the opportunity to subject the labor collectives to their will.

The events of recent months show that the actions of the governments of the Baltic republics and the new sociopolitical organizations are carefully coordinated. Whatever happens in Estonia is repeated a little later in Latvia. The proof of this is the increase in prices for alcoholic beverages and tobacco products and the rallies of former members of the SS which were announced in both republics but which were unsuccessful. And now hard-currency stores are opening up in Riga.

This means that it is time for the leaders of our labor collectives to think about how to guarantee a dignified standard of living for their workers. The experience of their Estonian comrades, now united in an association, will prove useful and will offer substantial help in this.

Latvian Independent Weekly Begins Circulation

LD2808013490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 23 Aug 90

[Text] One more piece of news from the field of mass information media. Beginning tomorrow [24 August] Latvian readers will be receiving a new press publication, the weekly illustrated journal PILSETA [THE CITY]. It is being issued by the Riga Information Bureau. In the journal will be found all the information about the week's concerts, exhibitions, theater performances, the most popular satellite television programs, commercial shop prices and so on. Thus, the information about everything happening and to be found in Riga. The motto of the new journal is: We know what you want to know.

As its creators emphasise, the new publication will absolutely not interfere in politics, will be completely neutral, nonpartisan, differing pleasantly from the great majority of what is published in Latvia.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Concludes Tour of Russian Republic

Criticizes Gorbachev Decree

PM2708141690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 90 p 2

[Report by TASS correspondent: "From the TASS Teletype"]

[Text] B.N. Yeltsin reacted quite sharply to a question from Sakhalin miners on his attitude toward the USSR President's Decree "On the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution of 9 August 1990": If matters go that far, M.S. Gorbachev may be left without Russia. However, at a press conference held late today, the chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet said: The process now underway is not one of confrontation but of the rapprochement of the leaders of the USSR and the RSFSR, major steps have been taken toward one another. But this decree represents a half-step backward, it is a distance which will have to be covered again.

Holds Meetings in Kamchatka

LD2708135290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1251 GMT 27 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Borovkov]

[Text] Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, 27 Aug (TASS)—Despite a shortage of time, Boris Yeltsin nonetheless continued his trip round Kamchatka in the Soviet Far East for several hours. At a precise, businesslike pace he held several meetings in labor collectives of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsk, at the oblast administrative center, and visited a housing combine and fish cannery.

This morning journalists found out that yesterday evening, having completed the official program, Yeltsin unexpectedly disappeared. Neither the local leadership nor even the guest's bodyguard knew where he was. It transpires that together with a local inhabitant he got into a car and went off on a trip round the town. Yeltsin chose an apartment at random, in a normal highrise block and acquainted himself with the life of a typical Kamchatka fishing family.

However, his trip to the Yelizovskaya boarding school for orphaned children was more important. Having found out about the difficulties which the school's collective is experiencing in its work, Boris Yeltsin said that he is allocating $30,000 from his London fund for the acquisition of a bus for the children. This, incidentally, is not the only act of charity by the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet: Yeltsin signed a contract with the town soviet of people's deputies for the publication here of his book "Confession on a Set Topic" [Ispoved na Zadannuyu Temu], the royalties from which will go to the development of the social sphere of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

During a short press conference on the results of the Kamchatka visit, Boris Yeltsin noted that despite the specific nature of the peninsula there are many problems which are common both to Russia as a whole and to the Far East in particular. Answering questions on the prospects for relations between Russia and Japan, he spoke in favor of the need for the conclusion, in the future, of a treaty between them. In his opinion, the Japanese side will not raise the question of the "northern territories" during the conclusion of such a treaty.

Urges Cooperation in Kamchatka

LD2708183290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1340 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] The topic is the trip around the Far East by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. You know that the head of the Russian parliament spent some time in Maritime Kray, Sakhalin Oblast, and in Kamchatka. Our special correspondent Sergey Omelchenko reports from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy:

[Omelchenko] Today is the last day of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's working visit around Russia. In the morning the head of the Russian parliament spent some time at a Petropavlovsk construction combine and discussed with specialists the problems connected with the construction of earthquake-resistant buildings capable of withstanding the severe conditions of Kamchatka. In the afternoon, Boris Nikolayevich visited a fish canning factory. Today he went again to a military unit. Servicemen occupy a large amount of territory here on Kamchatka. There are problems with the relations between the military and civilian authorities. Before he left for Moscow, Boris Nikolayevich called in to see the little Kamchatkans in the children's home. Boris Nikolayevich gave an interview to journalists in the House of the Soviets. This is how Yeltsin perceives the problems of Kamchatka with which he has become acquainted during the last three days.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] There are many problems, as is generally the case in the Far East. Many of the problems are common to the Far East, especially in connection with fishermen. What is new is the transportation problem, the problem of delivering cargo, foodstuffs, goods, and so on, by sea. This is a complex problem. Even today—we were just at the house construction combine—it is necessary to go over to new ways of decorating the fronts of houses because you cannot paint them. Under conditions of much moisture and falling temperatures, paint does not, of course, adhere. It is necessary to switch to some sort of stone treatment, as a type of decor. For this, sand is needed and the sand is in Sakhalin, but there are not vessels to carry it. Any issue, to a very great extent, depends on the issue of transportation. The specific problem is your own contacts in the localities, since you live very close to each other here. You have many common problems. In my opinion, they could be resolved by better cooperation. What is specific is that you are not striving to accelerate the exploitation of the economic potential. That is, of all that which you have deposited in the earth, you are not striving to construct all at once giant industrial enterprises, to prospect for oil, to build oil processing works. You are not acting as they did in Bashkiriya, Tataria, and other regions. It is evident that they have over-saturated their region with such facilities, especially chemical ones, and

of course nature has been so affected that it will be difficult or impossible to restore it to its natural contours. [end recording]

Leaves Kamchatka for Moscow

LD2708133190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, has completed his three-week tour of the republic and today he left Kamchatka for Moscow. He has visited various regions of Russia. Common problems of transfer to market relations, issues of economic independence of regions and enterprises, and issues of cooperation with other countries—Japan in particular—were discussed during the trip.

RSFSR Deputy Cited on Baltic Consultations

LD2808111790 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow August 28 TASS—"Direct talks between Russia and other constituent republics about bilateral documents laying down the principles of political relationship have been successful," a deputy of the Russian Federation parliament told TASS.

These contacts represent a fundamentally new element in federal relations, Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, chairman of the Russian parliament subcommittee on inter-republican relations, said here today.

"The first consultations were held with the Baltic republics," he said. "Draft joint documents have been elaborated. As regards Latvia and Estonia, these are interstate treaties, while the Lithuanian side inclines towards signing a joint declaration."

Much attention during preliminary consultations, Shelov-Kovedyayev said, was paid to the state status of the sides and human rights. Naturally economic issues also came up and the sides expressed similar views. As a result they have worked out common attitudes on questions of status and human rights, Shelov-Kovedyayev said.

"Of course no complete understanding has been reached, but negotiations will continue after provisional results are submitted to the Russian parliament and its presidium. So far the consultations have been a success, with the partners showing a readiness to meet each other halfway, to take the opportunity to tackle contentious issues. So I am optimistic about the future," the deputy continued.

Shelov-Kovedyayev said similar consultations will be held with Moldavian representatives within the next few days. They have been already held with representatives of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other constituent republics.

Such talks "enrich political life and help attain better cooperation between the republics."

Polozkov's Smolnyy News Briefing Reported

PM2408122390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by V. Nevelskiy: "I. Polozkov at the Smolnyy"]

[Text] Leningrad—I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, spent three days in Leningrad at the invitation of Leningrad delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the oblast party committee.

His press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists and staffers of diplomatic missions took place at the Smolnyy Wednesday evening.

Anticipating questions, I. Polozkov spoke about the priority tasks which the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee has set itself—the Russian communists' action program, the strategy and tactics during the transition to the market, relations with soviets (incidentally, I. Polozkov did not visit either the Leningrad City or oblast soviet during his stay). "The Russian Communist Party favors not any market," the guest of the Smolnyy said, "but a market geared to the interests of working people, the market as link between town, country, and the working intelligentsia, that is to say, it favors the unification of the whole people rather than their stratification; it favors a market which will not divide the people into social estates or create freedom of action for the smart operators of the shady economy."

In the Central Committee first secretary's opinion, the facts of the present day allow one to forecast that smart operators, who accumulated millions by unscrupulous means, and foreign capital will seek to get their hands on state property. Russian communists, their leader stated, cannot accept such a development of events.

Referring to the problem of renewing the party, I. Polozkov stressed that the RSFSR Communist Party has been proclaimed and the task is to create the most democratic party, the chief law of whose activity would be leadership by the party masses, to create a party that is open, accountable to communists and the people and subject to their control, to create a party which is equipped with the most up-to-date mass media, and to create a party which is open to cooperation with other sociopolitical movements in the interests of Russia and all Russians.

"The Communist Party," its leader observed, "takes upon itself the function of defending working people's interests. At the same time we do not consider other parties to be our enemies.... We have many supporters. And those who seek to strike a blow at the RSFSR Communist Party and to address it in the language of ultimatums assume grave responsibility and risk its backfiring upon them."

The Central Committee first secretary was asked quite a few trenchant questions. I thought that he answered them frankly and with disarming plain speaking. I will cite a few extracts from the dialogue that took place.

"You said that you intend to defend working people. But that is the trade unions' task."

"A very interesting question. Indeed the trade unions do set themselves the task of defending working people. Yet the Communist Party has confirmed in its program documents that it is the champion of the interests of the working people—the working class, the peasantry, the working intelligentsia. Naturally those strata of the population will primarily form its social base, and it will express their interests."

"You favor the market, but one geared to working people's interests, you favor a link between town and country, and are opposed to property-based stratification.... But these are a collection of slogans of the apparatus of socialism which may be very attractive, but which have not, alas, been put into practice. Do you really and sincerely believe in the socialist market or market socialism?"

"I do sincerely believe and am convinced that the market can be built upon precisely that basis. I do not know another market, an unregulated one, say. Particularly as we are in a special position—in a transition period. We are experiencing acute shortages and shortages, moreover, of almost everything. And in this transition stage it is very difficult to talk about a market without a regulatory system and normative acts. If we have made a socialist choice, we must construct our own model in conformity with our own conditions, without copying anyone."

"If the Russian Communist Party carried out a reregistration, what percentage of its numerical strength would it lose?"

"Not much, I think, because the processes of people leaving began not at the time of the Russian Communist Party's creation but somewhat earlier.... Since its creation, we have not observed any sharp increase in people leaving. Although we can predict that some Communists will either create their own parties or leave the CPSU. Even if 25 percent of its members leave, it will not become weaker as a result."

"Does what you said earlier mean that all of us communists are right now members of the Russian Communist Party? Or, if you are talking not about the party but only about the republic organization, are we not getting just another party level between the obkom [oblast party committee] and the Central Committee of the CPSU?"

"You are right in both regards. There is no reregistration proposed with the creation of the Russian Communist Party, there is no need.... The Russian Communist Party constituent congress stressed that the party builds its work upon the basis of the CPSU Program, the CPSU Statutes, and single membership of the CPSU. The organizational remolding into the Russian Communist Party presupposes that all Russian Communists will be united in it."

"Automatically?"

"Of course. By decision of the congress."

"You are now a major politician. What are the driving forces of your political leadership? As you are a major politician who is still young, do you perhaps have a role model? Whom do you study?"

"Driving forces... My name was cited at the congress once, twice, five times.... I naturally faced the question: This problem must certainly be taken up by someone. I reasoned that if a certain section of communist delegates pinned their hopes for the creation of a Russian Communist Party upon me, they have grounds. I was, as you will recall, elected by a majority vote. That was the will of the congress...."

"Yes, I am a young politician. But the question of whom to adopt as a model has never directly confronted me. I am unable today to give a specific example or name a specific individual, but I do keep a close watch on the work of many politicians and I try to adopt everything that I consider rational and that is well received by the people. I will, I think, continue to operate in this vein in the future."

New RSFSR Ministers Profiled

90UN2579A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 31, 31 Jul-6 Aug 90 pp 44-45

[Unattributed article: "The Yeltsin Team: Russia's Parliament Appoints the Federation's First Ministers"]

[Text] "We shall collaborate with all those who are willing to help," said Boris Fyodorov, the new minister of finance of Russia when he was introduced to the personnel of the ministry. In his maiden address to the ministry, Fyodorov said he was not going to sack anybody. What he wanted was to liberate the Ministry of Finance of Russia from its dependence on the corresponding Union ministry. This objective is extremely difficult to achieve, especially if one takes into account the fact that the federation's Ministry of Finance has until recently been a vastly decorative institution which could not influence the formation of the republican financial policy or budget. Sovereignty of Russia proclaimed at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation requires financial independence.

Boris Fyodorov, 32, is known in the world of finance and banking as a competent expert. He has worked for the State Bank for a long time where he combined practical work and scientific research. He holds the degree of Doctor of Economics. With the advent of perestroyka, Fyodorov decided to play a lone hand, and establish a

commercial bank. However, the attempt misfired because the financial sphere was still dominated by bureaucracy.

Last year, Fyodorov received an unexpected invitation to become a staff member of the Economics Department of the CPSU Central Committee. He believes he benefited from the time he spent working in Old Square, the CPSU Central Committee headquarters. He mastered the art of being accepted in high places and got to know many leaders personally. When he worked for the State Bank, for instance, he could not even enter the reception room of the Chairman of the Board. After transfer to the Central Committee, he could cooperate with people of such ranks on an equal footing.

"I am inspired by the composition of the Russian government," he says. "The cabinet is composed of very reasonable and sober-minded people. Many of them, myself included, lack managerial experience, but we all have a great desire to change the life of Russia for the better." Fyodorov intends to radicalize dramatically the financial policies of Russia. At the same time, he believes a minister of finance should be cautious, even conservative, in order to protect the state from further trouble.

Newly appointed Minister of Agriculture and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia, Gennady Kulik, 55, believes the current crisis in agriculture is a result of mistakes in the CPSU agrarian policy which milked agriculture for all it was worth and ignored the interests of peasants. An honours graduate of the department of economics of Leningrad State University, Kulik held a number of key positions in the agricultural management of Novosibirsk and Moscow.

Speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, Kulik said he saw a way out of the crisis. A comprehensive approach is needed, he believes. The main element of the recovery programme is agriculture's gradual transfer to free market relations. It is imperative that an equivalent and fair exchange be established between rural and urban areas, that taxation, investment and insurance policies in agriculture be changed. "We will not be able to solve the problems our agriculture faces without a variety of forms of ownership," Kulik said. "First of all, we should adopt an original Law on Land for Russia." His programme also includes proposals for the social restructuring of agriculture. Kulik believes the very structure and style of work of the Ministry of Agriculture should be altered: kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other agricultural enterprises should be granted extensive independence.

Gennady Kulik favours the development of privately-owned farms and has promised to table the proposal that the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation set up a special ministerial department to safeguard the interests of private farmers.

Kulik's view on selling land to private owners: "It may be allowed for certain purposes, say, to build a house with a patch of land around it for farming."

Kulik's credo: what is good for the peasant is good for Russia.

The Minister of Justice, Nikolai Fyodorov, 32, is also the chairman of the subcommittee for social legislation at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and author of a number of major bills. His main brainchild is the Press Bill, which has been heatedly discussed in parliament, society and the press.

He was offered a seat on the Constitutional Committee of the Supreme Soviet, but it meant a withdrawal from active politics, and so he refused. He intended to run for a local Soviet, but when he was in Moscow, he was informed that the meeting of the Cooperative Institute staff, which had nominated him for people's deputy, had been pronounced invalid; he had no time to change anything. In his native Autonomous Republic of Chuvashia, he was advised to withdraw his nomination for people's deputy of the USSR and threatened with ostracism in the press if he refused. This is how the senior lecturer of Chuvash State University, Candidate of Law, Nikolai Fyodorov, started to pay very special attention to the media, which later produced the Press Bill.

The youngest member of Premier Silayev's cabinet has spoken on how he planned to work:

"It is necessary to work out a programme of legal reform and of a reform of justice in particular. Our republic, just like the country as a whole, has never known a culture of law and legality; instead, we used to have a different culture, the culture of departmental bureaucracy. Legal nihilism dominated. Correspondingly, the Ministry of Justice merely conveyed the will of the administrative system to the procurator's offices and courts. My main condition as minister is that I should be subordinate exclusively and directly to the prime minister and the president of Russia. Premier Silayev agreed to this condition.

"The top-priority task is to establish rigid control over the entire system of acts issued by the executive branch, which is the Council of Ministers and various departments and ministries. The second most important task is to assist the Council of Ministers in working out democratic and legally accurate bills later to be submitted to the Supreme Soviet of Russia so as to help Russia approach the adoption of two basic documents: a Federal Treaty of the Peoples of Russia and a Civil Code of the Russian Federation."

Which relations will the new minister maintain with the Ministry of Justice of the USSR?

"I report only to the supreme bodies of power of Russia. Hopefully, however, we shall cooperate with the Union ministry in the spirit of mutual understanding and be able to avoid conflicts."

The new Minister for Industry, Victor Kisin, 49, is one of the new appointees who have never worked for the government, but were appointed straight from the

benches of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A Muscovite, Victor Kisin graduated from Moscow's Gubkin Institute of Oil and Gas Industries and has worked for Likhachev Motor Works ever since. His latest position at the Works before the ministerial appointment was head of the department of new technologies. He became a member of the Soviet of the Union's Commission for Industry, Power Generation and Technology, and was elected deputy chairman. Working in the Commission, Kisin acquired a broader view of the problems the Soviet industry faced. During one year of work for the Commission, Kisin formed an original opinion of how to solve these problems. He has been very active in parliament and the mass media.

It is still unclear what exactly industry of Russia means. A lot of plants and factories are located here, but all of them are subordinate to Union ministries. The new Union Treaty is still to be adopted, and the question of property of Union republics remains unresolved.

"First of all," Kisin says, "we should privatize the property of industrial enterprises by selling their fixed assets off to members of work collectives. The second most important task is to preserve economic ties between the republics and industrial enterprises located in the republics."

On the whole, the new minister's programme can be briefly expressed as the formation of a Union market in the conditions when Union republics are acquiring full sovereignty. He believes the country will need national reserve systems for purposes like relief of refugees or settlement of workers economically and socially forced to migrate across the country.

People's Deputy of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Poltoranin, has been appointed minister of information and mass media of Russia. Born in the township of Rudny Altai, he worked as a concrete worker at the mammoth Bratsk hydropower plant and served in the army. After graduation from the Kazakh State University, he worked as journalist for the newspapers RUDNY ALTAI, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA. Served as Editor-in-Chief of the Moscow Communist Party flagship paper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in 1986-87, but quit the job after Boris Yeltsin, then head of the Moscow City Party Committee, was ousted from his office. He has worked as political analyst for Novosti Press Agency ever since.

Even before perestroyka Poltoranin championed freedom of the individual and the right of every citizen to have complete information on the life of society and to express his or her attitudes freely. He believes the monopoly on thought is the most harmful of all monopolies which "partocracy" has imposed." He has never concealed his views, as a result of which his relations with the "top echelon" worsened from time to time. He has been a Party member for thirty years, but it looks like he will soon terminate his membership.

In his article, entitled "The Collapse of Bolshevism," published in the Soviet-Dutch MOSCOW MAGAZINE, Poltoranin wrote that Bolshevism was an extremist manifestation of Communist ideology, which obligatorily incorporated civil war, confrontation, setting of different segments of society at loggerheads, destruction of national cultures, suppression of the individual and deception of people.

As minister, Poltoranin wants to assist the establishment of bodies of Soviet power in Russia and to demonopolize the mass media by setting up an extensive network on independent periodicals, a Russian news agency and a Russian TV and Radio Committee.

The new minister plans to pay special attention to updating printshops of ethnic administrative entities inside Russia, where printing machines and equipment are antiquated. Yakutia, Bashkiria, Buryatia and the Hanti-Mansi Territory are the first on the list of the regions in need of urgent assistance.

A state programme for the "development of glasnost in Russia" is being worked out, whose adoption, Poltoranin believes, will help Russia "become a civilized, self-regulating civil society."

It was in childhood that the newly appointed Chairman of the State Committee for Geology, Fuel, Energy-Carriers and Mineral Resources, Dmitry Fyodorov, 58, chose his fate. The city of Grozny, where he lived, had only two colleges: a teacher training college and a college of oil technology. The teaching profession was not specially attractive to him, and he entered the college of oil technology. This decision affected the course of the rest of his life. Successful work with various prospecting parties showed that, although incidental, the choice had been correct. Before his appointment as minister, he worked as director of the Lower Volga Research Institute of Geology and Geophysics and Professor at Saratov University. In March of this year, Fedorov was elected people's deputy of the Russian Federation. "It was so unexpected," he recalls, "frankly speaking, I felt no joy, only concern."

The Committee, which has ministerial status, is being formed from scratch. The new chairman wants to abandon the departmental principle in prospecting, extraction and processing of mineral resources and to give individual enterprises complete economic independence. Enterprises should be subordinate to their common objective, not to various ministries and departments as before. In connection with the Declaration of Sovereignty of Russia, Fedorov believes prices of oil Russia exports to other republics should be brought in accordance with the world prices, or oil should be exchanged for various products on a mutually beneficial basis. Economic relations must be governed by contracts between republics, and in the future, possibly between members of a confederation or sovereign states. "Hopefully, as the Committee will develop, my concern will be gradually replaced by confidence," Fedorov said.

Militia Units Restore Order in Chelyabinsk

PM2408123990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Georgiy Shcherbina: "Alcohol Revolt"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—The events which flared up in a Chelyabinsk rayon on the afternoon of 22 August and which continued virtually throughout the night could be described as a revolt, an outrage, or hooliganism.

It was 1400 when the sale of spirits began. But the sales assistants in the drinks section of the rayon department store—possibly the largest in the city—did not start work. They were waiting for a militia detail which for some reason was delayed. And then the big crowd revolted and stones flew at the store windows. Three militiamen, who had arrived belatedly, were no longer able to control the excited passions. Hundreds of people, for the most part young, spilled onto the neighboring avenue, stopped traffic moving, and began smashing trolley cars and buses.

A stream of people stretched out to the Kurchatovskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Soviet Executive Committee] building. And there, to the sound of shattering window-panes, demands began to be made that the sale of not just spirits but also meat be expanded and that all ration coupons accumulated by people be honored....

This revolt, in which thousands of people were involved, lasted until dawn. Militia subunits which arrived on the scene managed to restore order only by the use of nightsticks. The toll was: 13 militia vehicles damaged, 11 militiamen injured, and dozens of disturbers of the peace detained.

The city leaders hastened to describe what happened as malicious hooliganism. That is no doubt so, but, on the other hand, how is one to describe the action or, more precisely, inaction, by the Kurchatovskiy Rayispolkom workers, who sedulously ignored the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] decision on increasing the number of wine and spirit counters and starting the sale of spirits three hours earlier?

It seems that they have their own way of interpreting the autonomy they have gained. Is it possible they will not learn the lesson this time either?

Karelia Forms Emergency Economic Commission

LD2808093590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Text] With the aims of guaranteeing the stable work of the national economic complex and improving the situation on the republic's consumer market, the Council of Ministers of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] has set up an emergency economic commission to stabilize the consumer and goods market. (Yeskunov), the deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, was appointed its leader. From today, enterprises and organizations in Karelia, irrespective of the department to which they belong, are to direct 50 percent of output gained above state orders, and not less than 15 percent of output which is not fixed by state order, for allocation by the emergency commission. The commission is granted the right to permit output from industrial enterprises essential to the agro-industrial complex to remain in the republic in dimensions which are such as to guarantee an increase in agricultural production in Karelia.

Kuzbass Mine Workers Can Afford Japanese Cars

PM2308081590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 20 Aug 90

[Report by N. Chirkov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Workers of the "Oblkemerovougol" leasehold production-and-commercial association are acquiring Japanese cars. Our Kuzbass correspondent Nikolay Chirkov reports:

[Chirkov] When such sought-after goods appear in the stores—the miners have bought 400 Nissan Sanyo cars—people inevitably ask themselves how the association's miners can afford such things. In order to understand this, it is necessary to compare the following figures: While, as a whole, coal production in the Kuzbass has decreased by 5 million tonnes over the past six months, the "Oblkemerovougol" leaseholders have produced almost 300,000 tonnes in excess of plan. They have also worked productively in recent years. The above-plan coal has been converted into the foreign currency with which the miners have bought the cars and many other things—television sets, video recorders, medical equipment, and clothing. The miners have only taken a small step towards the market. The barter deals are only the beginning of this trend. Production is being retooled, very intensive housing construction is under way, and—most important—the economy has been geared to commerce. Joint ventures with Soviet partners are being set up, negotiations are under way with representatives of the external market. There is only one objective: Not to let profits perish, to put them into circulation.

Incidentally, the association is not forgetting the owners of Japanese cars either. Their number is bound to increase. A large technical service center is being built for them. Equipment has been bought abroad and at the country's car plants.

[V.G. Ivanov, director of the technical service center] We are planning to carry out technical servicing of our miners' cars. There are currently some 2,000 cars in the oblast, including 400 Nissan Sanyo private cars. In the future there will also be a sales section at the center. In general we are trying to create all possible amenities for our people to put a smile on their faces.

Moscow Construction Projects Far Behind Schedule

OW2408145190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 90

[Video report by A. Pischayev from the "120 Minutes" program]

[Text] [video shows high-rise building under construction, construction crane and earth-mover standing idle, scattered construction materials] The old-timers call this tourist attraction the construction project of the century. It is in Moscow's Leningradskiy Rayon, and curiously is not the only such site. The Union Ministry of Trade and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Housing and Municipal Services erected the monumental complex of glass and concrete on neighboring construction sites at a leisurely pace. They were engaged in the construction of a so-called housing design bureau and a complex for scientific research organizations. Everything would have been fine except for the fact that the deadlines have been delayed a bit—by almost 20 years.

True, work resumed not long ago at the site of this masterpiece of model architecture. A joint Soviet-West German enterprise is working here for the Ministry of Trade. Furthermore, they are planning to turn it over in 1991. Well, let us wait and see. [video shows interior of a second building with construction materials and trash scattered about, a pool of water collecting on the floor, deteriorating walls with moisture and mildew, broken windows, construction materials and trash piled together out in the construction yard, broken bricks lying about, and a single worker walking towards the camera]

Meanwhile, on the other site, the one belonging to Housing and Municipal Services, peace and quiet reign and have reigned since 1982. Not suprisingly, the building in the interim has deteriorated and is in a disastrous condition. The equipment has rusted through. The lower floors have been turned into a public restroom and the upper floors have become a giant bird nesting area. This situation should give us pause for huge sums have been spent on these grandiose projects. More than five million rubles have been spent on the Ministry of Trade skyscraper alone. And it is difficult to say how much will be appropriated for the completion—or more accurately the restoration—of its RSFSR cousin. I foresee the objections of the ministries, which will claim that the construction was delayed as a result of negligence by the contractor, Mosstroy [Moscow Construction], which was devoting all its attention at that time to housing problems.

All this is true. But have such problems really decreased today? Meanwhile, this same Ministry of Trade managed to find both the means and the possibility of continuing the construction. Interesting. At whose expense?

Yes, we have more than enough of such overdue construction projects. And we have a difficult time accustoming ourselves to the fact that the latest ministry is expanding its office space. It is a banal tale, but not completely. It is noteworthy that it was these very ministries—those that provide us with food, consumer goods, and housing—that got bogged down in overdue construction projects. An exception? No. More likely the rule.

Without a doubt it is necessary to finish this construction. But I have been thinking: At this very moment do we really need more departments in the administrations? Wouldn't it be better to transfer these buildings so they can be turned into educational facilities which we need so much?

Controversy Over Leningrad Dike Reported

LD2508210790 Leningrad Maritime Press Service in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Aug 90

[Text] According to the architects' design, the dike being built in the Gulf of Finland is supposed to be a reliable shield, protecting Leningrad from flooding. However, over the years of its erection the ecological situation in the zone has radically worsened. Opponents of construction believe the dike will soon turn the whole Neva estuary into a sedimentation tank of sewage. They are warning the city of epidemics, and they propose doing the same to it as happened to the Berlin Wall: to break it up for souvenirs.

However, proponents of the dike believe, thanks to an original engineering resolution, the dike is not facilitating the buildup of sewage at the Neva estuary. In their view the problem lies in the deficiencies of the city cleansing plants or in their lack of efficiency, and in the outdated equipment of Leningrad plants and factories.

Proponents of the dike also adduce other arguments. They recall that the dike has helped relieve the city center of transport, connecting auto routes across the banks of the Neva estuary, and has made it possible to exploit the coastal regions, where housing units are being built.

Scholarly Opinion

A special economic study carried out under the leadership of A. Yakovlev, correspondent member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was called upon to summarize the unceasing polemic between the dike's proponents and opponents and formulate specific decisions. The commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium has come to the conclusion that the basic reason for the worsening of the ecological state of the Neva estuary and the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland is the dike, since ecologically and economically the design of Leningrad's flood defense installations was not well-founded.

"Taking account of the ecological, medical, and biological risk of the erection of defense structures in accordance with the ratified project, the construction of the dike must be ceased and the building frozen," reads the academicians' conclusion.

In comparison with previous expert studies the conclusions of the latest commission seem unusually sharp. This can be explained: During the time of stagnation the academy felt itself to be the executive of specific charges of the government, rather than a higher academic arbitrator in society.

Trial of Former Figures and Plans of the New Mayor

The academic commission proposes raising the issue of the personal responsibility of oblast party and soviet leaders for the pointless waste of funds and the implementation of a dangerous project.

But this is a specific detail. The major question remains: What is to be done with the incomplete dike? After all, the threat of flooding, which has inspired Petersburg writers to literary masterpieces, hangs as before like a sword of Dikeocles over the city created by the will of Czar Peter the Great. Time, which has turned Leningrad into one of the world's architectural pearls, simultaneously subjects the city to destructive catastrophes. Today, the foundations of the historic buildings have decayed and any significant flooding will strike the city a blow from which the Palmyra of the North will not recover.

So, perhaps it is better to have this shield than none? All right, the great czar was mistaken in his choice of site for his capital. Will the city leadership of the era of perestroyka manage to set this error straight, or will it add another failure of Soviet perestroyka to the czar's failure?

Leningrad's new mayor is convinced: It is amoral to build the dike according to the present plan. An explosive ecological situation is being created and colossal amounts of resources are being expended without a check. One cannot invest money into something which could turn into a real catastrophe for the city.

A. Sobchak considers that it is necessary to announce an international competition and carry out further expert studies. Specialists must make a decision. Various options are viable: getting rid of the dike altogether and implementing a local flood defense of the city or else redesigning it and the cleansing plants, having significantly increased the penetrability of the dike itself. Alternative proposals already exist. Thus, academician Alferov proposes turning the dike into a bridge and installing gates which will shield Leningrad in the case of flood.

Ufa Water Supply Cut After Plant Explosion

PM2808100190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Aug 90

[Report by M. Gafurov and cameraman F. Valeyev from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] During work scheduled for completion the air has been polluted by a new installation producing phenol and acetone at the Ufa Synthetic Alcohol Plant. A report from our correspondent:

[Gafurov] During startup and adjustment work following a major overhaul of the phenol and acetone production facility certain faults in the work of the equipment were discovered, and the previous day the facility was shut down to correct these faults. But unexpectedly today at approximately 1030 local time there was an explosion in the reactors producing hydrogen peroxide compounds. The reason for the accident is being investigated. The people injured were mainly repair workers and firemen. Two of them have been taken to the Ufa Burns Unit. However, more than half the inhabitants of the million-strong city are again without drinking water—as was the case in March this year. An emergency commission, taking account of the seepage of phenol into the city water system this spring and with a view to preventing any repetition of it, has temporarily suspended water supplies from the southern reservoir to residential areas. According to preliminary specialist assessments, the national economy has suffered damage running into tens, if not hundreds of millions of rubles.

Western Republics

Moldavian Gosteleradio Stops Gagauz TV Programs

LD2708135890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1200 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] As you know, the parliament of Moldova has not recognized the recently-established Gagauz Republic within a renewed union of the Soviet Socialist Republic. The conflict between the Moldovan leadership and the Gagauz is continuing and assuming new forms.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Fateyev, seen interviewing a group of six men in a city square] And now here in Odessa there is a delegation from the Gagauz rayons of the Republic of Moldova. The first question, of course, is why you are here?

[M.V. Kendigelyan, deputy chairman of the Komratskiy Rayon Soviet] We are here in order to break through the blockade of the mass information media of the Republic of Moldova which followed the formation of the Gagauz Republic on 19 August 1990.

[I.I. Anastasov, director of Kamrat television studios] I represent the local television studios. We went on the air and broadcast 10 programs.

[Fateyev] In the Gagauz language?

[Anastasov] In Gagauz and in Russian. We broadcast local news. But now the Gosteleradio and the Ministry of Communications have banned us from...

[Fateyev, interrupting] Whose Gosteleradio?

[Anatastasov] Gosteleradio of Moldova. We have not gone on the air (?for five months now).

[G.I. Kalchu, lawyer, people's deputy of Moldova] We would like to take this opportunity to see that all citizens of our country, of all the republics in the Union, understand us corrently, should understand that we are not extremists of any kind. We want to make the country aware of what the Gagauz people want, and of the fact that the Gagauz people have never committed any acts against the Moldovan people, and that we shall strive to ensure that none should occur in the future.

[Fateyev] Sergey Fateyev, special correspondent in Odessa, for the Television News Service. [end recording]

4 Aug Moldavian Party Plenum Report Published

90UN2669A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 1

["News Brief on Joint Plenum of Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee and Auditing Commission"]

[Text] A joint plenary session of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee and Auditing Commission was held in Kishinev on 4 August. A group of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, the chairmen of the auditing commissions of the city and rayon party organizations, a group of primary party organization secretaries, ranking officials from ministries, agencies, enterprises, and the mass media, as well as representatives of some public organizations of this republic were invited to attend.

The plenum approved the following agenda: Results of the 28th CPSU Congress; Statute on Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee commissions; Commission to draft Communist Party of Moldavia Program and Party Rules; The party press; Organizational matters.

A report on the first item on the agenda was presented by Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee First Secretary P.K. Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The following took part in the discussion and debate following presentation of the report: N.I. Dudeu, first secretary of the Kishinev City Party Committee and member of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Bureau; Yu.V. Yarovaya, fur dresser-cutter at the Beltsy Fur Combine, member of the Central Committee; G.F. Anton, first secretary of the Streshenskiy Rayon Party Committee, member of the Central Committee; N.S. Chebotar, chief agronomist of the Molodaya Gvardiya Kolkhoz, Dondushenskiy Rayon, member of the Central Committee; M.I. Kodin, chairman of the Communist Party of Moldavia Auditing Commission; R.D. Suveyka, editor in chief of the Moldkino Republic Creative Arts Production Association, member of the Central Committee; R.F. Odinets, acting docent, Moldavian State Conservatory imeni G. Muzichesku, member of the Central Committee; P.G. Vasiloy, metal trades benchworker, Moldavgidromash Scientific-Production Association, member of the CPSU Central Committee; P. M. Tsymay, first secretary of the Bendery City Party Committee, member of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee; A.G. Dyakonu, first secretary of the Leovskiy Rayon Party Committee, member of Central Committee; A.A. Zavtur, director of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee's Institute for Sociopolitical Research, member of the Central Committee; M.S. Gospodinov, director of the Yantar Agrarian Cooperative, Basarabyaskiy Rayon; Z.P. Bodyu, first secretary of the Sholdeneshtskiy Rayon Party Committee, member of the Central Committee; K.I. Sakhanovskiy, first secretary of the Ungenskiy Rayon Party Committee, member of the Central Committee; A.I. Gaydarly, party committee secretary, Pobeda Kolkhoz, Taraklinskiy Rayon; V.D. Karamanov, party committee secretary, Tiraspol Construction Trust, member of the Central Committee.

The plenum passed an appropriate resolution on the discussed agenda item.

The plenum ratified the statute on Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee commissions.

The plenum approved the membership of the Moldavian Central Committee Commission to Draft a Communist Party of Moldavia Program and Party Rules.

The plenum was briefed by Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Secretary V. Sobor on the republic party press and instructed the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Bureau to consider the submitted proposals and to make an appropriate decision on them.

The plenum examined organizational matters. The plenum relieved A.P. Lupan of his duties as a member of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Bureau at his request, for reasons of health.

P.G. Dubalar was elected member of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Bureau. He was at the same time approved as deputy chairman of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Organizational Commission. The following were also approved as Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee commission deputy chairmen: N.F. Movilyanu and V.F. Stanev—Ideological Commission; I.N. Russu—Agrarian Policy Commission.

G.I. Kushnir was approved as Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee Administrator.

The Central Committee plenum relieved V.I. Kanikovskiy of his duties as member of the Central Committee in connection with his appointment to the Communist Party of Moldavia Auditing Commission and his election as deputy chairman and member of the Communist Party of Moldavia Auditing Commission Bureau.

The plenum considered a request by M.I. Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, to suspend his CPSU membership for the period during which he performs the duties of chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet. The plenum granted his request.

P.K. Luchinskiy made a final statement.

CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and secretary O.S. Shenin addressed the plenum.

This ended the proceedings of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee plenum.

Moldavia Plans To Open Police Academy

LD2708162990 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Kishenev August 27 TASS—The Moldavian government has decided to open a national police academy on September 1 to train specialists for work with Interior Ministry security forces in the republic.

The academy, which will be granted university status, will provide a four-year course of studies and graduate highly-qualified lawyers.

Rank-and-file policemen and non-commissioned officers will be trained at the National Police School, a specialised secondary educational establishment with a two-year course of instruction which is due to open on January 1, 1994 to replace the present secondary militia school of the Moldavian Interior Ministry.

These establishments will enrol people who permanently reside in the republic and have a good command of the Moldavian language. Moldavians residing outside the republic and having good command of the mother tongue will also be admitted.

The staff will be paid 15 per cent more than in other similar establishments of the USSR Interior Ministry.

Students of the police academy and school will study Italian and spend some time in Romania and Italy to study police training and work in those countries.

Moldavia's Luchinskiy Speaks to Plenum 4 Aug

90UN2669B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 5 Aug 90 pp 2-3

[Text of speech by Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary P.K. Luchinskiy, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee and Auditing Commission joint plenum on 4 August 1990: "Results of the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] Comrades! It is no exaggeration to state that not only the delegates but all of you as well were participants in the debates and discussions at the 28th CPSU Congress, and you of course saw with what difficulty and unevenness it proceeded. The emotional coloration, the irritability and no-uncertain-terms tone of the statements made by a number of delegates at times turned one aside from constructive discussion. Party members linked different hopes, ideas, and deeds to the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress, and this is understandable.

Some awaited it with sincere anxious concern over the future of the party and country. Others awaited it with the thought of how one could adapt to the new situation in the party, preserve one's secure position intact, and leave everything the way it was. For still others the congress was an occasion for carrying out the action of resigning from the party, a move which had been thought through in advance. Many party members were counting on, and are continuing to count on receiving from the congress precise and clear instructions on what is to be done and how to do it, for that is the way it has always been: the central echelon knows everything and will tell us how to proceed.

But one thing united the majority of those at the congress: the desire to change the situation for the better. Although they were seeing different, frequently opposite ways and means.

At the present time it is apparently not possible to make a final assessment on what effect the congress will have on the course of events both in the party and in society. We shall be analyzing adopted documents and placing them in correlation with the actual affairs of each party organization. But one thing is clear: the congress constitutes the beginning of an enormous job of party renewal. And this requires not merely traditional execution. In our opinion the main thing lies in innovative analysis and interpretation of the congress decisions in practical daily activities at each party echelon, taking specific circumstances into account. This is of particular importance for the Union republics, with their specific ethnic and historical features. This presupposes independence of thinking and boldness in actions, that is, everything of which we were deprived in the past. And the sooner we—from party group organizer to Central Committee secretary—rid ourselves of the waiting syndrome, the more effective our efforts will be.

The essence of the CPSU crisis lies in separation of the party masses from the party committees. Being the sole party, for a long time the party was built right into the governmental system of society. The principle of party leadership and guidance, which was strictly applied everywhere and at all levels, led to anemia in the party organizations, to a loss of personal initiative on the part

of Communists. The rank-and-file party member was needed as a simple executor of party decisions.

You will agree that the party operated as a mechanism of authority through governmental agencies and party committees, while its primary organizations were merely a reflection of this power. But then when their primacy was declared, as well as the transfer of power to the party masses, the majority proved to be unprepared to assume the burden of specific, independent actions, without looking to the "higher echelon."

Now the situation is changing radically. Party members are being liberated from bondage, freed from the dictate of authority, and are obtaining the right to their own views. It is true that this was manifested at the congress in a very peculiar manner and frequently boiled down to sharp criticism of the CPSU Central Committee leadership, to an endeavor not so much to call them to account as to make them pay.

There is no question about it. The CPSU Central Committee and Politburo have frequently delayed excessively in making decisions, at times have acted inconsistently, and have not always taken into consideration the possible development of events both in the party and in society. However, comrades, all of us must finally become aware of the fact that the processes which are taking place in our country are unparalleled. And one can hardly count on ready solutions when creative productivity by the masses is required every day, a search for unconventional solutions to a given situation. We party members must proceed from common sense in all things, displaying good reasoning and a thoughtfully-considered approach to discussion and debate within the party. Today these are taking place before the eyes of society, in conditions of a genuine multiparty system. But inability and disinclination on the part of Communists to restrain themselves in the heat of debate strikes first and foremost at the image and prestige of the party itself.

This understanding has not come easily, but it did have supporters among the delegates. The nature of the work being done at the congress differed strikingly between the beginning and the end of the proceedings. The congress maximally approached awareness of a simple truth: confrontation means the demise of democracy, the demise of perestroyka. Only in an atmosphere of party pluralism, respect for the opinions of others, comradely discussion, observance of democratic principles and joint search for a way out of this situation can we preserve the party, ensure its renewal, and return to it the respect and trust of the people.

General program tasks and points cannot and do not provide ready recipes and specific mechanisms for their implementation for all cases and for all organizations. Each party committee and primary party organization is free at its own level to choose practical actions, work means and techniques. In other words, each should know its own maneuver. I would like this truth to be thoroughly grasped and adopted at all echelons of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

On the Nature of Sociopolitical Processes in this Republic

In spite of the great diversity of opinions and proposals, the 28th CPSU Congress emphasized that the party's destiny and future are directly linked to achieving the goals of perestroyka and improving the life of the people. The Communist Party of Moldavia also considers as the foundation of its activities service to society, defense and securement of the political and social protection of working people, and improvement in living standards for the people of our republic. But this requires civic consent, an atmosphere of trust and tranquility, and people's confidence in the future. Only then can we work innovatively and productively and change things for the better.

Unfortunately expressions such as "complex sociopolitical situation," "sharp aggravation of the political situation," "destabilization," "explosive," "exacerbated," and the like have recently been customary for us in appraising the situation in this republic. Such descriptions have become part of our daily lexicon. Without going into the past in greater detail, we should state that the people are tired of all this and long for a normal life. Their patience is not infinite.

People expected that mass political meetings and demonstrations would cease following the holding of democratic elections, that there would be fewer ultimatums and threats, and that, finally, long-awaited tranquility would arrive and stability would be achieved. That is, we too would take the road which is trod by civilized countries. In recent time the Communist Party of Moldavia has also sought this. And people proceeded from this same imperative when voting for people's deputies. But what has happened? Instead of concentrating on solving urgent problems in the life the people, there commenced heated argument and jockeying for position in the Soviets at the various levels. Valuable time has been wasted, and yet the problems remain, joined by new problems; people's resentment is growing.

The Communist Party has honestly and openly renounced its monopoly of power and has declared the primacy of the law. We are consistently and patiently conducting a dialogue with all political movements, feeling that a course of policy toward cooperation and civic consent is our most important matter of business. Our position is clear: no one party, no one political organization can speak on behalf of the entire people; all parties and political organizations shall operate under equal conditions and within the framework of the law. The Communist Party of Moldavia strictly adheres to these most important principles and is entitled to expect that other sociopolitical movements will also follow them.

Unfortunately, this is not the case. While declaring their devotion to democracy and advocating the need for a multiparty system, which presumes the interaction of all societal forces, some of them claim a special place in society. Elements have recently appeared which are subjecting the Communist Party of Moldavia to massive attacks, and not in the form of discussion and debate but rather using the method of pressure. Fidelity and tolerance for the opinions and convictions of others are yielding to dictate, carping criticism, and pressure on the part of those who would speak in the name of the entire people, including among this republic's leaders. Elements launching massive attacks against any and all actions by the Communist Party have recently become increasingly more active.

Of course the point does not lie in criticism proper; criticism proceeds from the logic of political struggle. This is understandable. But we are absolutely against public defamation and across-the-board smearing of everything connected with our policies and with our history. The method chosen for attacks on and accusations against our party produces little benefit.

Let us examine this issue. It seems to me that one must gain a clear understanding of two elements here. The first is that most people were deceived in the past. The party's finest minds became victims of Stalinist repression and were physically annihilated or herded into concentration camps. Secondly, the majority of those who are party members today had not even been born yet when this was going on. We therefore consider groundless attempts to discredit party members and to pin the mistakes of the past on the entire present-day party. This is not only erroneous; it is immoral as well.

We realize that against the background of conflictive restructuring processes, there are those who disagree with our policy and with our principles. New political forces have entered the arena, forces pursuing their own goals and with their own work methods. Our relations with the Moldavian People's Front are being extensively discussed in this republic within this context.

What can be said in this regard? We have taken an honest and open position, in the interests of the cause and for the good of society as a whole. Realistically assessing the situation, we realize that the People's Front, just as any other political force, has the right to existence, and we have advocated cooperation toward the goal of renewal. And we intend to continue the constructive policy of cooperation on the basis of these noble aspirations. But when they level sweeping, blanket accusations against us, when they attempt to create the "image of the enemy" in the person of the Communist Party, we firmly part company with those persons of the People's Front who take such a position. We have stated our position in a declaration of the Central Committee Bureau which has been published in the media. As we know, membership in any other political parties is henceforth prohibited, pursuant to the bylaws approved by the Second Congress of the Moldavian People's Front. In connection with this many genuine democrats who had been present at the very inception of the MPF [Moldavian People's Front] have been forced to part company with this movement. At the same time this decision unties the hands of the primary party organizations, the ranks of which presently contain members of the Moldavian People's Front. It is evidently high time to clarify their status as regards membership in the CPSU.

The "ideological contest" declared by the MPF should be waged with dignity, using civilized methods, that is, the way it is done in a democratic society. The Communist Party has its program, and the People's Front has its program. Let the people themselves determine what suits them. We feel that precisely this approach should foster normalization of the situation in this republic. But if in somebody's opinion the Communist Party is doing something wrong, let everybody come together and state their complaints against one another. This should not, however, be done at mass meetings, which are frequently used as a means of applying pressure. Whither are we going, once again "toward a bright" past? More and more voices are being heard, both among public opinion and in the print media: what is happening here? Are we becoming free of the dictate of one in order to come under the dictate of another? It is my conviction that in the interests of all of us it is better to look ahead, to become more civilized and more democratic. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia is seeking, in the interests of the people, to proceed along the path of understanding and consensus. That is our fundamental line of policy.

We reject attempts to unleash anticommunist hysteria in this republic. This runs counter to common sense and contemporary political thinking in the civilized world. It is in contradiction to the vital interests of the Moldavian people and leads to a splitting of the nation. History of course will judge, and each will receive his just deserts.

For several months now the new Supreme Soviet, which was democratically elected, has possessed total political power, and the Communist Party also supported this. Giving up its monopoly of power, it firmly declared that it shall operate within the framework of the constitution and the laws and shall refrain from usurping the functions of the Soviets at all levels.

Power belongs solely to the people and its lawfully elected representatives, not to any parties or movements. We therefore intend to work constructively within the Supreme Soviet. We are proceeding from the position that the Supreme Soviet is responsible for its decisions and that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia is responsible for its own decisions or for those which have been taken by the parliament and government at our initiative or following a process of reaching joint agreement or consensus: such as, for example, when we took most active part in implementing the enactment, adopted at the initiative of the Central Committee, pertaining to the "Limba Noastre"

[Our Language] celebration. An organizing committee was formed, headed by Central Committee Secretary Ye.V. Sobor, funds were allocated from the party budget, and almost everywhere this work was headed by first secretaries of city and rayon party committees. At our request the holiday will be widely celebrated in the Left-Bank areas.

I must frankly state that at the initial stage there was a certain haste in the proceedings of the parliament and in the forming of its permanent commissions. The draft documents submitted for consideration by the Supreme Soviet were not always of high quality. But we consider this to be growing pains and hope that by the next session the drafting of bills will proceed more smoothly and that a democratic mechanism for polling public opinion in conjunction with the passage of legislation will be determined. And we Communists should take more active part in drafting, discussing and passing new legislation. A club has just been formed under Central Committee sponsorship, which we hope will work constructively in parliament, defending the interests of the Communist Party.

We should make particular mention of the Communist Party member's position in these complex processes. He should be, and I shall not shrink from high-sounding words, an example in carrying out the laws. What do I mean by this? In spite of the conflictive nature of those decisions which have recently been adopted, we proceed from the irrevocable nature of worldwide practice: if a law has been passed, it must be respected and obeyed. Other approaches, whether we like it or not, lead to destabilization of the situation in this republic and to increased tension. As they say, there can be no other choice.

Consolidation and Unity of the Communist Party of Moldavia

At its 17th congress, the Communist Party of Moldavia thoroughly analyzed its activities, acknowledged and denounced the mistakes and distortions of which its leadership had been guilty in the past. And this was accepted by all decent people. Today the party contains a different generation, a generation which has broken free of the totalitarian-bureaucratic system and has resolutely condemned the old mechanism of political and governmental organization of society.

New people have come into the leadership of the Communist Party of Moldavia. In the last five years there has occurred virtually a total replacement of primary party organization secretaries and party bureau membership. During this period 204 new secretaries have been elected in 49 rayon and city party committees, including 43 first secretaries. People of the third generation of perestroyka are working in some party committees. Some 85 percent of the members of the Central Committee have been replaced, while there has been total replacement in the bureau and secretariat.

It is precisely these people who have set a course of policy aimed at renewal and democratization of society. Their thoughts and ideas are expressed in the proceedings of the November (1989) and March (1990) plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, in the Program for Renewal of the Communist Party of Moldavia, adopted at its 17th congress, in recent documents, and in practical activities. And this policy has been adopted in all earnestness. We declare this with full awareness and responsibility and shall do everything to ensure that there is not a return to the past.

Of course these processes are not simple, nor are they easy. They require time. In real life such miracles do not happen as, for example, where you wake up in the morning and see before you everything you have planned. There are many things that we are not succeeding in accomplishing, and there are miscues engendered by the old work style. But can one blame the present generation of Communists for the fact that they want to change our life, to make it better and more worthy of man? In this most difficult task we need consolidation, both moral and material support, and for this reason we are grateful to those who offer their support. We are people of a different kind of thinking, sincerely concerned about party renewal. Take the program of renewal, and carefully examine the decisions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia. Anybody who looks at them in an unprejudiced manner will see that profound democratic reforms have commenced in the party, what I would say are irreversible changes.

Decisive measures have recently been taken to free ourselves from the scab of uncalled-for privileges and imperious administrative arrogance. We are deciding property ownership, publication and other issues on a decent, humane basis. A substantial portion of party funds has been spent on the needs of children and teenagers and on the development of language and culture. There has been a substantial cutback in the administrative appendage of party agencies, and democratization of all areas of Communist Party affairs is picking up momentum. We are talking about a new party in content, in its work efforts, and its internal structure, directed toward communication with the worker masses and realization of common human values. And only a person who does not want to see this will fail to see it.

Of course far be it from us to entertain illusions. There are various types of people in the Communist Party. There are still many political opportunists, timeservers, unscrupulous and morally detrimental individuals. Some of them were until recently eulogizing the party and its leaders, gaining points with this. Today they are leaving the party, since they have found a new, more advantageous application of their lack of principles and career-seeking.

It would also be naive to expect an instant renewal of the Communist Party. This process cannot be squeezed into

ready schemes or sets of formal instructions. Only practical experience provides answers to the numerous questions. And practical experience helps us dump useless ballast, helps us get rid of those who insinuated themselves into the party at various times.

There are presently more than 190,000 members of the CPSU in the Communist Party of Moldavia. More than 3,000 persons left party ranks in the first six months of this year. The greatest number of resignations have occurred in the party organizations of the city of Kishinev and of Orkheyskiy, Yalovenskiy, and Sloboziyskiy rayons. There are various reasons for this. For the most part people list as motives for resignation the party's diminished image and prestige and disinclination to perform party duties and pay membership dues.

We should not view these processes simply as self-purging of party ranks. Many Communists are leaving the party because they have been unable to exercise their social activeness in party organizations due to the poor level of party organization activity. This is their misfortune, and we bear culpability. And we should devote time to working with those who can still find their place in the party. We therefore appeal to all upright individuals who are pondering over how to proceed and what to do. Among the people there has always been respect for those who do not take fright at a difficult moment, who hold out, who put their shoulder to the wheel. Today a moment has come where the party needs the help and support of all decent, upright individuals who hold its interests dear.

We hope that, prior to submitting his resignation, each person will think back to that moment when he wrote his membership application statement, stood before his comrades, and how sincerely he desired to benefit others. Such an opportunity still exists, and it must be fully utilized.

We have recently witnessed a number of public spectacles—what else can you call them?—where certain CPSU members, including highly-placed republic officials, announced their resignation from the party. Well, as they say, if that is what they want to do.

We know these people well, and we remember the stick-to-itiveness many of them displayed in past years, when they were seeking party membership and when they were endeavoring to obtain high posts by hook or by crook. Their personal political ambitions are fully manifested here, their desire to exploit anti-party attitudes for their own purposes, to create around themselves the aura of a "courageous" fighter against conservatives from the period of stagnation. As a rule these are the same persons who find it convenient to utilize new regulations to promote a new political career.

Public disavowal of one's party convictions is nothing new, and the people are not deceived on this score. As a rule this is typical of persons without ideology and without principles, persons ready and willing to promote only themselves, in any ideological cast. I would think that primary party organizations will make a correct political assessment as regards such CPSU members and will exercise their right to bring order within their ranks.

Working in close coordination with the oversight and review bodies established in the Communist Party of Moldavia, we shall make a consistent effort to unite party ranks.

The road toward party reform also lies through renewal of party ranks. Today it is no longer a questionnaire and it is no longer social affiliation which determine membership in the party. There are many people of integrity in society who see that the party is at a crossroads, in a process of renewal, and who sincerely desire to help us. The party also needs them.

Approaches to CPSU membership, dismissal and voluntary resignation from the party have been fundamentally changed in the new CPSU Party Rules. First of all these matters are becoming the prerogative of primary party organizations. It is important that they fully comprehend their role in the forming of party ranks, for it is precisely today, when things are particularly difficult for the party, that the finest people, dedicated to the ideals of good and justice, are joining its ranks. Just this year alone more than 1,300 persons have been accepted to CPSU probationary and full membership. This constitutes the true hope and support of the Communist Party of Moldavia, and I am confident that their numbers will grow. Party organizations must now find active, nontraditional forms of working with new members, more rapidly involve young party members in political activity, form clubs and groups, and organize political debates. In short, we must give thought to creation of a structure for young Communists.

I want to return to the primary party organizations and their role in party renewal and the advance of perestroyka. The primary organizations strongly declared their presence on the eve of the congress, taking active part in forming the body of delegates and recommending persons for party executive bodies. The voice of the primary party organization spoke out loudly at the 28th CPSU Congress, and it is now represented in the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and in the Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

But these are only first steps. The primary party organization has not yet become a bearer of party authority; in the past it has functioned to a considerable degree in name alone, and is this not one of the reasons for the crisis in the CPSU? Let us recall who in the recent past determined the moral countenance of the party member and who determined whether a party member had acted correctly or incorrectly. The primary party organization and his party comrades? No. Frequently this would be done by higher-echelon party committees and with a ready-made evaluation, which would be passed down essentially with a political label to the primary organization for review: the latter would be expected to take measures, and God forbid that this decision not be

accepted! You will not be deprived of criticism regarding political immaturity, spinelessness, etc, etc. Sometimes a primary party organization secretary would have to keep his balance between the party committee and his own party members.

We all know what this led to. To a loss of internal linkages within the party, to separation of leadership from the party masses and, most important, to loss of respect for the primary organization, especially if it had been acting unfairly, under pressure from above. This is why we feel that it is of fundamental importance that the party organizations themselves, at their own initiative, review their own decisions of past years, analyze instances of unfair punishment of party members, rectify mistakes, and make a public apology. One should not wait until they write a petition to party oversight agencies, and not everybody will do this, out of pride and resentment. The party's image will only gain from this. Emphasis today must be placed on turning toward people and toward their lives.

The new provisions of the CPSU Party Rules significantly broaden the authorities of primary party organizations and give them precedence in a number of matters which up until recently were determined at the party committee level. What is needed now is development of a mechanism of practical implementation of the provisions of the party rules. You can say all you want about the independence of primary party organizations, but if we do not help them exercise their authorities, then perestroyka within the party will not be accomplished. Let us talk things over and determine how this can be done immediately.

Rayon and city councils of primary organization secretaries should become one of the forms of interaction between party committees and organizations, as we decided at the 17th congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia. The creation of these societal structures is dragging out, however. In many places there is even being expressed the opinion that their establishment is inadvisable, since some believe that they will be an alternative to the party committee and will usurp its functions. It is difficult to say where such fear of societal structures in the party has come from in our time.

A new situation is forming in this republic in connection with adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the Decree on Governmental Authority. What I am talking about is that provision which does not permit a system of party or other political leadership in governmental and law enforcement agencies, state security agencies, military and paramilitary force organizations, at enterprises and establishments, and in organizations. This has evoked a powerful wave of debate and discussion, at times in quite acute forms. I too, as Central Committee first secretary, have also taken flak. My statements at the Supreme Soviet were greeted by many with incomprehension, and by some with great disappointment.

At the session I called upon the people's deputies not to display haste in voting on the provision stipulating the impermissibility of party and political leadership at enterprises, establishments, and in organizations, since I feel that this will complicate the situation in workforces. Unfortunately this proposal was not supported by a majority (only 124 delegates voted in favor). But when a vote was taken on the overall decree, I voted for it, just as did many other Communists, since in the general formulation there is no doubt about the need for it. Similar documents have been adopted in a number of Union republics.

At the same time I would emphasize that today party leadership virtually does not exist in the old meaning of the term. Party organizations do not oversee economic management activities or executive personnel, they do not usurp the functions of the services, they do not interfere in production matters, and they have renounced peremptory orders and instructions on what is to be done, by whom, and how. But what has remained is the practice of holding meetings and other forms of party work during working time, using workplace facilities free of charge, etc.

In this case the point of the Decree on Governmental Authority is well taken; such a practice should be abandoned. But there are those who fail to note another important feature of the decree: it places all parties and sociopolitical movements in conditions of equality: none of these are entitled to exercise political leadership in the enumerated collectives. But this faces us Communists with new tasks; it increases demands on the activities of all party components. Workforces will not tolerate loafers and idle talkers from any quarter. It would be better for all of us to give a great deal of thought to how work should be organized under the new conditions. One should confer with party members, party activists, and with party organization secretaries. We must seek new forms of organizing party work at the local level.

As for rural localities, as we agreed at the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress, rural territorial party organizations should be formed. This work is already in progress. We must also think through how to extend this practice to cities, towns, and rayon administrative seats. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia has some observations on this matter.

The time remaining to passage of the Law on Political Parties also enables us to hold requisite consultations with the Supreme Soviet, with party-member deputies, and with specialists, and to submit appropriate proposals pertaining to the substance of the laws, so that each law is in keeping with the provisions of the republic's Constitution and human rights and is in conformity with the spirit of perestroyka. We therefore feel that one should not panic and declare the disbandment of party organizations, as some are already attempting to do. The right to be a member of any party and to join together on this basis is guaranteed by the republic's Constitution. This practice exists throughout the world.

Numerous proposals, including by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, for a separate section in the party rules entitled "Communist Parties of the Union Republics," were considered in the course of preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress as well as during the congress proceedings. There was a lively discussion of and debate on this section, which reflected the complex processes which are taking place in the republics and in their Communist parties. Everybody is familiar with the results of this debate; they are stated in the provisions of this new section.

We apparently need to return to the question of autonomy for the Communist Party of Moldavia. The matter in question is the drafting and adoption of its party rules. The adopted course of policy naturally proceeds from the process of formation of a Union of autonomous sovereign states, the relations between which will be governed by appropriate treaties. Obviously the main thing which will bind the Communist Parties of the Union republics together in these conditions is their program goals and a common ideology.

I shall stress once again that this will not mean leaving the CPSU, as some people assume. And first and foremost because this would be disadvantageous to the Communist Party of Moldavia. We resolve many political as well as economic issues through participation in the CPSU and its central directive bodies. Why should we renounce those advantages we derive from participation in the CPSU? But this is a pragmatic approach, as they say. The main thing is ideological unity and common program goals—the building of humane socialism.

One final point. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, its Bureau and Secretariat have been functioning with their new membership slightly more than two months. During this time we obviously could have accomplished more than we have done. We are willing to listen to criticism, comments and suggestions. But we cannot accept the decisions made by a number of party organizations pertaining to the Central Committee—decisions which constitute outright ultimatums, stated in harsh terms, and essentially calling for direct confrontation within the party.

The Bendery City Party Committee, for example, is sending out to party committees a resolution in which it castigates the Central Committee for what in its opinion is a lack of a position on the situations which are constantly arising in the republic's sociopolitical affairs. Persistent voices are heard in the party organizations of the Left Bank and in the southern rayons, calling for establishment of their own elected party bodies, virtually in parallel with the Central Committee, and peremptorily "calling on the carpet" the Central Committee first secretary. I must register disagreement with what they are doing, at least with the form of discourse being used.

In addition, 14 primary party organizations in Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa are refusing to remit dues to the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee account. Initially they explained that they were waiting for the 28th CPSU Congress, but now, it turns out, they are waiting for this Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee plenum. They certainly interpret their autonomy in a strange way! Apparently we, together with the Auditing Commission, should look into and rectify this situation in conformity with the standards of the CPSU Party Rules.

During these difficult days for the republic and its Communist Party, party members should close ranks, display party comradeship, and find all possible points of contact for mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect for ethnic interests. Diplomacy at the popular level should function at full steam, and the internationalist traditions of our party should manifest themselves. Quarrels, clashes, and a split among Communists only plays into the hands of our opponents and ideological adversaries. Nor do they conceal the fact that they expect precisely this of us and are doing a great deal to stir up strife among Communists.

Therefore let our party comrades give considerable thought to the responsibility they are taking upon themselves when they push us with their ultimatum-like actions. In any case, in this difficult, explosive situation the Central Committee and its bureau are endeavoring to find that path which would lead to the building, not to the splitting either of the party or of the republic.

Subordinating Ideological Work to the Interests of the People

There is something very similar between the present state of the ideological and sociopolitical situation in this republic. They reflect one another, as it were, being dependent one on the other. I say this not because I want to denigrate the significance of the ideological work by party organizations or because I consider it the sole "guilty party" for the present instability and the "intellectual ferment" in society. It would of course be wrong to do so. The issue is much more complex. Past mistakes and deformations have also reflected in full measure on ideology.

It is another thing altogether that today we must cast off as quickly and as resolutely as possible the "bureaucrat's uniform" of unquestioned authority and renounce the customary dogmas and postulates which are so dear to the hearts of many. What constitutes the main point of departure here, and from what point should one proceed to stride toward the new today and tomorrow? First and foremost we are dealing with people, cadres, whose job it is to "make" and implement our ideology. We have taken the step of restoring truth. We have renounced, or almost renounced, the primacy of quantitative factors in determining the so-called effectiveness of indoctrinational work. But we have essentially not yet proceeded with the job of forming a corps of party propagandists who are free of past standards, who are able to organize things, to conduct dialogue, to gain people's interest. We

felt the shortage of highly-qualified ideological cadres particularly acutely during the election campaign for the Soviets.

It is true that there were active propagandists, but they were not working for us. This must be acknowledged, and practical conclusions must be drawn, partmands," as was the case in the "good" old days. One should not wait for this, because the time allowed for reflections has run out.

What would I point out right now as a first-priority task? One could concisely formulate it as follows: engage without icularly by the Ideological Commission and the Central Committee Institute for Political Knowledgeability, whose job it is to deal directly with this matter. The city and rayon committees also. One should not expect "guidelines," "instructions," and "comdelay in extensive publicity of the results of the congress and the congress proceedings, in order to accomplish stabilization of the political situation in this country. Political dialogues, which the people in this republic expect, are an important stage of this work.

With the expanded rights of the primary party organizations and the broad opportunities which are opening up in their activities, one should diversify work effort targeted to one's place of residence, filling it with the ideas of the time. We must make fuller use of dialogue work forms and all kinds of discussion and debate clubs: party, political, and cultural. As we have seen, the people who take part in them want to accomplish something practical in life and are seeking to bring their energy to bear. Therefore practical application is necessary, for otherwise we shall turn it into empty talking. We need similar approaches to party instruction, the system of which should be maximally democratized and focused on self-education and the forming of political knowledgeability in party members and activists.

What do people expect of us? Ion Boldishor, a resident of the village of Tudora in Shtefan Vode Rayon, has the following to say on this subject in a letter to the Central Committee: "We were spiritually and intellectually indigent, and we became materially indigent as well. Investigation of 'man as a phenomenon' is necessary in this regard. Man is by nature a highly complex being. This is why party members and, what is worse, party workers avoid dialogue with people.... I propose that party members, Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee secretaries, and its administrative workers come out into the rayons and villages, to see for themselves what kind of a job people are doing in the localities. Let the rayon committee members also come out of their refuges, visit workforces, and talk candidly with people."

Any commentary would be superfluous, as they say.

Yesterday Comrade O. S. Shenin and I visited Drokiyevskiy Rayon. The people there raised the same issues and expressed the same wishes.

In the present situation we must expand the social base of our audience and visit various social and professional groups. This is necessary in order to establish cooperation with them, in order to have new allies in carrying out the tasks of renewal. This is particularly important when one is dealing with the intelligentsia and, in particular, such a large segment of the intelligentsia as the teaching profession. We are proceeding from the position that today the school and the schoolteacher are in need of considerable help, that the most difficult situation in which they find themselves must be radically changed.

We therefore consider it essential to present the republic Supreme Soviet and government with a draft document entitled "On Improving the Material Welfare and Social Protection of This Republic's Teachers," which will propose adoption of a specific, comprehensive "teacher" program, seek ways to increase teacher salaries effective January 1991, and to establish differentiated pay for teachers. As an additional source of financing, we propose the establishment of a suitable philanthropic foundation, etc. The Central Committee Bureau has examined and approved this document. We feel that it is also high time to adopt an overall Law on Public Education. These measures would make it possible to improve the teacher's position and social status as well as that of the school as a whole.

What about our position in interrelations with science? We support the following platform for cooperation between party organizations and science: a resolute departure from the command style and a return to realism and dialectically-grasped common sense, awareness of the global significance of humanism and the uniqueness of human civilization, the indissoluble bond between man and the environment, and the attainment of genuine equality of rights of the members of society. We must proceed from the fact that today only that political force which interacts with science and which does a better job of relying on existing intellectual potential can emerge victorious. In conditions of radical changes in work forms and structure of the administrative apparatus, party organizations must actively cooperate with scientists and other specialists and establish something in the order of "think tanks" to formulate points of reference and practical solutions. We are very much in need today of high-quality sociological studies which reflect actual societal trends, and we need a scientifically-validated mechanism of studying and shaping public opinion.

The Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee's Institute for Sociopolitical Research (Comrade A.A. Zavtur, director) is only taking the first steps. At the same time suggestions are ringing out more and more loudly from the localities, calling for the establishment of an institute model which would help the Communist Party in formulating ideological and theoretical approaches in policy, in the spiritual/intellectual [dukhovnyy], ideological, and cultural domains, and in

working with the masses. The Central Committee commissions and the Central Committee Institute for Sociopolitical Research have the task of joining together sociologists, political scientists, historians, and philosophers for the purpose of more fully understanding the dynamic processes which are taking place in this republic and reflecting them in the language of science and practical recommendations. It is of course also necessary to concern oneself with training specialists in sociology. There are very few of these in this republic.

As for cadres as a whole, one should note that the most acute shortage today is the shortage of creative individuals who are capable of independently, energetically, knowledgeably, and in a professional manner making the correct decisions and taking personal responsibility for their implementation. This shortage is currently being felt both in the Central Committee and at the local level. It therefore particularly behooves us to display a careful, solicitous approach to that cadre potential which we presently have and which is currently operating.

This applies not only to ideological workers but also to specialists in other fields of knowledge. A wasteful attitude toward them, a "brain drain," which has already commenced, can lead to extremely negative consequences both in level of cadre preparation and in the economy. We should probably take a close look at worldwide experience. Particularly since all of us want this republic to become civilized and prosperous. This also applies to the area of cultural knowledgeability—both political and general.

But if we approach our restructuring prospects and the further advance of perestroyka with the large view, without establishing a solid alliance with culture in the broadest meaning of the term, our efforts will turn out to be in vain and ineffective in large measure. Vulgarization of the ideas of socialism, including in our republic, has led to separation of cultural policy from the spiritual/intellectual needs of the people, to drying up of the roots of ethnic cultures, the destruction of a substantial portion of historical and cultural sites and artefacts, and to our historical forgetfulness. All this today advances issues pertaining to the intellectual and spiritual rebirth of the people to the forefront in the activities of the Communist Party of Moldavia.

I would like to state in this context that recently there have been calls to wipe from the face of the earth, as it were, everything connected with the name of V.I. Lenin. These have nothing in common with democracy. Entire generations lived and labored with this name and hoped for a better life. One should not mock history. This is immoral at the very least. Respect for the name of a person who has been acknowledged throughout the world as an outstanding political figure of the 20th century comprises a mandatory element of the overall cultural awareness on the part of each individual who considers himself to be a member of the civilized world. It is another thing altogether that transformation of a lofty idea into terms of consumer goods which exceeds the bounds of common sense can only depreciate and discredit this idea.

It is precisely for this reason that we consider it warranted in some cases to rename lagging enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, associations, and educational institutions which undeservedly bear the name of V.I. Lenin. Party organizations in turn should revise the content of all visual agitation and introduce proper order here. And on the whole one must be sensitive to the realities of life, take into account the uniqueness and specific features of the present day, refrain from old interpretations and stock phrases of the Stalinist dogmatic legacy in regard to the name of Lenin in any and all of its manifestations.

The role of the creative intelligentsia is indispensable in instilling decency, humanism, and a high degree of cultural awareness. History contains many examples where, at difficult, critical turning points in history, it has been precisely the masters of culture and art who, with their inherent high degree of civic awareness and responsibility for the fate of the people, have stood on the front lines, defending and enriching the treasure house of things precious to all mankind. I believe that, working together, we shall be able more effectively to prevent the negative processes which are capable of doing damage to the people's genuine culture. "Beauty will save the world"—these words are of unfading significance.

We know that many persons active in culture in this republic firmly intend to dedicate their talent to the noble service of our people and toward teaching the younger generation such lasting qualities as integrity, decency, kindness, humanism, respect for one's elders, and solicitude for the weak. The Central Committee will do everything to support these noble undertakings in every possible way. We are ready and willing to cooperate in many areas.

In my opinion, in the immediate future these could include, for example, preparation of analytical materials for initiatives pertaining to the adoption of a "Law on Culture" and a "Law on Legal Protection of the Creative Intelligentsia." We feel that it is a good idea to assume moral and, to the extent of one's capabilities, also material support of unique individuals, creative persons who are capable of ennobling society by their works, of humanizing society, of making it more responsive and kinder. We feel that it is the correct thing to do to revive such a noble undertaking as patronage of the arts and literature. Culture also awaits sponsors.

We must implement party policy in the cultural domain in a competent manner, openly and candidly, in healthy competition with other parties and societal organizations. It must definitely be grounded on profound respect for the creative process, for the uniqueness and equal merits of national and ethnic cultures, and on the

principle of banning any and all forms of acts of moral terrorism toward persons who think differently.

I must also mention the matter of the press. A great deal in this area has changed in the course of perestroyka: glasnost and openness are being affirmed. We have put an end to a monopoly of and dictate over the mass media, if I may phrase it in these terms. A new law creates conditions for full and equal functioning of a commercial and even private press, alongside a party press and an alternative, opposition press. All these are without question positive processes. We have an understanding attitude toward this.

But there are certain things with which we cannot agree. I am talking about a specific manifestation of tendentiousness and prejudice in the press, in particular the anticommunist thrust of certain print media. As paradoxical as it might seem, these things are occurring in publications headed by Communists. I do not believe that any party in the world would allow its members to smear or defame their party. Nor shall we permit this. Journalists who do not share the ideas of the CPSU are entitled to choose another party and another periodical. It is unethical and intolerable to use the party press for attacks on the party. We see the principal significance of journalist's labor on the part of the party sociopolitical affairs writer in defending common human values, in publicizing and disseminating the ideas of perestroyka, and in seeking unity behind a position advocating renewal.

We must seek out new forms of cooperation with national and ethnic television and radio, which are becoming independent of political and public organizations. We should also thoughtfully consider the question of how more effectively to utilize printing facilities, as well as the rayon and city press.

The Communist Party of Moldavia and This Republic's Economy

As we know, the 28th CPSU Congress endorsed a course of policy aimed at a decisive reform of the economy and a turn by the economy toward social problems and the needs of the individual. While speaking out in favor of a shift toward a market-oriented economy, the congress at the same time unequivocally rejected "shock therapy" methods, firmly declaring that the CPSU has been and continues to be a defender of the interests of the working person.

A few days ago this republic's Supreme Soviet considered and approved a government plan calling for transition to a market economy. One senses a strong desire on the part of the new people who have entered government to change the situation for the better. And it seems to me that our desire to assist them in this is natural, for only by uniting efforts will it be possible to accomplish anything genuinely beneficial for the people.

Thus there is a plan, and the task at hand is to implement it. We are in favor of converting state enterprises to joint-stock ownership without delay, of provision of the right of free enterprise, the leasing out of small enterprises and stores, and allowing the purchase and sale of dwellings, stock shares and other securities, as well as a portion of the means of production.

It is my conviction that we must speed up the process of forming commodity and stock exchanges, move more swiftly to reform the banking system, adopt an interest policy, and create conditions for the establishment of competing plants and associations, small and medium enterprises, especially in the domain of consumer goods manufacture. It is clear that we shall be denationalizing a portion of property in industry, the service industry, and land, as well as developing external economic activities, including the attracting of foreign capital into this republic.

Considerable reforms should be carried out in the domain of agricultural production, which is of key significance for our republic. I hope that our plenum will support the initiative of the Communist Party Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy. What is being sought is to transform these next five years into a period of accelerated social and cultural development in the rural areas, establishment of processing industry facilities based on small-scale enterprises, and mobilization of the efforts of governmental, economic, as well as all other organizations and movements in this republic toward achieving this goal.

It is also proposed that private farm plots be increased in size to 0.5 hectares or larger, transferring them as orchard and vegetable plots to a status of lifelong, inheritable possession and use. As for the remainder of the land, we feel that it should be turned over to the Soviets, which in turn will handle its transfer to workforces and individual citizens, depending on local conditions, desires and interests, for long-term lease, possession and use. All land users thereby should pay taxes on the land and on their income.

We are against the fad which has seized many regions of this country—to disband the kolkhozes; we are in favor of immediately forming in the agroindustrial complex a mixed market economy, in which equal economic conditions should be created for all forms of farm operation and ownership, including private ownership, equal conditions promoting normal development and commercial competition in the foodstuffs market. But all these complex issues should be decided only in consultation with the peasants, persuading them of the advantages of various forms of farm operation.

Today it is vitally important that each and every party committee know how people are living in a specific village, how they are feeding themselves and with what, how they are being provided with manufactured goods, and what issues are of concern to them. And the party committee should not only know but also help resolve these problems, giving party work in rural areas a businesslike efficiency, specificity, and purposefulness.

Neighborly assistance and mutual help are also needed, especially in the critical conditions which have developed this year in the southern part of our republic.

One thing today is clear: this republic's acute social and economic problems can be solved only with unconventional, innovative methods. The old methods do not work here, at least those which have outlived their usefulness.

In voting for economic reform, we are advocating a decisive shift in the republic's economy toward people's needs, as well as social priorities. In transitioning to a market-oriented economy it is our duty to propose and stoutly advocate measures which would protect the public against voluntarism, arbitrariness and injustice on the part of technocrats, and to propose alternative, more reasonable solutions to the problems which arise. Wherever we are convinced that Soviet and economic agency officials are doing a good job, we must help them in their work with all our capabilities. In such cases we should cooperate with the new agencies of legislative and executive authority, help them during the period of familiarization, offer political support, and work jointly with them in carrying out positive changes in this republic.

But I should like to warn against one danger: if we direct our principal efforts and energy only at doing away with the old structures, without at the same time creating new ones which would assume the necessary functions for supporting a market economy, we shall find ourselves in a difficult situation. We feel that the center of gravity should be shifted toward the forming of subdivisions which would naturally force out the old structures as new economic methods are introduced. We should also have a more solicitous attitude toward those cadres which are currently being eliminated. Among them there are many competent individuals who are capable of bringing much benefit to Moldavia. Simply replacing them with new persons, who sometimes lack adequate experience and knowledge, could complicate the situation. I feel that such important issues should be settled not with a sweeping move but in a differentiated manner in each case. It is always easier to destroy than to build. For some reason there is no indication that selection of cadres for the new structures is being done on the basis of a competitive system, with tests and other modern approaches. We feel that competence, experience and knowledge should be the principal criteria in promoting and advancing new personnel.

This is the constructive position taken by the Communist Party of Moldavia. It is my conviction that all Communists and party-unaffiliated will understand this position. It will benefit the people. This does not mean that the party is usurping the functions of the Soviets and administrative agencies. But it will exercise its influence through party members working in the economic domain, for the benefit of the interests of the people.

For Specificity in One's Work

The decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress create a good foundation for consolidation of the party, for advancing to a qualitatively new level in our society, which is in the process of renewal. Practical implementation of these decisions should bring the Communist Party of Moldavia to vigorous actions and specific deeds.

First of all we must communicate to party members the results of the congress proceedings and the significance of the adopted documents. This task has been assigned to the congress delegates, and it is already being carried out jointly with the body of party activists. The main thing is to get away from predictable pattern and routine and not to limit things to discussion at the party committee and primary organization level. There should be an across-the-board effort to hold get-togethers with various groups of working people: with workers, kolkhoz farmers, intelligentsia, youth, women veteran workers, and leaders of public organizations and movements.

We must get rid of any and all defeatist attitudes and confusion which have appeared in a number of party components. Now is not the time to make somber prognoses and to shrug one's shoulders helplessly. Our program of action is defined in the decisions of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldavia. It correlates with general party policy and with the goals and tasks of perestroyka.

We do not want to exacerbate or aggravate assessments, but we should stress that, following the city and rayon party conferences, which formed new-membership party committees, their transition to vigorous, aggressive actions has shown patent delay. Activists in elective office have also not really gotten going. New commissions in a number of city and rayon party committees are presently only at the stage of formation or determination of their goals and tasks, while the situation demands action and more action, and this means constructive actions directly proceeding from the logic of the political situation developing at the local level.

Many party committees as well as primary party organizations lack precisely a sense of healthy pragmatism and a focus toward resolving practical, everyday issues of concern to people. A single action is worth a dozen adopted resolutions. What are needed today are concrete actions directly focused on improving the party's image and prestige.

Today there are no grounds for passing the buck to the central authorities, claiming that the central echelon is failing to take a position, while there is no autonomy at the lower echelons. Such "impasse" situations in the party are eliminated by the congress program declaration and the new CPSU Party Rules.

All preconditions have been created for the potential of party organizations to be implemented in sociopolitical practice and to become, through concrete deeds, an

active factor of perestroyka and renewal of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia.

Of course society and the Communist Party are going through some difficult days. But it is precisely misfortune which brings out a person's mettle. And today all of us must work together in a common cause. If we are serious about perestroyka, all of us must work together in harmony, utilizing all our capabilities in the interests of the people. And one should not fear that people will not notice or appreciate this. The people are wise; they are responsive to kindness and selflessness, and without question the people will appreciate the noble efforts of the Communist Party of Moldavia to accomplish the rebirth of society, improvement in our people's living standards, level of culture and education, and establishment of peace and harmony on our magnificent land.

Head of Chernobyl Station on Reactor Shutdown

LD2808122290 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev August 28 TASS-UKRINFORM—The power supply for the system to protect and operate the third reactor of the Chernobyl nuclear power station stopped Monday morning, August 27.

Director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station Mikhail Umanets said that, in accordance with regulations, the staff worked for 30 minutes to remedy the defect, but to no avail. Regulations then required shutting down the reactor. This was done at 7:53, local time. The stoppage of the reactor and the power-generating set proceeded normally. Safety regulations have not been violated.

Xenon now formed in the fuel, requiring a pause of 48 hours. After that the voltage can be stepped up.

When a reactor is shut down, xenon [words indistinct] in the fuel. It engulfs neutrons and makes it impossible to increase the neutrons' flux. But xenon disintegrates, and in 48 hours it no longer interferes with neutrons's flux, that is the increase of a reactor's voltage.

Umanets said that Monday's events are not unusual at nuclear power stations.

Chairmen of Industrial Towns Meet in Donetsk

LD2708141790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1200 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] An interregional conference of soviets of the major industrial towns in the country has completed its work in Donetsk.

[Correspondent Kondaurov, speaking over video of open-air meeting, groups of people in discussion, and banners saying: "CPSU, give your plunder back to the people!" and "Let the CPSU live at Chernobyl AES (nuclear electric power station)!"] Deputies, chairmen of soviets, and their deputy chairmen from 24 cities around the country with a population of 1 million and over—namely Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and others—came to Donetsk for the conference. The participants came to a meeting, a gathering with inhabitants of the city of Donetsk in an attempt to find out how the voters would react to the ideas and solutions of such an unprecedented parliament of major urban centers. Contradictions have emerged between soviets of various levels, and in the soviets themselves, between the presidiums and the executive committees. Ration coupons are being introduced for food produce and goods in one town, and people at once lay siege to shops in neighboring towns. Nothing has changed for the better in civic economies.

Will this sort of conference be a permanent one?

[A.G. Makhmudov, chairman of Donetsk City Executive Committee] Yes. We have established and stated in our conclusion that today a permanently operating interregional conference of city soviets of the major industrial centers is essential.

[Kondaurov] The representatives of the city soviets think they have a better knowledge of the problems and can offer more viable solutions than the Union parliament and the republican parliaments.

Ukraine's Kravchuk Views Parliamentary Relations

90UN2681A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 29 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, by parliamentary correspondent V. Nikipelov; place and date not given: "We Can No Longer Live 'Second in Line'"]

[Text] [Nikipelov] A major historical event has occurred in the life of the people of the Ukraine—the Declaration on State Sovereignty has been adopted. What in it appeals to you most?

[Kravchuk] Its novelty. In all aspects—historical, political, economic, social, spiritual.... Even if one turns to history, there has never been such a document in the Ukraine. It encompasses all aspects of life. And, what is particularly important, has been well developed.

Some people were even put on their guard initially by some of its sections on account of their boldness. For example, on external and internal security, citizenship, economic independence, including the financial system and the republic's share of the diamond and foreign currency reserves and the gold reserves and, if necessary, the creation of its own unit of currency. But whoever has read the draft closely, without extracting individual parts or sections from it, and has attempted to take in this document as a whole has discovered all those basic positions which define the Ukraine in the system of our renewed community as an independent socialist state.

Incidentally, the majority of all these revolutionary ideas were heatedly discussed by the delegates at the recent Ukrainian Communist Party congress even. They were clearly set forth also—in different wording, perhaps—in the final documents of the party forum: in a resolution and in the program principles of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

[Nikipelov] And what, incidentally, is your view of the new Union treaty?

[Kravchuk] Primarily as being mutually beneficial to all and not infringing on the republic's interests. Each republic itself determining how it would like to see this most important document, proceeding primarily from its own historical singularities, economic situation, and available experience of relations both with other republics and with the central authorities would, obviously, be logical also.

I believe that the republics themselves should decide also which rights they can delegate to the Union, and which they reserve for themselves. They are, after all, joining the Union not in order to lose something or sacrifice something or other. The imperial approach, which still exists—give this, take that!—is on its last legs. It is unacceptable for any civilized state.

Just ask yourself, what government in the world relegates the interests of its people to the background? It would in this case have just a day to live! So the system of life "second in line," as they say, is now impossible. All the peoples of our Union must live as they work and be masters on their own land.

We all need an economically and politically strong and dependable Union based on the equality of its constituent sovereign republics. And it should be more profitable to the latter to be part of it rather than outside it. This is for us a position of principle.

[Nikipelov] Very well. The declaration has been adopted, what now?

[Kravchuk] Ahead lies the elaboration of a new constitution. After all, it is not enough to proclaim our intentions, a basic law regulating the activity of the whole of society and precisely prescribing and defending the duties and rights of each of its members is needed for the further development of a sovereign state.

For this it is essential to create as quickly as possible a parliamentary commission for formulation of the main directions and structural sections of the future constitution. If it works well (in conjunction with various specialists and scholars) on the conceptual bases of the new constitution, in the fall even or, at least, at the start of next year the draft of it could be published for public discussion, and then, at the summer session, we could embark on its ratification.

[Nikipelov] When, on 16 July, the hall rose as one man and ardently greeted the results of the voting for the adoption of the declaration, it seemed that there were no longer among the deputies either rival blocs or various groupings. Might this not be the first serious step toward consolidation in parliament?

[Kravchuk] Such a conclusion is permissible, I confess. The people present in the hall, with different viewpoints and adhering to different party and political positions, ultimately overstepped their group interests when deciding the people's fate.

But, you will agree, prior to this it was frequently otherwise, when it was primarily emotions that took their toll and preference was given satisfaction of personal ambitions, not to a solution of the problems in question. I would often observe how sometimes one party, sometimes another would be "against" only because the opposite party was "for." Now, however, such a step to accommodate one another has, I would like to believe, been taken. Of course, there is still a long way to go to complete mutual understanding. Nor is it, obviously, all that useful. After all, it is only in heated argument that the real truth is born. It is just that this argument must be worthy of gentlemen—proper and respectful.

[Nikipelov] And what is your attitude toward the "National Council?"

[Kravchuk] As toward any phenomenon—ambivalent. There are in that same "National Council" intellectuals, that is, people of high culture, and people who know what they want. Whether I like what they want or not is another matter, but they are moving consistently toward their goal. I am also clearly aware that in their ideology and policy these people wholly disagree with the socialist choice, with the federation, the Union. Their ultimate goal is the Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union.

There are anticommunist forces, that is, those that absolutely reject communist ideology. Well, the Ukrainian Republican Party was, I believe, short-sighted, at the least, when it recorded in its program that communist ideology is antipopular and unnatural. I imagined to myself for a minute what it would be like if all parties which are now coming into being here were to record in their program rejection of this ideology or the other. How, then, would we interpret the words about pluralism, exchange of opinions, dialogue, and constructiveness? There are also people who for various reasons hate the communists, and expecting them to become their friends may be ruled out. This is the nature of the "National Council."

But, despite all this, I proceed from the fact that the "National Council" exists and that its members are real people elected by the people to parliament. And it is necessary to live and work alongside them. And when dictated by the interests of the cause, it is necessary to know how to find a compromise with them. But the bloc also needs to consider that nor do constant ultimatums do any good and sometimes engender in people simply rejection.

Of course, the position of a minority is difficult. I am for its opinion being heard and taken into consideration. But there can be no taking the path of pressure, obstruction, and crude breaches of parliamentary standards and, sometimes, simply human ethics.

[Nikipelov] What is your opinion on the question of the combination of party and state office?

There was at first, as you recall, a premise in the combination of these offices. But its novelty entailed the old views of both work in the party and work in the soviets. The party, after all, found its position in practice facilitated, and no great effort was needed to defend its policy or strategy. The apparatus would function and produce some decisions or other, and they would be discussed, signed, and disseminated. No one attacked the party from either the left or the right, and it lived for itself under these privileged conditions. And if, say, there was no Central Committee secretary for six months even, this might have gone unnoticed even.

And how were the soviet sessions conducted earlier? Twice a year deputies would arrive for a day or two, vote, and disperse for their home districts. Under such conditions combination did not complicate the work of either office. Take our session. It will go on for no less than six months altogether. And the Supreme Soviet chairman has to work strenuously and involve himself in law-making. But what about party affairs? After all, party leaders today must go constantly to the masses, defend the party, and make new policy.... Is it possible to be successful in both places? The answer is obvious. This is why I believe that such a combination is today inexpedient.

In short, the new life requires a concentration of efforts on some one topic. Yet earlier, the more the appellations in one's title and the more the decorations, the more prestigious and authoritative a person seemed to himself. He was not even troubled by what the people thought about this as they waited in line.

[Nikipelov] By what methods should the ruling party operate in parliament?

[Kravchuk] It must primarily draw up and offer attractive and sustaining programs, and in parliament itself, persuade the deputies of the expediency of precisely these proposals. The ruling party should, in my view, not only recommend its candidates for this position or the other in the Supreme Soviet or government but also introduce in practice their open, official recall in the event of their failing to justify trust and failing to cope with the duties entrusted to them. And the ruling party only proposes, what is more, the recall of this earlier nomination, but the Supreme Soviet might not agree with this proposal. But in this case the party would divest itself of responsibility for this nomination.

[Nikipelov] Your attitude toward Yeltsin and Ligachev....

[Kravchuk] Taken at the general conceptual level, I do not share the views of either. Yeltsin is a radical, Ligachev a conservative. Today the word "conservatism" is identified with us with a reluctance to move forward along the path of revolutionary renewal. We were all recently hearing vigorous speeches from Yegor Kuzmich which, incidentally, contained in themselves nothing new—other than seemingly correct calls for organization and discipline—and which essentially meant a turning back. Although as a man, as a personality, he was, in my view, of interest for his originality and his aspiration to actively champion his viewpoint. Even though getting on in years, he fought for his idea to the end. But his viewpoint did not impress me because it was one-sided.

Boris Yeltsin is a reflection of the era of perestroyka. He is a product of a particular environment who, under the influence of criticism, as is usually the case, has turned so far left that he has become more than left. I believe that, as a whole, his actions contain much boldness, decisiveness, and interesting discoveries, but I dislike in all this some kind of theatricality, that quitting of the party at the congress, for example. It seems to me that this was wrong for a person of such political dimensions as the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

The people of Russia have, like the people of the Ukraine also, earned through suffering the right to a better life. And Yeltsin, of course, understands that the Russians need to be helped.

[Nikipelov] What is your attitude toward the incorrect decisions that have been made in the years of perestroyka?

[Kravchuk] In itself a mistake is not as bad as the reasons for its emergence are dangerous. Inexperience, ignorance, or a reluctance to take account of the people's interests? Our antialcohol campaign, when we began to fight not against the vice but people, may serve as a striking example. As a result we stimulated homebrew most actively, and billions of rubles from the sale of liquor which previously had gone to the treasury settled in the pockets of smart operators of the shadow economy.

I could cite you other examples of mistaken decisions also. We read about them in the newspapers and hear about them from on high. Recognition of mistakes is a good thing. But not making them is even better. In politics absolution does not benefit the people, for it is ultimately the people who suffer.

[Nikipelov] Leonid Makarovich, are you yourself fond of acknowledging your mistakes?

[Kravchuk] Tell me just as frankly, who does? That acknowledging them is essential and needs to be done opportunely is another matter. By a politician particularly. I personally manage to find sufficient effort and courage for this. If I see that I have made miscalculations

or been inaccurate in some things, I either say so outright or, when this concerns a public statement, find a reason for also publicly disavowing my viewpoint or confessing it mistaken.

[Nikipelov] The formation of the government is now being completed. What tasks and what first step of yours do you consider most important?

[Kravchuk] We are now putting the emphasis on the strategic directions of parliament's actions. They are today well known, and practically all are reflected in the declaration. I believe that the first step of the new chairman today should be geared primarily to the efficient organization of parliament and the consolidation of the deputies.

And this is not a formal-bureaucrat task. The Supreme Soviet is, after all, a law-making body. And the success of our entire activity will depend on the composure, constructiveness, and political peace in parliament and a combination of deputies' efforts when tackling this question or the other.

The people of the Ukraine must see that parliament is the place where their future is created—through severe tribulation at times—not a place for ascertainment of the relations of different groups of deputies.

Ukraine's 'KGB Without Secrets' Program Viewed

LD2708153490 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 90

[Text] Our listeners, among them O. Balash from France and V. Halyuk from Canada, ask in their letters about the work of our country's state security organs. That is why we offer you today a broadcast "The KGB Without Secrets," prepared by journalist Anatoliy Ostapenko.

[Ostapenko] I am sitting in the office of Colonel Yevhen Marchuk. He has traversed a road from junior operative to first deputy chairman of the KGB of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. So, let us start.

Yevhen Kyrylovych, the activities of the KGB have always attracted the attention of the public at large. However, in the press, and in radio and television programs there have been almost no reports on this subject. But today, the situation, it seems, is changing.

[Marchuk] You know, there were quite a few reports in the past. Unfortunately, those reports dealt in the main with the positive sides of our work, or they touched only on the successful cases conducted by us or with our operations in general terms. Therefore, I presume, those reports did not make any imprint in the memory of many readers or listeners, although in my view, those reports contained a great deal of valuable and objective information on our work. Unfortunately, some materials appearing now not only have a biased character, but have nothing in common with reality. I mean the certain events revealed recently by General Kalugin.

[Ostapenko] Of late, what we have witnessed are exactly the revelations of this kind, be they sanctioned or not, made by KGB employees of various ranks. Are you trying to say that among your colleagues there are people prepared to give false information about the work of your organization?

[Marchuk] Well, you know, people are people. This applies to any organization. For a long time an impression prevailed that all public statements by KGB employees must be of a stereotypic character, sanctioned by higher authorities beforehand. The thing is, in our organization, just as in any other, people hold different views on certain issues, including the evaluation of our own work. In the statements of certain employees, including Gen. Kalugin, we see alongside many objective and, in my view, normal judgments also, to our regret, things which simply do not exist in nature. For example, although I hold a high rank I know nothing about the existence of some subunits engaged in the preparation of disinformation for consumption by our people and the country as a whole.

[Ostapenko] In other words, you also have a problem with cadres. That is what I deduce from your reply. What sort of people are working in the state security organs, and how do you select candidates?

[Marchuk] Our employees are ordinary people, just ordinary citizens. They do not differ from other people by having extraordinary, exclusive qualities. True, there are certain specific traits in the people whom we accept for work in the KGB, and in the people who apply to us of their own choice. What are these traits? First, as a rule, they must have higher education. In a majority of cases, preference is given to persons with juridical education or with humanitarian skills, although now there is a demand for specialists in technical fields. In general, the range of professional demands to our employees is sufficiently wide. Second, the would-be-employee must be a normal, honest, and highly moral person. Quite obviously his or her biography should be free of any details that could discredit them. Our employees must be of good health. That is, they must be strong physically, spiritually, and morally.

[Ostapenko] Could you tell our listeners how many people the KGB employs? And how your organization is financed?

[Marchuk] The secrecy regarding this question is not imposed by us. Many people are of the impression that it is the KGB itself which does not want to reveal its budget and the strength of its workforce. Let me assure you that when all this is revealed—it will be done on the decision of the Supreme Soviet—you will not experience great sensations. What I can tell you is that we do not employ many people in the Ukraine. In some oblasts we have divisions where only one or two—three at a maximum—operatives cover two to three rayons.

[Ostapenko] Regardless of this, the KGB is viewed as a state within a state. I don't know how this qualification

is correlated with the number of employees, but many times here, and in the West, it has been said that the KGB has its informer in every organization.

[Marchuk] A state within a state? Well, this is an outright exaggeration. As to the belief that in every organization the KGB has its secret operatives, I can tell you with all responsibility that it is not true.

[Ostapenko] Could you tell me, please, whether you select applicants by making allowances for their nationality—is he Russian, Ukrainian, Jew, or Pole—or to what organization he belongs? Does this play any role in your decision to accept them or not?

[Marchuk] Nationality does not mean anything. Today, we have employees of 23 nationalities in the republic's KGB. In the main they are Ukrainians, an overwhelming majority are Ukrainians and Russians. The percentage of Ukrainians and Russians almost corresponds to the proportional composition of the republic's population. We also have Jews, Poles, and Greeks. As to their party allegiance, until the Constitution contained Article 6, naturally the advantage was given to members of the CPSU. This rule governed until recently. Now we intend to change this attitude, especially now that the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine has been adopted. In other words, the question of party allegiance will cease to be of any serious significance.

[Ostapenko] Yet, up till now, such a question or problem as the deideologization of the state security organs and the organs of the interior, as well as the Army, has not been resolved. Most likely, you are a member of the CPSU. Is it obligatory for you to be governed in your work by decisions of your party organization? What cue are you taking in such cases; to which side is your loyalty placed?

[Marchuk] Indeed, I am member of the CPSU. If you really want to know my view, here it is. I think that even if party committees are abolished within our structure, with primary party organizations remaining intact, no essential changes will occur. Even if a decision is made by higher legislative organs forbidding workers of law-maintaining organs to belong to parties, I must observe that this will not lead to depolitization. Why? Because the law- maintaining organs will carry out the policy line formulated by the higher legislative organ.

[Ostapenko] May I ask you this question: Do you foresee a variant when your organization will give a roof to several party committees representing, let us say, the Ukrainian Republican or Democratic parties, or the CPSU, or any other?

[Marchuk] It is difficult to say today that if a decision is adopted to forbid or exclude the activities of party organizations in such establishments as ours, this will lead to a full 100 percent turnover of employees. This would be unrealistic thinking. Myself, I would prefer a course of trial—and why to forbid? —maybe it would be better to allow.

[Ostapenko] You mean, to allow the creation of party organizations and party committees of any party?

[Marchuk] Yes. This is exactly what I mean, provided these parties work within the limits of the Constitution, within the framework of existing laws.

[Presenter] Let me to remind you, esteemed listeners, you are listening to a broadcast "The KGB Without Secrets," with the participation of Yevhen Marchuk, first deputy chairman of the State Security Committee of the Ukrainian SSR.

[Ostapenko] There are many people who are interested in the work of your organization, the KGB. Some of them consider that you should be dealing only with domestic matters, others that your place is in the external political field.

[Marchuk] This thought has been in cirulation for a long time. It derives from the analogy of this kind with the Western services. Mostly, the comparison is drawn with the United States, where the CIA is separated from the FBI. In our country it has historically come about that intelligence and counterintelligence operate mutually interlinked. However, I do not foresee a great tragedy should the intelligence section be withdrawn from the KGB system and subordinated only to the president. But I can say from my own experience that the activities of the intelligence and counterintelligence sections are mutually interlinked to such an extent that their artificial separation will produce a negative effect for a protracted period. Even so, I think it is possible to proceed along the road of what we have accumulated.

[Ostapenko] Could you map out the sphere of activities of the KGB, at least briefly?

[Marchuk] With pleasure. First, according to the tradition, I will begin with intelligence-gathering operations. The KGB has a subdepartment responsible for intelligence. The intelligence-gathering section supplies information to the higher echelons of the state apparatus. I should note here that in connection with the adoption of the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine, the intelligence section of the Ukraine SSR KGB will supply necessary information primarily to the higher governing echelons of Ukraine. Let me add that this is already being done.

[Ostapenko] Could you cite some examples of your providing information to any of our present-day parliamentarians?

[Marchuk] There are such cases, but because of the delicacy of the matter, I cannot talk about it openly. We concentrate on providing objective, true, precise, and balanced information of 100 percent quality.

[Ostapenko] Can you tell me if there exists a narrow circle of people in the parliament who enjoy the right to make use of this information?

[Marchuk] We address this information to the Supreme Soviet. And it is up to the presidium, its chairman, and his deputies to decide who is to be made privy to this information. Apart from this, we send information to different Supreme Soviet commissions. for example, to the commissions headed by Yavorivskyy, Pavlychko, or Tanyuk.

[Ostapenko] Several times you have mentioned the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine. Concerning this, don't you think the time has come for The State Security Committee of Ukraine not to be subordinate to the all-Union organ?

[Marchuk] In connection with the development of our republic's independence, the greater part of functions and aims of the Ukraine SSR KGB should serve the interests of the republic. Although, let me be frank, even now up to 80 percent of our operations and information directly relate to the problems of our republic.

Now a few words about us not being subordinate to the all-Union department. Will it be for our common benefit? It will be more difficult for the Ukraine KGB to fight organized crime on its own. Or, take the struggle against espionage activities by special services, which conduct work not specifically against Ukraine, but against certain all-Union trends, etc.

[Ostapenko] You only mentioned intelligence work. I guess there are other directions in your activities.

[Marchuk] Indeed. We have a counterintelligence department. The amount of its work has not decreased. It has not decreased because intelligence operations against our country have not slackened—for instance, the United States. Its CIA, or the National Security Agency, or the intelligence departments of various services of the Armed Forces have not, as far as I know, been reduced. Quite the reverse, some of them are being expanded. Therefore, the amount of work for the counterintelligence department is not decreasing, and our republic has been and still remains an object of strong intelligence interests on the part of Western special services, and this attention of theirs we feel rather strongly.

[Ostapenko] In what are they primarily interested? At what are their operations directed?

[Marchuk] They pursue different, but even so, traditional interests. They are first of all interested in the defense potential of our republic, which is very significant within the magnitude of the entire Soviet Union. And not only this. They are also after information on the sciences which benefit our defense. Apart from this, they are very keen on our economic potential. The intelligence services of these countries, especially of those which stand against us, are greatly interested in the processes taking place in our republic. They watch everything closely. Their main aim is not merely watching, but making prognoses, and angling for information as to our plans, intentions, and specific actions, regardless of whether they are nourished by the political leadership, the legislative organ, or the Council of Ministers. They seek everything which can be termed as political information.

[Ostapenko] Could you cite, at least briefly, a case proving the involvement of Western special services in the events in our country of our republic. Could you name these organizations which attract their special attention?

[Marchuk] Everything which may lead to the emergence of internationality hostilities, everything which may resort in illegal actions, all those processes or formations or small groups which may go underground or become semilegal and whose activities rest on the anticonstitutional principles, everything which may lead to bloodshed and to fratricidal conflicts—it is these processes and, of course, people involved in them, that are the prime interests of these services.

[Ostapenko] From this I deduce that you are unable to cite a concrete case.

[Marchuk] We will cite such cases at the proper place and at the proper time. Here I can only say that in such cases people who are basically honest and respectable, but who in the heat of political or public activities may find themselves involved in such unenvious currents or are pushed into doing such deeds, are involved. They themselves do not intend or aspire to be engaged in anticonstitutional activities. Therefore, because of this, I would not like to cite names.

[Presenter] Esteemed listeners, you have heard the first part of a broadcast "The KGB Without Secrets."

The second part will be broadcast tomorrow.

Caucasus

Azerbaijani Group Presents Draft Union Treaty

LD2808125890 Moscow TASS in English 1245 GMT 28 Aug 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow August 28 TASS—An Azerbaijani delegation met representatives of central authorities in the Kremlin today to present their draft of the Union treaty.

The delegations were led by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the chambers of the Soviet parliament), and Afrand Dashdamirov, chairman of the Commission on Inter-Ethnic Relations of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet.

The two delegations favoured preserving a single national market as the basis of the future union but stressed the necessity of reviewing such issues as the formation of the nationwide budget, money emission in the country, credit and the pricing policy. The creation

of single funds to finance nationwide programmes, including research, medicine and education, evoked lively discussions.

Views differed on the expediency of each republic having its own armed forces and self-defense units, patterned on the national guard.

It was decided to set up working groups to work on specific areas. The groups wil start work on September 1.

Disarmament Decree 'Not Being Met' in Armenia

LD2808113790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1022 GMT 28 Aug 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Aug (TASS)—Reports coming in from Armenia show that the demands of the USSR president's decree on disarming, the deadline for which is 13 October, are not yet being met in the republic. As was reported in the main administration for Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the quantity of voluntarily surrendered and confiscated weapons is minimal, while thefts of weapon are taking place virtually every day. In Oktemberyanskiy Rayon, more than 20 armed terrorists attacked a unit of the Soviet Army. They took a machine gun, three automatic weapons, and six grenades. The attackers escaped.

The illegally acquired weapons were put to use without delay. In Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], servicemen of the Internal Troops were fired on from Armenian territory. The attack was beaten off. There are no casualties among the servicemen.

Trouble continues on the border with Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy Rayon. Advances of small groups of Armenian terrorists have been observed in adjacent territory in Noyemberyanskiy and Idzhevanskiy Rayons. During a local inspection in the village of Voskepan, servicemen of the Internal Troops discovered 22 rocket shells and 12 mortar bombs.

A crowd numbering 3,500 gathered at the party rayon committee of Shaumyanovsk on 27 August. People expressed discontent at the removal of V. Agadzhanyan, first secretary of the rayon committee. Additional forces of the Internal Troops arrived in the town to prevent mass disorders. The crowd dispersed at the request of the commanders. But some individuals whipped up passions and tried to grab weapons from the hands of the soldiers. In order to avoid graver consequences, the servicemen were compelled to fire several warning shots in the air and use "Cheremukha" gas.

Moscow, Armenian Officials Discuss Union Treaty

PM2808102590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by TASS "official": "Consultations Held"]

[Text] On 23 August preliminary consultations were held in Moscow between representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and representatives of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet on concepts for a new Union treaty.

The representatives of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet—K.Kh. Sardaryan, chairman of the standing commission on the establishment of independent statehood and on nationalities policy questions, and Armenian SSR people's deputies D.M. Vardanyan, A.A. Karapetyan, and Sh.M. Kocharyan—set out their positions and their view of the future union of sovereign states.

R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; and N.N. Gritsenko, Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, V.G. Kucherenko, and G.S. Tarazevich, chairmen of USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions, provided information on consultations that have taken place with representatives of other republics and accords reached on the continuation of work to prepare a Union treaty.

There was a intense exchange of opinions on principled questions of Union relations.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Session Resumes 27 Aug

LD2708221690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Report by correspondent Koryun Khumoryan on Armenian situation]

[Text] As before, the main event in the republic is the work of the new Supreme Soviet which resumed after a one-day break on Sunday. After the adoption of the declaration on independence and on renaming the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] the Republic of Armenia, a number of symbolic events took place here. First, the 12th convocation of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet naturally turned into the first convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia. On the same day the state flag of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was lowered from the flag poles of government buildings and in the very hall of the Supreme Soviet, and the state flag of the Republic of Armenia was raised. Beginning tomorrow republican television and radio programs will also begin with the anthem of the Republic of Armenia of the years 1918-20. But this is evidently temporary, because a competition has been announced for both a new anthem and a new coat of arms.

The editorial staff of the republican KOMMUNIST newspaper, the organ of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party, the Supreme Soviet, and the republic's Council of Ministers, has amazed readers. Without any kind of warning or discussion with the readers, this paper has been published under a new name: Voice of Armenia [golos armeniyi]. And, at the same time, it has also ceased to be the organ of the republic's Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers,

which has caused bewilderment among many deputies who are today asking themselves the question: Does the party newspaper have the right to speak on behalf of the whole of Armenia? For the sake of fairness, it must be said that this has to do not only with the Communist Party's official organ but also with a number of other public and political organizations which use the name of the republic for the names of their bodies.

Recent armed skirmishes on the border with Azerbaijan continue to be at the center of public attention. The republican Committee for State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have stated their positions on this question pretty late in the day, almost a week late, on the pages of the press. Even a preliminary and superficial analysis, says the KGB statement, gives grounds for drawing conclusions that a skilfull, planned, and sharp provocation was of benefit only to destructive forces in the two neighboring republics. Unfortunately, the inhabitants of our republic have been hearing such general views for more than a year, and it is probably time to identify these destructive forces in both republics for what they are. The republic's Committee for State Security also expressed concern over the fact that certain central mass news media are broadcasting or publishing unverified and sometimes false data about the conflict with which they are promoting the rousing of passions.

MVD Commander Comments on Armenian Guerillas

PM2808095190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by our special correspondent N. Belan: "Acute Impasses"]

[Text] Everyone realizes that the cost of the adventure organized by the Armenian militants is enormous. We have seen this for ourselves, having spent nearly the past three days touring the area with Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops. Before flying to Moscow he granted SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA an interview.

[Belan] What we have seen has made a considerable impression on each of us. What are your conclusions, Yuriy Vasilyevich, those you will be reporting to Moscow?

[Shatalin] Above all that people in the region are becoming increasingly unsure of the ability of the law-enforcement organs, including Internal Troops, to ensure their safety. Appeals for reason are of no use.

So, as I see it, the only way to stabilize the situation is through the implementation of the president's decree on disarming all informal military groupings. Who is going to do this—the republican leadership, using its own forces, or the center—is another matter. But it is as clear as day that it must be done as quickly as possible, because I can no longer give the Azerbaijani people any guarantees that armed provocations will not recur—I have done it twice, but I will not do it a third time, since that would undermine my own authority and that of the central authorities.

[Belan] In your opinion, what happened here from 19 through 21 August; was it a deliberate, premeditated act or an accident?

[Shatalin] It is hard to say at the moment. It will take time, it needs to be investigated.

[Belan] In all the cases where there were battles or shooting, were the Armenian militants the first to attack?

[Shatalin] In all cases, that is clear. There are hundreds, thousands of witnesses. Moreover, we were forced to use combat equipment, but we did not use it immediately: The Armenian militants started firing at 1000 hours on Sunday; the reply came at 1600 hours, that is a quarter of a day later.

[Belan] What reply was that, after all the internal forces' posts joined battle immediately?

[Shatalin] I am talking about the retaliatory helicopter strike.

[Belan] What weapons have the Armenian militants been using?

[Shatalin] We know they are using hail guns—100mm former antiaircraft guns, real combat weapons, which had been handed over to be used for peaceful purposes.

They have used grenade launchers, machine guns, submachine guns, sniper rifles. That is, weapons they have seized in attacks on Soviet Army serviceman and Internal Troops stationed on Armenian territory, plus the weapons they have been illegally manufacturing at certain republican enterprises—mortars, submachine guns, various explosive devices like the F-1 grenade, and other items.

[Belan] Yuriy Vasilyevich, how do you assess the current state of affairs on the border?

[Shatalin] There are accurate data that say that the military are leaving the area. We are keeping a constant watch on them; we have all our intelligence facilities trained on this, because there is always the possibility that they will stage a new provocation, but in another area where the law-enforcement force is smaller. There is another very important factor that characterizes the situation: Internal Forces and facilities have already arrived to set up security detachments and checkpoints on the Armenian side, thereby establishing a five-kilometer zone along the border.

[Belan] The establishment of this zone, as I understand it, is the result of an accord reached at your meeting with Armenian leaders on Wednesday, is it not?

[Shatalin] To be precise, the decision was made by the Armenian Council of Ministers on 21 August. I learned of it on Wednesday at the meeting with republican

Supreme Soviet Chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan—he gave me the text of the Council of Ministers order on setting up security detachments in Noyemberyanskiy, Idzhevanskiy, and Shamshadinskiy Rayons in the republic of Armenia, on the border with the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The proposal I took to the meeting and the Armenian Council of Ministers' decision coincided at this point. But I was also proposing a state of emergency and curfew in a five-kilometer zone along the entire border, but I did not receive a clear reply.

[Belan] Yuriy Vasilyevich, I would like to hear your impressions of the meeting, how far the accords reached at it inspire confidence that there will be no more bloodshed on the border between the two republics.

[Shatalin] The dialogue was calm, with no irritation and no misunderstandings. I was pleased that Ter-Petrosyan condemned the militants' unlawful actions. Formerly the leadership had sought to justify their every step in some way. Now it was not the case. I believe this is indicative of a changing attitude toward military formations, particularly the Armenian national army, "Tigran-Velikiy," and others, which in principle are no longer under the republican leadership's control. The fact that ways are being sought to control them somehow and bring them within the compass of the law or disband them, gives one hope. I know one thing: Such armed provocations bring suffering and mean human casualties both for the Azerbaijani people and for the Armenian people.

Reportage Continues on Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

20-23 Aug Events Reported

PM2708214190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[News roundup compiled by I. Andreyev: "Transcaucasus: Tension Persists"]

[Text] As we were told at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Center, during the morning of 23 August a GAZ-53 truck near the village of Farukh-Khramort in Askeranskiy Rayon, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, came under fire from Agdanskiy Rayon in the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. A passenger, villager Khanabad Babayan, was wounded by gunshot pellets. In the evening Lenin Kolkhoz [collective farm] machine operator Ambartsumayan was hit and wounded when a smooth-bore weapon was fired from the same place.

Some 10-15 Armenian guerrillas opened fire with automatic weapons from Vaykskiy Rayon in Armenia on militia posts and shepherds in summer pastures near the village of Kyukyu in Shakhbuzskiy Rayon in the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] (Azerbaijan). After the militia fired back the shooting stopped.

Fortunately there was an equally bloodless outcome to an exchange of fire between a small group of Armenian guerrillas and a detachment of the Internal Troops in the vicinity of the village of Shada.

According to Armenian MVD reports, late in the evening of 21 August around 30 persons unknown seized two hail guns, 56 shells for them, and 48 explosive devices from a hail protection detachment in the village of Kurtan. The detachment rifleman took 24 hours to report this incident to the Stepanavanskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department.

On 22 August an armed group of almost 40 men attacked the guard block at the Sanain railroad station. Five "Nagan" revolvers and 35 rounds of ammunition were seized at gunpoint.

As the Armenian MVD reports, a vehicle carrying Armenian license plates came under fire in the vicinity of the Kazakhskiy Rayon village of Barkhudarly in Azerbaijan.

As Major General Yu. Popelskiy, deputy chief of staff of the troops in the sector [voyska napravleniya], reported from Baku at the editorial office's request, on 23 August 17 vehicles belonging to civilian organizations were stolen and driven off in an unknown direction. In Armenia the burial of guerrillas killed in the fighting which they unleashed on Azerbaijani territory has begun.

According to Army data, in Bichenakskiy pass near the border between the Nakhichevan ASSR and Armenia a guerrilla post has been organized on Armenian territory where around 30 armed men have dug themselves in. A tent camp where two operating radio stations had been identified has been destroyed.

On 23 August a military stockpile guard patrol came under fire five kilometers from Yerevan.

Clashes Increase; No Reprieve

NC2808095990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] Despite the measures by the republic's leadership and military command to stabilize the situation, certain irresponsible criminal elements are continuing to foment clashes between the Armenian people and Soviet Army servicemen.

Private Sultanov was attacked on 21 August in Leninakan in order to get his weapon, which was returned after measures were taken.

An armed attack took place against hospital guard Private (?Barantsuk) at 1745 on 22 August in Kirovakan. He was killed and his automatic weapon seized.

A 30- to 40-man group armed with automatic weapons launched an attack on an Army unit at 1930 on 26 August. Resolute measures were taken, and the attack was repulsed. There are victims among the attackers. Three automatic weapons and one machine gun were stolen.

Vehicles are still being seized, military transportation is still being blocked, and military settlements are still being fired upon.

We think that such illegal acts do not create the opportunity for peaceful work but instead exacerbate the situation in the republic.

Militants Continue Fight

PM2708211090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 90 First Edition p 5

[Telephone report by Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "Zone of Despair"]

[Excerpts] Gyandzha-Kazakh-Tbilisi, 24 Aug—Not even 10 minutes had elapsed after our helicopter landed in the settlement of Ashagy Askipara, when a forward air controller ran up, saying breathlessly: "The hail gun has moved into firing position. They are loading it. It will start again in a moment."

The order is terse and inevitable. The first helicopter embarks on the target run and rocket projectiles pepper the slope of the wooded hill. The second helicopter finishes the job with its guns. An oppressive sight. But after everything that has happened here recently, you understand with particular acuteness: Not a single bullet fired at the military will now be forgiven, nor a single volley fired by the militants against peaceful villages. Shots will be answered by shots. Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, flew around the Army outposts and you could see how Valeriy Anisimovich's muscles worked when he examined the signs of destruction. Indeed the very appearance of the countryside had lost its peaceful aspect: You see the fanned-out pattern of trenches with armored personnel carriers installed in them, the positions of other military hardware. The fourth post was the scene of recent fighting, which has already been reported in some detail. [passage omitted]

According to the latest field reports, the situation in this region has become rather more stabilized. But this concept is relative, and does not reflect the whole drama of the situation. According to available information, Armenian militants have not abandoned their intention to inflict new blows on Azerbaijani territory. A gang of bandits has been spotted north of Idzhevan, and rayons where bandit formations are setting up field fortifications are being monitored. As Major General of Internal Troops Yu. Kosolapov, leader of the troops' operations group based in Kazakh, told me, the militants' tactics are becoming more sophisticated and resourceful. They often transport weapons in food trucks and follow behind, "traveling light." They also have other dodges, but the bandits evidently cannot understand the harsh but uncompromising truth: Retribution is inevitable. And the criminals will have to disarm—that is quite unequivocal. There is no alternative.

...As we take off, evening is approaching. Down below is the silence of villages exhausted by the sultry heat. And it seems that nothing can ruin the harmony of nature. Only military helicopters patrolling the hills. Only a disabled hail gun, rearing up clumsily on a hill. Only the bitter admission of Col. Gen. V. Patrikeyev, heard through the noise of the rotor blades: "This is the second district under my command, and I have been in the Army for decades. Did it ever occur to me that I would have to defend my own people against my own people in my native country?"

Border Still Seen as 'Tense'

PM2708204490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Roundup by V. Litovkin: "Transcaucasus: No Letup in Shooting"]

[Text] The situation in the Transcaucasus, especially on the border between the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, remains tense. Field reports from the USSR KGB and reports from the staffs of the Baku and Yerevan garrisons show that the weapons stolen from servicemen, armed security guards, the militia, DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], and training centers are still being used.

Here is just a brief roundup for the past 24 hours.

Kelbadzharskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan. During the night of 23-24 August, the village of Yelmadzha came under fire from the direction of Vardenisskiy Rayon in Armenia. Fortunately there were no casualties.

On 24 August the republic's militia received a report that people of Armenian nationality near Alolar village had kidnapped an Azerbaijani shepherd who was in Armenia's Vardenissky Rayon. Azerbaijan Interior Ministry workers informed their Armenian colleagues. The circumstances of the case are being investigated.

A resident of Azerbaijan's Agdamskiy Rayon who was driving toward Stepanakert was attacked by four unidentified persons using cylinders filled with gas. It was only the approach of a bus which made the attackers flee. The victim was taken to hospital in Agdam city.

Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Dzhulfinskiy Rayon. At around 0200 hours Armenian thugs fired on the Internal Troops outpost near the settlement of Arafsa. The servicemen were forced to return fire. There were no casualties.

Ilichevskiy Rayon, Nakhichevan ASSR. At 1400 hours Avush village came under automatic gunfire from the direction of Yekhegnadzorskiy Rayon in Armenia. There were no casualties.

A report from Armenia. An authorized rally in which over 10,000 people participated took place on Yerevan's Theater Square from 2040 hours to 2140 hours.

Republic leaders also attended the rally. Speakers congratulated the assembly on a noteworthy event— the adoption of a declaration of independence—and demanded that the government take resolute measures to combat the orgy of crime, work for the good of the people, and bring the informal paramilitary formations under the control of the lawful authorities, the republic's Supreme Soviet.

The body of a man named Tevonyan from Akhtanak village was found near Baganiz village on Mount Arsnyakar in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon: He had been shot. A state farm worker born in 1962 died in unexplained circumstances.

Shamshadinskiy Rayon: At around 1800 hours eight helicopters flew in from Azerbaijan's Tauzskiy Rayon. Three of them landed near the village of Verin-Karmirakhlyur, where there were seven hail guns. The Internal Troops and Soviet Army soldiers got out of the helicopters, knocked out the guard protecting the guns—four men—and blew the weapons up.

(Further details from the Baku garrison: The hail guns trained on Alibeyli village in Tauzskiy Rayon were spotted by the helicopter men shortly before the assault force landed. The day before there had been no weapons near the village. In view of the past sorry experience, urgent measures had to be taken to ensure that they did not fire.)

The staff of the Yerevan garrison informed your IZVESTIYA correspondent that the previous night had passed quietly. There were no attacks on military outposts.

One more point. Reports in the republic's press that thugs who stole 165 flamethrowers at the beginning of August from a military unit's dump had returned them are untrue.

Armenians Leave Area

LD2708224990 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 27 Aug 90

[Text] In Armenia the population has been leaving the areas bordering with neighboring Azerbaijan. General Kolesnikov, the chief of staff of Transcaucasian troops, has explained that people have been exhausted by constant shooting, fear, and uncertainty. Armed extremists have been continuing their raids on army units. Yesterday the (Bambakasat) was the site of a battle between militants who took two soldiers and officers hostage and local garrison fighters. The hostages were set free. The shelling of Azerbaijanian villages from Armenia continues. The (?specific) mountain terrain enables militants to escape into the mountains with impunity.

Armenian Fighters 'Liquidated'

LD2808104190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 28 Aug 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] Commenting on recent events in Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy rayon, the republic's interior minister, Mamed Asadov, has said that 74 Armenian fighters have been liquidated in the course of fighting there. He went on to report that under a decision by the Azerbaijan republic's government, a series of measures are to be adopted to disarm gangs operating on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, in Azerbaijan's Shaumyanovskiy rayon, and in the area of the village of Chaykend in Khanlarskiy rayon. Asadov said that there are considerable concentrations of armed Armenian fighters in these villages.

Abkhaziya Rail Blockade Disrupts Traffic

LD2708210190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 27 Aug 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] We are all tired of the interethnic conflicts in various republics, because they not only complicate the situation but cause tens of thousands of passengers to suffer from the railway blockade. Many people have said the railways should be immune from all this.

At midnight last night traffic was again halted on the railway running through Abkhaziya. This time there was a blockade at Sukhumi in protest against the resolution on sovereignty adopted yesterday by the Supreme Soviet of Abkhaziya. The incident made things difficult not only for the railway stations of Sochi but also for the health resort overall. And the passengers had to break their journey and wait for an indefinite time.

Since midnight seven trainloads have been waiting, nearly 2,500 people, including children and old folk. And now people are trying to prevent trains leaving Adler for the north and are trying to halt road traffic, as a way of voicing their protest. It is time for fines against people who play with rail traffic. Today a ship has been organized from Sochi to Sukhumi, and a bus service has also been organized to Gagra and Sukhumi for the train passengers.

A correspondent has just reported that the blockade of the railway was lifted today but owing to the disruption of the rail timetable at the Adler station a large number of northbound and southbound passengers have accumulated.